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AUDIT COMMITTEES AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the impact of audit committee characteristics on financial 
reporting quality in the context of a large sample of UK companies over the period 
2007-2010. The notion of financial reporting quality is assessed by looking at the audit 
quality and earnings quality of the firms. This study utilises the audit fee and non-audit 
fee ratio as its proxies for audit quality and accruals based earnings management 
models as its proxies for earnings quality.  The findings from the multivariate analysis 
show that audit committee meetings and financial expertise exert a significant positive 
impact on audit fees.  Investigating expertise further, this study finds no support for 
the notion that accounting expertise influences audit fees, however a significant 
positive influence on audit fees is recorded for the non-accounting financial expertise. 
However, the holding of additional directorships has a significant negative impact on 
audit fees. This study also finds that audit committee members' financial expertise has 
a negative and significant impact on non-audit fee ratio suggesting a strong support of 
members with financial expertise on issues relating to auditor independence. The 
study also documents that audit committee members serving longer on the boards do 
not prefer to purchase high amount of non-audit services from the incumbent auditor.  
This study also records a significant positive impact of the holding of additional 
directorships on the provision of non-audit fee ratio, thus signifying a profound 
support for the busyness hypothesis which argues that overstretched directors are not 
very good monitors of financial reporting quality.   
 
Furthermore, this study finds broadly consistent evidence that audit committees 
meeting three or more times per year and fully independent audit committees exert a 
significant positive impact on the quality of reported earnings. This study also finds 
some evidence (depending on the earnings model used) that the level of ownership of 
audit committee members also exerts a positive impact on the quality of reported 
earnings, highlighting the fact that audit committee members with an equity stake in 
their companies are considered more effective in their oversight of the financial 
reporting process. On the other hand, this study finds evidence that the busyness of 
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audit committee members (busyness defined in terms of the holding of board seats in 
other companies) has a significant negative impact on the quality of reported earnings. 
The composite variables (i.e. ACE1, ACE2, ACE3 and ACE4) representing those 
companies that satisfy all aspects of current best practice in terms of audit committee 
composition and operation, has a positive impact on the quality of reported earnings. 
 
This study covers the period 2007 to 2010 and therefore offers a contemporary 
analysis of the influence of audit committee characteristics on financial reporting 
quality. The study is very comprehensive in its scope not only in the selection of audit 
committee characteristics and methods employed to quantify these characteristics, 
but also in the use of various proxies developed to capture the true essence of 
financial reporting quality.  The choice of multiple measurement methods both for the 
dependent and independent variables facilitates a much richer investigation into the 
relationship between governance and financial reporting quality variables.  Therefore 
this study makes a major contribution to our understanding of the association 
between the various audit committee characteristics and financial reporting quality in 
the wake of recently introduced regulatory recommendations.  These findings will also 
have policy implications as regulators around the world continue to define and refine 
the desired characteristics and behaviour of audit committees.  Therefore, the findings 
of this study will ensure future policy changes regarding audit committees are 
adequately informed.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides an introduction to this research thesis.  It begins by discussing 
the development and role of audit committees in the current corporate governance 
environment.  Section two outlines the motivation for this study, including a discussion 
of the study’s main aim as well as a summary of the specific research objectives the 
study seeks to address.  Section three presents an explanation of the contribution this 
research makes to our understanding of the governance role of audit committees.  
Section four summarises the research methodology being used, including a discussion 
of the sample and some of the key variables used in the subsequent analysis.  The final 
section of this chapter presents an overview of the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1 The Development and Governance Role of Audit Committees 
The audit committee is defined as “a committee established by and amongst the board 
of directors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial 
reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer” 
(SOX Act, 2002, p29). It forms part of the governance structure of a company and is 
arguably the most important and challenging sub-committee of any company's board 
of directors. It is seen as a guardian of a company's financial integrity (Rezaee, 2005) 
and “has the potential to improve the quality of financial reporting by reviewing the 
financial statements on behalf of the board” (Cadbury, 1992, p67).  As noted by Collier 
(1996) and Fichtner (2010), among others, the origin of audit committees can be 
traced back to the aftermath of the McKesson & Robbins Inc. fraud in the late 1930s 
when the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) recommended that external auditors should be selected by a special 
committee composed of non-officer board members. Interest in audit committees was 
revived in the 1970s, when a series of corporate failures motivated regulators in the 
US to recommend that listed firms should possess an independent audit committee. 
Indeed, Sommer (1991) cites a 1989 Korn/Ferry International survey of boards of 
directors which found that 97.7% of responding companies had an audit committee. 
By 1977, the NYSE required all listed companies to possess an audit committee. Over 
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the next 20 years or so a number of other commissions in the US sought to further 
reinforce the quality of audit committees but, importantly, without recourse to 
legislation. However, this was to change in the aftermath of the Enron collapse in 2001. 
 
The history of audit committees in the UK is a much more recent phenomenon. Collier 
(1996) points out that audit committees were virtually non-existent prior to 1979 and 
only began to be formed in earnest in the early 1990s, not least as a result of the 
Cadbury Committee (1992), which recommended that all listed companies establish 
‘properly constituted audit committees as an important step in raising standards of 
corporate governance’ (p29). The central component of Cadbury’s appropriate test 
was that audit committees should comprise a minimum of three non-executives. In the 
years immediately following the Cadbury Committee (1992) recommendations, 
virtually all UK-listed companies established audit committees, and in a subsequent 
report of compliance the Cadbury Committee (1995) showed widespread compliance 
with the original recommendations. Therefore, by the end of the 1990s, both the US 
and the UK had in place a system of regulation whereby listed companies were 
expected to possess independent audit committees. However, the dramatic failure of 
Enron in the US in 2001, despite the presence of a significant level of audit committee 
self-regulation, forced a re-think on the part of regulators and governments, not only 
in the US and UK, but throughout the developed world (Fichtner, 2010). 
 
The failure of Enron in 2001 initiated a significant amount of additional audit 
committee regulation both in the US and elsewhere. In the US, the most obvious 
response was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US House of Representatives, Committee on 
Financial Services 2002), which focused on ‘the protection of investors and consequent 
restoration of confidence in the nation’s financial markets’ (Elson and Gyves 2003, p. 
10). A key mechanism provided by the Act in pursuit of this objective was the creation 
of invigorated audit committees. Specifically, SOX requires that every public company’s 
audit committee be composed of independent directors and at least one member 
must, either through education or experience, qualify as a financial expert. The audit 
committee is also responsible for determining the level of non-audit services provided 
by the external auditor and is directly responsible for the hiring, fee negotiation and 
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general oversight of the external auditing process.  Finally, the audit committee is 
required to provide procedures through which an employee is able to report 
questionable accounting or auditing matters. In the UK, the response was the 
establishment of the Smith Review (Smith Committee 2003) which provided a detailed 
set of recommendations for improving the governance role of audit committees1, and 
these were subsequently included in the revised version of the Combined Code 
published in 2003. Importantly, the UK response was not legislative, but continued the 
tradition of self-regulation, which has been a hallmark of UK governance for the past 
20 years, whereby listed companies are encouraged to comply with the 
recommendations of the Combined Code, but are also at liberty not to do so, provided 
an appropriate explanation is provided in the annual report. The similarities with SOX 
are striking though in that the Smith Report (Smith Committee, 2003) 
recommendations include the suggestion that all audit committee members should be 
independent directors; at least one of whom should have recent and relevant financial 
experience; the audit committee should have primary responsibility for all aspects of 
the company’s relationship with the external auditors; the committee should make an 
annual report to shareholders, to include an explanation as to how the auditor’s 
objectivity and independence is maintained in cases where the auditor is also 
employed to provide non-audit services to the company. However, the Smith Report 
(2003) also included greater prescription than previously with recommendations that: 
there should be at least three members (two in the case of smaller companies); 
members should not serve for more than two three-year terms; and there should be a 
minimum of three meetings per year. 
 
Subsequent revisions of the Combined Code in 2006 and 2008 as well as the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council 2010) have essentially carried 
forward the existing recommendations for audit committees as suggested by the Smith 
Report (Smith Committee, 2003). It should also be noted that similar regulatory 
                                                          
1
 The main role and responsibilities of an audit committee should be to: monitor the integrity of the financial 
statements of the company; monitor and review the effectiveness of the company’s internal audit function; make 
recommendations in relation to the appointment and remuneration of the external auditor; monitor the external 
auditor’s independence and effectiveness; develop and implement policy with regards to the supply of non-audit 
services by the external auditor (Smith Committee 2003). 
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initiatives were introduced in many other countries. For example, Australia, New 
Zealand, Spain, Singapore and China all now require audit committees to have a 
majority of independent members, possess an independent chair, possess at least one 
financial expert, be responsible for the selection, appointment and removal of the 
external auditor and review the effectiveness of the internal audit function. Further 
information on the audit committee requirements of selected countries is included in 
Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 - Overview of Audit Committee Requirements: International Comparison 
Overview of Audit Committee Requirements: International Comparison 
Feature U.S. U.K. Australia New Zealand Spain Singapore China 
Regulation Sarbanes-Oxley act 
(U.S House of 
representatives, 
Committee on 
financial Services 
2002) 
The UK Corporate 
Governance Code 
(U.K. Financial 
Reporting Council 
2010) 
The Australian 
stock exchange 
Corporate 
Governance 
Principles and 
recommendations 
with 2010 
amendments (ASX 
2010) 
New Zealand 
Securities 
Commission 
(2004): Corporate 
Governance in 
New Zealand: 
Principles and 
Guidelines 
Unified Code on 
Good Corporate 
Governance 
(Spanish Securities 
Market 
Commission 2006) 
The Singapore 
Code of Corporate 
Governance 
(Singapore Council 
on Corporate 
Disclosure and 
Governance 2005) 
China Securities 
Regulatory 
Commission: Code 
of Corporate 
Governance for 
Listed Companies 
in China (China 
Securities 
Regulatory 
Commission 2007) 
Formation Mandated by law 
and listing rules 
Voluntary “comply 
or explain” 
approach* 
Voluntary “comply 
or explain” 
approach 
Voluntary “comply 
or explain” 
approach 
Voluntary “comply 
or explain” 
approach 
Voluntary “comply 
or explain” 
approach 
Voluntary 
Composition All directors must 
be independent 
Recommends at 
least three 
directors be 
independent 
Recommends all 
directors be 
nonexecutive 
Recommends 
majority 
independence 
Recommends 
independent chair 
who is not chair of 
the board 
Recommends all 
directors be 
nonexecutive 
Recommends 
majority 
independence 
Recommends 
independent chair 
who is not chair of 
the board 
Recommends all 
directors be 
nonexecutive 
Recommends 
majority 
independence 
Recommends 
independent chair  
Recommends all 
directors be 
nonexecutive 
Recommends 
majority 
independence 
Recommends 
independent chair  
Recommends 
audit committee 
comprise solely of 
directors 
Recommends 
majority 
independence 
Recommends 
independent chair  
Financial expert One expert, must 
be independent 
Recommends one 
expert, need not 
be independent 
Recommends at 
least one expert, 
need not be 
independent  
Recommends at 
least one expert, 
need not be 
independent 
Recommends all 
members possess 
accounting, 
finance and 
management 
knowledge and 
experience 
Recommends at 
least two experts, 
preferably both 
independent 
Recommends at 
least one 
accounting 
professional who 
is an independent 
director 
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Feature U.S. U.K. Australia New Zealand Spain Singapore China 
 
Financial literacy All directors must 
be financially 
literate 
Recommends all 
directors be 
financially literate 
Recommends all 
directors be 
financially literate 
Silent Silent Recommends all 
directors be 
financially literate 
 
Silent 
Resources to hire 
advisor 
Can hire expert 
advice under law 
Company must 
provide funding to 
hire expert advisor 
Silent Silent Silent May engage 
external advisors 
Code states audit 
committee should 
have access to 
resources to carry 
out its functions; 
does not 
specifically 
address hiring of 
an advisor 
May engage 
intermediary 
institutions to 
provide 
professional 
opinions, the 
relevant expenses 
to be borne by the 
company 
 
External audit Appoint, 
compensate, and 
oversee work of 
CPA firm providing 
audit or related 
services 
Assess and review 
auditor’s 
independence 
Pre approve audit 
and non audit 
services provided 
by the auditor 
Recommend 
appointment and 
compensation of 
the auditor 
Monitor 
effectiveness of 
the audit  
Review auditor’s 
independence 
Does not specify 
audit committee 
pre approve non 
audit services 
provided by the 
auditor 
Recommend 
appointment and 
removal of the 
auditor, and 
rotation of 
engagement 
partners 
Review auditor’s 
independence and 
performance 
Does not specify 
audit committee 
pre approve non 
audit services 
provided by the 
auditor  
 
 
Encourages audit 
committee to 
recommend 
appointment of 
auditor 
Oversee entity-
auditor 
relationship 
Does not specify 
audit committee 
pre approve non 
audit services 
provided by the 
auditor 
Responsible for 
the selection, 
appointment, 
reappointment 
and removal of the 
external auditor 
Review auditor 
independence 
Ensure company 
and audit adhere 
to current 
regulations on the 
provision of non 
audit services 
Recommend 
appointment and 
compensation of 
the auditor 
Review auditor’s 
independence 
Does not specify 
audit committee 
pre approve non 
audit services 
provided by the 
auditor 
Recommend the 
engagement or 
replacement of 
the auditor 
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Feature U.S. U.K. Australia New Zealand Spain Singapore China 
 
Internal control Responsible under 
the law (SOX) to 
monitor the design 
and operating 
effectiveness of 
the internal 
control system; 
review 
management and 
auditor’s report on 
internal controls 
Review internal 
controls 
Review 
effectiveness of 
internal audit 
function, if any 
Review internal 
controls 
Assess the 
performance and 
objectivity of the 
internal audit 
function 
Silent Supervise and 
review the internal 
audit function, if 
any 
If no internal audit 
function then 
audit committee 
monitors the 
integrity of the 
internal control 
systems 
Ensure a review of 
internal control is 
conducted either 
by the internal or 
external auditor 
Review 
effectiveness of 
internal audit 
function, if any 
Monitor internal 
controls 
Review the 
internal audit 
system and its 
execution 
*If companies fail to follow recommended practices, they are required to disclose the reasons for not doing so, including any alternative processes or 
mechanisms in place. 
            Source: Adapted from Sharma et al. (2009) 
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Even though this section summarizes the development and current state of audit 
committee regulation, it should be noted that the regulation of audit committees 
continues to evolve. With specific reference to the UK, both the European Union EU) 
and the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) are currently in the process of consulting on 
further regulatory changes. On 30 November 2011, the European Commission outlined 
a number of proposals designed to enhance the independence and technical 
competence of audit committees within the EU (European Commission 2011). While 
these proposals cover many aspects of the audit process for listed companies, the 
proposals of specific relevance to audit committees can be seen to cover audit 
committee composition and responsibility. In terms of composition, the proposals 
state that: audit committees should be comprised of only non-executive directors, a 
majority of whom should be independent; at least one member must have 
competence in auditing and another member must have competence in accounting 
and/or auditing; and the committee members as a whole must have competence 
relevant to the sector in which their firm is operating. In terms of responsibility, the 
proposals state that the audit committee should: supervise the completeness and 
integrity of the draft audit report; authorize, on a case by case basis, the provision by 
the statutory auditor of those non-audit services that are still permitted under the 
proposed reforms; and the overseeing of other aspects of the reforms such as audit 
rotation, audit tendering and the supply of non-audit services. These proposals still 
need to be discussed both by the EU Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. 
In view of the radical nature of the proposals, at present it is difficult to know when, or 
in what form, these proposals will eventually become part of the regulatory 
architecture. 
 
In April 2012, the FRC proposed changes to the guidance on audit committees 
currently provided in the UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council 
2010). In particular, it proposes that FTSE 350 companies will be expected to put the 
audit contract out to tender at least every 10 years. The audit committee is expected 
to report to the main board of directors on the following three specific areas: (i) any 
significant issues that it considered in relation to the financial statements and how 
these were addressed; (ii) whether the annual report is fair, balanced and 
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understandable and provides the information necessary for users to assess the 
company’s performance, business model and strategy; and (iii) its assessment of the 
effectiveness of the external audit process and its recommendation on the 
appointment or reappointment of the external auditor, including the steps taken in 
deciding whether or not to recommend that the audit be put out to tender (FRC, 2012). 
The FRC is currently consulting on these changes, but it is anticipated that they will be 
incorporated in the UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council 2010) 
with effect from financial years commencing on or after 1 October 2012. 
 
1.2 Motivation for Study and Research Objectives 
Over the years there have been major irregularities in the way companies have 
reported financial information in their annual reports (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, etc). In 
more recent times, many financial institutions have either collapsed or needed 
rescuing by governments despite having unqualified audit reports. These 
developments have focused attention on the quality of reported financial statements 
and encouraged regulators and researchers to seek ways of improving the integrity 
and quality of the financial reporting process.  The audit committee is a central 
element of such reforms with successive governance reports both in the UK and US 
recommending the use of appropriately constituted audit committees to co-ordinate 
and monitor all aspects of the company’s financial reporting process (Smith, 2003; Blue 
Ribbon, 1999; Cadbury, 1992). Indeed, the existence of an appropriately constituted 
audit committee is now a necessity for all listed companies in the UK and US (The UK 
Corporate Governance Code, 2010; Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002), with corporate governance 
regulation placing significant importance on the role of the AC.  Therefore, there is a 
profound need to explore the features of audit committees in the UK context, the 
changing nature of its characteristics and association of these characteristics with the 
financial reporting process. 
 
The widespread use of audit committees and a quick glance at corporate governance 
guidelines (The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010) highlights the importance 
placed on the role of appropriately constituted audit committee in monitoring the 
financial reporting process. Various regulatory committees’ reports (BRC, 1999; 
10 
 
Cadbury, 2002; Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002; ASX, 2003; Smith Report, 2003) have 
recommended that a number of characteristics are important for an audit committee 
to perform its role competently and effectively. The Smith Report (2003, p3) notes that 
while all directors of a company need to act in the interest of the company, the audit 
committee has an even more focused role in ensuring, independently from the 
executive, that the interests of the shareholders in relation to financial reporting 
quality are protected.   The notion of financial reporting quality is tantamount to the 
effectiveness of the external audit process and overseeing the external audit process is 
the prime responsibility of the audit committees. The notion of financial reporting 
quality is also synonymous with the ‘true and fair’ view of financial statements that is 
expected by shareholders. One way of ensuring financial statements are ‘true and fair’ 
is by assessing the quality of earnings presented in these statements.  If the audit 
committee is effective in its role then earnings quality will not be compromised.  The 
quality of earnings stands as an indirect measure of the efficiency of the audit 
committee.  Thus assessing earnings quality is a good way of investigating audit 
committee (including different characteristics) efficiency.  
 
Therefore the purpose of this research study is to examine the impact of audit 
committee characteristics on financial reporting quality in the context of a large 
sample of UK companies over the period 2007-2010. To achieve the desired objective, 
this study investigates the following research questions: 
1 Do audit committee characteristics (including: size, independence, 
expertise, meetings, busyness, share ownership and tenure) influence the 
quality of external audit in UK companies? 
2 Do audit committee characteristics (including: size, independence, 
expertise, meetings, busyness, share ownership and tenure) influence the 
quality of earnings in UK companies? 
 
1.3 Contribution of Study to our Understanding of Audit Committees 
This research makes a number of key contributions to the literature on audit 
committees and financial reporting quality.  First, this research examines the influence 
of various audit committee characteristics (i.e. size, independence, expertise, meetings, 
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equity ownership, busyness and tenure) on financial reporting quality using UK 
companies’ data. The scope of the study (e.g. 1400 firm-year observations from the 
largest 350 companies listed on London Stock Exchange covering a time span of four 
years) makes a valuable addition to the literature by providing some conclusive 
evidence on the governance effects of audit committees in many areas where audit 
committees have been expected to bring governance benefits but where prior 
research findings were either inconclusive or very limited (Peasnell et al., 2005; Baxter 
and Cotter, 2009; Zaman et al,. 2011).  
 
This study covers the period 2007 to 2010 and therefore offers a contemporary 
analysis of the influence of audit committee characteristics on financial reporting 
quality. This study is very comprehensive in its scope not only in the selection of audit 
committee characteristics and methods employed to quantify these characteristics, 
but also in the use of various proxies developed to capture the true essence of 
financial reporting quality.  The choice of multiple measurement methods both for the 
dependent and independent variables facilitates a much richer investigation into the 
relationship between governance and financial reporting quality variables.  Therefore 
this study makes a major contribution to our understanding of the association 
between the various audit committee characteristics and financial reporting quality in 
the wake of recently introduced regulatory recommendations. In this study the 
researcher is measuring the impact of expertise of audit committee members on 
financial reporting quality by looking at five different dimensions of expertise. These 
dimensions include; governance expertise, overall financial expertise of an audit 
committee (i.e. accounting, finance and supervisory expertise), audit committee 
members with accounting financial expertise and audit committee’s non-accounting 
expertise.  The importance of such in-depth analysis presents a fuller picture as to the 
nature of governance and financial expertise which helps constitute an effective audit 
committee.  For similar reasons the busyness of audit committee members is also 
measured in four different ways.  With members being considered less busy if they 
hold one other main market directorship, busy if they hold two other main market 
directorships and very busy if they hold three or more other main market directorships, 
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and also examining the overall busyness of the audit committees and its impact on 
financial reporting quality.   
 
This study also seeks to establish the impact of the tenure of audit committee 
members on financial reporting quality. Recent regulatory reforms call for rigorous 
review of independent directors after the sixth year of their appointment and 
questions the independence of these members after the appointment exceeds nine 
years (The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010). The findings of this study, therefore, 
are important in that it provides us a rare insight of the impact of the tenure of audit 
committee members on financial reporting quality. Other than these traits, this study 
also measures the impact of equity ownership of audit committee members on 
financial reporting quality. It is argued that audit committee members perform better 
if audit committee members have an equity stake in the firm. Hence this study 
provides some much needed empirical evidence to back up this important but 
previously untested area in the UK.   
 
This study also seeks to establish an appropriate independence level for audit 
committees by measuring the impact of fully and proportionate independent audit 
committees on financial reporting quality. The findings in relation to the independence 
of these directors are an important contribution and unique in a way that for the first 
time the notion of independence is measured using independent directors and not just 
‘non executive directors’. The study also tests recommended best practice in relation 
to audit committee size and meetings as well as the corresponding absolute values of 
these variables. This is particularly important as the literature generally suggests that 
higher levels of audit committee independence, size and diligence result in positive 
outcomes, however the question still remains as to the actual level (of independence, 
size and diligence) needed to achieve these outcomes.  This is an important issue 
which the current study seeks to explore.  This study utilises a composite measure of 
audit committee effectiveness from Zaman et al., (2011), a dummy variable 
representing those firms whose audit committees satisfy all four of the recommended 
characteristics (ACE1). The study also introduces three new composite measures to 
capture audit committee effectiveness. Firstly ACE1 is extended to include both the 
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presence of an accounting expert and the absence of members with excess of nine 
years’ tenure (ACE2).  The other two measures (ACE3 and ACE4) include variables 
representing the accumulated score for each of these four and six variables used in 
ACE1 and ACE2 respectively.  
 
The study provides support to the board of directors in understanding the important 
characteristics of the board and audit committees that play a key role in the quality of 
financial reporting and hence enhance the overall financial reporting process.   This 
study is also equally important to market/financial analysts as the findings of this study 
in terms of the monitoring mechanisms and the resulting overall financial reporting 
quality can be used to effectively assess and gauge the market perception of FTSE 350 
firms.  These findings will also have policy implications as regulators around the world 
continue to define and refine the desired characteristics and behaviour of audit 
committees.  Therefore the findings of this study will ensure future policy changes 
regarding audit committees are adequately informed.   
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
Agency theory provides the main theoretical underpinnings for this study and 
determines to a great extent the approach used in the study.  This study takes a 
quantitative research focus in order to answer the research questions outlined above.  
A sample of FTSE 350 companies from the London Stock Exchange is selected and their 
annual reports are used as the primary source for data collection. These annual reports 
are either obtained directly from the companies’ websites or accessed using FAME 
database. The audit committee variables and other board variables data are collected 
by hand and financial statement data items are accessed using DataStream, Thomson 
One Banker and FAME databases. This study employs panel data analysis and hence 
data is collected over a period of 4 years from 2007-2010.  This research study is 
introducing new measures to quantify audit committee financial expertise, its 
busyness and the directors’ length of tenure. This study is also using new measures to 
quantify audit committee size, its independence and the numbers of meetings it holds 
during the year. Other than using different variables to quantify audit committee 
characteristics, this study explores the notion of financial reporting quality by 
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investigating the impact of audit committee characteristics on audit fees and non-audit 
fee ratio as well as by employing two different earnings management models to assess 
the impact of governance characteristics on financial reporting quality, thereby making 
analysis more rigorous and reducing any issues of data validity and reliability. 
 
1.5 Structure of Thesis 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the vast empirical literature that exists in the area of 
corporate governance, audit committee characteristics and financial reporting quality.  
The first section of the chapter seeks to review the ever expanding academic literature 
on the governance role of audit committees.  Prior reading on this area suggests that 
the literature can be categorised into a number of different sections:  (i) the impact of 
audit committees on statutory audit; (ii) the impact of audit committees on the quality 
of financial statements (iii) the market reaction to audit committees and their 
characteristics; and (iv) the role of audit committees in the context of the internal 
audit function.   After reviewing this section of literature, the chapter then considers 
the role of audit committees in influencing financial reporting quality.  The purpose of 
this section is to introduce the dual measures of financial reporting quality analysed in 
the study; earnings quality and audit quality.  To this end, this section of the chapter 
firstly discusses audit quality, in particular focusing on both audit effort and audit 
independence as measures of audit quality.  The studies analysing the role of audit 
committees and audit quality are then discussed.  This is followed by a discussion on 
earnings quality and the different methods used by prior studies to understand 
earnings management in the literature.  This section also introduces studies that have 
sought to understand audit committee characteristics and their influence on earnings 
quality.  Finally, the chapter brings all sections together and provides a brief overview 
of the actual subject under consideration in this thesis, i.e.  to understand audit quality 
and earnings quality as construct of financial reporting quality and their linkage with 
audit committees. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the research method employed in the study.  The chapter begins by 
explaining the theoretical paradigm in which this thesis is located. This section 
discusses the appropriateness of using agency theory and its assumptions to underpin 
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the research. The chapter also outlines the research questions to be investigated and 
discusses the development of the specific hypotheses this study is seeking to 
investigate.  The hypothesis development section draws heavily from the literature 
reviewed in the previous chapter.   In particular hypothesis related to financial 
reporting quality and audit committee size, expertise, meetings, tenure, share 
ownership, busyness and effectiveness are presented.  Following this the chapter 
justifies the choice of sample selection and the data collection methods employed in 
the study.  Due to the empirical nature of the study, a significant portion of this 
chapter is devoted to identify and justify the dependent and independent variables to 
be used in analysis.  The chapter also explains in detail how the dependent variables 
(i.e. financial reporting quality) are measured, both in terms of audit quality and in 
terms of earnings quality.  The measurement of independent variables are also 
discussed here (i.e. audit committee size, expertise, meetings, tenure, share ownership, 
busyness and effectiveness. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the 
regression models employed to examine audit committee characteristics and both 
audit quality and earnings quality.  The statistical techniques used in the univariate and 
bivariate analysis are also explained.   
 
Chapter 4 provides a detailed analysis and discussion of the impact of various audit 
committee characteristics on audit fees and non-audit fee ratio.  The analysis section 
begins by outlining a comprehensive descriptive analysis of the variables utilised in the 
first empirical. This is followed by a detailed univariate analyses that highlights the 
significant differences in the mean and mean rank values of various audit committee 
variables for firms that are large in size compared to firms that are small in size.  The 
study then includes a correlation matrix showing a two way Pearson correlation 
between the variables included in this study. Finally this study presents the results of a 
detailed multivariate regression analysis based on pooled dataset that investigates the 
hypotheses set out in the previous chapter. The multivariate analysis includes a robust 
investigation of the impact of various audit committee characteristics on audit quality 
by utilising audit fee and non-audit fee ratio as measures to capture audit quality. 
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Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the impact of various 
audit committee characteristics on firms' earnings management practices.  The chapter 
begins with a detailed descriptive analysis of the audit committee and earnings 
management variables utilized in this study. Similar to first empirical presented in the 
previous chapter, a detailed univariate analyses is included to highlight the significant 
differences in the mean and mean rank values of various audit committee variables for 
firms that are large in size compared to firms that are small in size. The study then 
includes a correlation matrix showing a two way Pearson correlation between the 
variables included in this study. Finally the researcher presents the results of a detailed 
multivariate regression analysis that includes a robust investigation of the impact of 
various audit committee characteristics on earnings quality. The notion of earnings 
quality is measured by using two earnings management models namely McNichols 
(2002) and Francis et al., (2005). 
 
Chapter 6 then brings together the analyses and discussion conducted in the previous 
chapters and provides conclusions and recommendations on this study and any future 
research potential.  This chapter also discusses research limitations of the study.   
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Introduction 
Developing in parallel with the various policy initiatives surrounding audit committees 
is a rapidly expanding academic literature seeking to investigate various aspects of the 
governance role of audit committees.  Initial work in this area developed largely from 
agency theory and viewed audit committees as a potentially useful tool in seeking to 
reduce agency problems between shareholders and managers. Early research 
therefore focused on such issues as the determinants of audit committee formation 
(Pincus et al., 1989; Collier, 1993), with a particular interest both in the influence of 
specific governance characteristics on audit committee formation (Bradbury, 1990) as 
well as trying to ascertain whether the formation of an audit committee served to 
improve governance and accountability in firms (Wild, 1994).  The findings of these 
early studies are important as they provide a rare insight into the influences and 
determinants of the voluntary formation of audit committees and the governance 
consequences of such audit committee formation in a relatively unregulated 
governance environment.  However, research has moved on considerably from these 
early studies and now focuses on different avenues of research.  The first section of 
this chapter will therefore review the more up to date literature concerning the 
governance role of audit committees.  The second section of the chapter then 
considers the role of audit committees in influencing financial reporting quality.  To 
this end, this section provides an overview of both audit quality and earnings quality as 
construct of financial reporting quality and their linkage with audit committees. 
 
2.1 The Governance Role of Audit Committees 
The widespread adoption of audit committees as one of the key tools of governance 
reform from the early 1990s changed the nature of academic enquiry away from issues 
surrounding formation to more focused studies on audit committee characteristics and 
impact.  These issues have motivated a vast amount of empirical research, which this 
chapter seeks to review.  For the purposes of reviewing this literature it is useful to 
segregate this work into four streams: (i) the impact of audit committees on the 
statutory audit; (ii) the impact of audit committees on the quality of financial 
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statements; (iii) the market reaction to audit committees and their characteristics; and 
(iv) the role of audit committees in the context of the internal audit function. 
 
The next section reviews existing studies that have examined the role of audit 
committees in influencing audit quality.  Issues covered here include how audit 
committees perceive “audit quality”, audit committee behaviour in the context of 
manager-external auditor conflicts, the influence of audit committees on external 
auditor behaviour and the choice of external auditor, as well as the interaction 
between audit committees and other governance mechanisms.  Section 2.1.2 
examines the influence of audit committees on the quality of a firm’s financial 
statements.  Work in this stream seeks to examine whether audit committees and 
their characteristics impact on the presence and extent of financial misstatements 
and/or restatements.  Section 2.1.3 examines the market reaction to specific audit 
committee issues.  This area of enquiry focuses almost exclusively on the positive or 
negative share price reaction to specific audit committee “events”, often the market 
reaction to appointments of new members, more recently focusing on reaction to their 
level of audit/accounting expertise.  Section 2.1.4 investigates the interaction between 
audit committees and companies’ internal audit departments.  Much of this strand of 
research focuses on the characteristics of audit committees and the quality of internal 
auditing in order to explore how these two key mechanisms of internal governance 
interact.  Section 2.1.5 brings together and summarises the governance role of audit 
committees. 
 
2.1.1 Audit Committees and the Statutory Audit Process   
Even from the earliest days, audit committees were viewed as an important 
mechanism in seeking to improve the statutory audit process.  The stream of research 
looking at the relationship between audit committees and audit quality has sought to 
examine this from a number of different perspectives such as:  trying to understand 
how audit committees themselves perceive audit quality (Schroeder et al., 1986; 
Knapp, 1991); investigating audit committee behaviour in the event of auditor-
manager conflict (Knapp, 1987; Dezoort et al., 2003a; Bierstaker et al., 2012); the 
interaction between audit committees and external auditor behaviour (Collier and 
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Gregory, 1996; Abbott et al. 2003a; Zaman et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2012); and the role 
of audit committees on the choice of external auditor (Chen et al., 2005; Chen and 
Zhou, 2007).  Table 2.1 contains details and summarises the key findings of each of the 
studies undertaken in the area of audit committees and audit quality. 
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Table 2.1:  Audit Committees and the Statutory Audit Process  
 
Author (Date) and Journal  Research Method Key Findings 
Eichenseher and Shields (1985) 
Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy 
An analysis of 128 US firms listed on 
AMEX that reported a change in auditors 
between 1973 and 1978. 
Companies were more likely to form ACs following auditor changes if the new auditor was a Big 
Eight firm.    Companies switching to Big Eight auditors were more likely to have ACs than 
companies switching to non-Big Eight auditors. 
Schroeder et al (1986) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory 
A survey of 81 AC chairpersons and 41 
audit partners in Fortune 500 firms. 
AC chairpersons perceive ‘level of partner/manager attention given to the audit’ and ‘planning 
and conduct of audit team work’, as more important factors in influencing audit quality than 
either the ‘reputation of audit firm’ or ‘total audit fee charged.’   
Knapp (1987) 
The Accounting Review 
 
An experimental study using 179 AC 
members as subjects (drawn from the 
1985 annual reports of Californian firms) 
AC members with specific background (i.e. corporate managers) support auditors rather than 
management. They also provide support to auditors when relative professional standards are 
objective and when the financial condition of the audited firm is poor. 
Haka and Chalos (1990) 
Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy 
A mailed questionnaire sent to a random 
selection of 200 firms among Fortune 
500. 
The findings indicate the presence of an agency conflict between management and AC chairs with 
regard to financial disclosure and discretionary accounting choices.  However, there is no 
significant perceptual difference between the internal and external auditors and the AC chair. 
Knapp (1991) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory 
A hypothetical situation analysis of AC 
members drawn from 192 publicly 
trading firms. 
AC members perceive that size of the auditor and the auditor tenure has a significant influence on 
the quality of the audit service provided. 
Menon and Williams (1994) 
Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy 
The sample in this study consists of a 
random selection of 200 over the 
counter firms in 1986 and 1987. 
57 ACs met only once or did not meet at all and 19 of the ACs had inside managers as members. A 
close link found between the formation of an AC and the presence of big 8 auditor but there is no 
link between use/reliance of AC and the big 8 auditor. 
Collier and Gregory (1996) 
The European Accounting Review 
An analysis of 315 FTSE 500 firms 
in1991. 
There is a positive and significant relationship between audit fees (size-related) and the presence 
of an AC. There is also a negative relationship between the presence of an AC and audit fees (risk- 
and complexity-related). 
Collier and Gregory (1999) 
Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy 
An analysis of 142 major UK companies 
listed on LSE. 
A positive relationship found between AC activity (meeting duration) and high quality (Big 6) 
auditors and leverage (cost of debt). AC activity is significantly lower in firms where the chairman 
and the chief executive roles are combined.  The presence of executive directors (insiders) on an 
AC had a significant negative impact on AC activity. 
 
O’Sullivan (1999) 
The European Accounting Review 
An analysis of the 1995 financial 
statements of 146 large non-financial 
listed companies in the UK. 
 
This study shows that corporate governance mechanisms such as board and AC characteristics do 
not influence auditors’ pricing decisions subsequent to the Cadbury reforms. 
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Author (Date) and Journal  Research Method Key Findings 
Abbott and Parker (2000) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory 
A sample of 500 companies listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ exchanges in 
1994. 
More active and independent ACs are positively associated with the selection of an industry 
specialist auditor. The results are significant only with respect to a composite measure that 
defines effective audit committees as those that meet minimum thresholds of both activity (a 
minimum of 2 meetings per year) and independence (AC composed of outside directors). 
Carcello and Neal (2000) 
The Accounting Review 
 
A sample of 223 non-financial 
companies that were financially 
distressed based on 1994 data. 
Firms with a high proportion of affiliated directors on their ACs are less likely to receive going 
concern audit reports. 
Archambeault and Dezoort (2001) 
International Journal of Auditing 
The sample consisted of 60 publicly 
traded U.S. companies from the period 
1994-1996. 
Companies with suspicious auditor switching are less likely to have an AC, have less independent 
directors on the AC, have less members with accounting and finance experience, are small in size 
and are less active than the non-switching companies. 
Dezoort and Salterio (2001) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory 
An experimental study involving a 
sample of 68 AC members taken from 
largest 500 Canadian firms. 
A positive association was found between the number of directorships and the AC support for 
auditors in an auditor-management dispute. Study also confirms a positive relationship between 
the audit-reporting knowledge of AC’s members and their support for auditor s.  However, no 
association is found between AC members’ financial reporting knowledge and their support for 
auditors. 
 
Carcello et al (2002b) 
Contemporary Accounting Research 
 
A survey of 258 companies audited by 
big 6 auditors from the Fortune 1000 list 
in 1993. 
There is a positive and significant relationship between board independence (percentage of 
outside directors), diligence (number of meetings), and expertise (other directorships held) and 
audit fees. Study also finds a positive and significant association between audit fee and AC 
independence and expertise but finds no significant relationship between the audit fee and 
frequency of AC meetings. 
Cohen et al (2002) 
Contemporary Accounting Research 
Interviews with 36 practicing auditors 
from the U.S. 
 
Respondents see ACs as less important and less significant in the corporate governance mosaic. 
Several participants expressed their concerns regarding AC expertise by saying that members 
often lack the expertise to perform their job effectively. 
Abbott et al (2003a) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory 
 
 
Sample includes 492 non-regulated 
firms, audited by Big 5 auditors and filed 
annual proxy statements between 
February-June 2001. 
 
Certain characteristics of ACs, independence (composed solely of independent directors) and 
financial expertise (at least one financial expert) are associated with higher audit fees. Meeting 
frequency was not significantly linked with higher audit fees. 
Abbott et al (2003b) 
Contemporary Accounting Research 
538 firms filing proxies  between 
February 2001 and June  2001 
Companies whose ACs are independent (consist solely of independent directors) and active (meet 
minimum four times a year) have a lower non-audit fee to audit fee ratio. 
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Author (Date) and Journal  Research Method Key Findings 
 
Carcello and Neal (2003a) 
The Accounting Review 
 
Analysis of 374 randomly selected 
companies trading between 1988 and 
1999, audited by a big 6 firm. 
 
Companies with more affiliated directors on the AC and directors with greater stock ownership 
are more likely to change their auditor after receiving a going concern report. Companies whose 
ACs had more governance expertise (sitting on more than one board) are less likely to change 
their auditor.  
Dezoort et al (2003a) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory 
An experimental study using 131 AC 
members selected from US public firms 
in 2000.  
If the auditor is consistently asking for audit adjustments then AC members are more likely to 
recommend adjustments and also in the case of annual report adjustments rather than quarterly 
reports. However, AC members who were CPAs were less likely to recommend adjustments. 
 
Dezoort et al (2003b) 
Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy 
 
An experimental study using 55 AC 
members of US public companies in 
2000. 
Study finds that auditors received more support from AC members when materiality justification 
included both quantitative and consequences-oriented factors (i.e., the interruption of an 
earnings trend) and when the accounting issue was subject to precise measurement. Also, AC 
members with CPAs and with greater experience provided greater support for the auditor than 
did other AC members. 
Ng and Tan (2003) 
The Accounting Review 
An experimental study involving 101 
participants (audit managers) from 
various US offices of a Big 4 firm. 
The availability of authoritative guidance and the effectiveness of the AC jointly influence the 
perceived auditor-client negotiation outcome. However each variable has greater effect on 
auditors' perceived negotiation outcome in the absence of the other variable. 
Raghunandan and Rama (2003) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory 
An analysis of proxy statements filed by 
199 US companies during 2001. 
Shareholders are less likely to vote against auditor ratification if the AC is composed only of 
independent directors. 
Lee et al (2004) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory 
A comparative analysis of 190 US firms 
with auditor resignations and 190 firms 
with auditor dismissals during the period 
1996 to 2000. 
Auditors are less likely to resign when the AC is independent and have financial expertise present.  
The frequency of AC meetings and AC share ownership are not statistically significantly associated 
with auditor resignations. 
Chen et al (2005) 
Accounting and Finance 
The study comprises 458 Australian 
listed companies in 2000. 
A positive relationship found between AC independence and the use of an industry specialist 
auditor.  However, no association was found between the number of meetings, financial expertise 
of AC, and the use of an industry specialist audit firm.  
Krishnan and Ye (2005) 
Accounting Horizons 
An analysis of 383 firms taken from S&P 
500 list in fiscal year 2001. 
The AC’s financial expertise is positively associated with the likelihood of seeking ratification but 
AC diligence and independence do not seem to matter. 
Gaynor et al (2006) 
The Accounting Review 
An experimental study involving 100 
experienced corporate directors. 
 
AC members are more likely to recommend joint provision if audit quality improves, a finding in 
line with investors’ preferences. However, ACs are reluctant to recommend joint provision when 
public disclosures are required. 
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Author (Date) and Journal  Research Method Key Findings 
Goodwin and Kent (2006) 
Accounting and Finance 
A survey of 401 Australian public listed 
companies in 2000. 
Higher audit fees are related with AC existence, increased use of IA function, and the frequency of 
AC meetings. AC expertise is only related with higher fees when AC independence and the number 
of meetings are low. 
Knechel and Willikens (2006) 
Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting 
An analysis of 102 Belgium listed 
companies in 2001. 
Audit fees are higher when a company has an AC, discloses a high level of financial risk 
management, and has a higher proportion of independent board members. 
Abbott et al (2007) 
The Accounting Review 
A survey  of Chief Internal Auditors of 
219 firms from Fortune 1000 in 2000 
Effective ACs have a significant negative relationship with the outsourcing of IA routine tasks to 
the external auditor. There is no significant relationship between AC effectiveness (a composite 
variable which includes independent directors, minimum four meetings and at least one financial 
expert) and the outsourcing of non-routine tasks to external auditors. 
Chen and Zhou (2007) 
Contemporary Accounting Research 
Analysis of 821 firms that dismissed 
Arthur Anderson as auditor during 2001 
and 2002. 
Firms dismissed Andersen quite quickly when they had large and independent boards, had more 
independent ACs and had financial expertise available. 
Lennox and Park (2007) 
Contemporary Accounting Research 
Analysis of 1198 firms that change 
auditors and appoint Big 5 firms 
between 1995 and 2000. 
An audit firm is more likely to be appointed if the company has an officer who is an alumnus of 
that firm. However the study shows that companies are less likely to appoint officers' former firms 
if ACs are more independent. 
Stewart and Munro (2007) 
International Journal of Auditing 
 
An experimental study, using 75 audit 
partners and directors, senior managers 
and managers from auditing firms, 
located in Australia. 
AC existence, its meeting frequency and the auditor’s attendance at meetings are significantly 
associated with a reduction in the perceived level of audit risk.  ACs assist in resolving conflicts 
with management and lead to some improvement in overall audit quality. However, the 
frequency of AC meetings and the auditor’s attendance at meetings does not appear to influence 
these perceptions. 
Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) 
The Review of Quantitative Finance 
and Accounting 
Sample comprises the Fortune 500 firms 
in 2001 and includes audit fee data from 
2001 to 2003. 
Audit committee size, expertise, and independence are positively associated with audit fee levels, 
consistent with the notion that ACs serve as a complement to external auditors in monitoring 
management. 
Boo and Sharma (2008) 
Accounting and Finance 
469 US listed companies both regulated 
and non-regulated in 2001. 
The results show a weak association between AC independence and size and the audit fees in 
regulated firms as compared to non-regulated firms. 
Dezoort et al (2008) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory 
An experimental study based on 
material administered to 372 AC 
members. 
AC member support (especially with CPA qualification) for adjustments proposed by auditor is 
significantly higher in post-SOX period.  
Hunton and Rose (2008) 
Accounting, Organisations and 
Society 
An experimental study involving 88 
experienced AC members from US 
publicly listed companies in 2005. 
AC members are less likely to accept an auditor’s restatement recommendation than adjustment 
recommendation. AC members holding multiple directorships are less likely to accept an auditor’s 
restatement recommendation than members with a single directorship. 
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Author (Date) and Journal  Research Method Key Findings 
Lee (2008) 
Applied Financial Economics 
An analysis of 631 S&P firms with 2000 
and 2001 fiscal year ends. 
Finds a negative association between AC effectiveness and changes in the non-audit to audit fee 
ratio. 
Mangena and Tauringana (2008) 
International Journal of Auditing 
An analysis of interim reports of 258 
non-financial UK listed companies 
published in the period 2001–2002 
Finds a positive association between the external auditor’s involvement in reviewing interim 
reports and AC independence and financial expertise. There is no significant association between 
the external auditor involvement in reviewing interim reports and AC size and meetings. 
Bronson et al (2009) 
Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy 
A  useable sample of 208 firms taken 
from datasets used by Carcello and Neal 
(2000, 2003)* 
 
The results show that the benefits of AC independence are consistently achieved only when the 
committee is completely independent. 
*These datasets (1994 and 1988-1999 respectively) precede the BRC (1999) and SOX (2002) 
requirements that all AC be completely independent. 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and 
Finance 
801 firm-year observations from S&P 
500 firms, all audited by Big 5 auditors 
between 2000 and 2002. 
Financial expertise of AC members is negatively related to audit fees only when expertise is 
defined as accounting financial expertise.  There is a positive but insignificant relationship 
between the audit fee and broadly defined financial expertise (non-accounting or accounting 
financial experts). 
Engel et al (2010) 
Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 
An analysis of 3,295 firm-year 
observations over the period 2000 to 
2004. 
Total compensation and cash retainers paid to audit committees are positively correlated with 
audit fees and the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Pomeroy (2010) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory 
A Canadian experimental study using a 
modified version of the Johnstone and 
Muzatko 2002 teaching case. 
Negotiation knowledge increases AC discomfort but has no effect on AC investigation. AC 
members investigate more extensively as accounting decisions become increasingly aggressive 
and AC members with accounting expertise are particularly thorough in their investigations. 
Zaman et al (2011) 
Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting 
A sample of 155 UK companies covering 
the period from 2001 to 2004. 
The results show that ACE (composite measure of AC size, independence, expertise and meetings) 
has a significant and positive impact on both audit fees and fees for non audit services. 
Bierstaker et al (2012) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory 
A US based experimental study involving 
six experienced audit committee 
members. 
The findings show that audit committee members are more likely to support the auditor in an 
accounting disagreement when audit committee compensation includes long-term stock options.  
Chan et al (2012) 
Accounting and Finance 
An analysis of 1524 firm-year 
observations for the years 2005 and 
2006. 
The results show that audit fees are negatively associated with the proportion of long board 
tenure directors on the independent audit committee. 
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Prior studies have analysed the perceived priority of audit committee members in 
oversight tasks (Dezoort 1997) and explored how audit committees help to understand 
the complex nature of the factors associated with the quality of audits (Schroeder et 
al., 1986; Knapp, 1991).   Research looking at audit committee member’s perception of 
audit quality has found that audit committee members see the quality of audits, as 
measured by the auditor’s ability to disclose material error, improving in the first few 
years of an auditor engagement but then note a drop in quality as auditor tenure 
lengthens (Knapp, 1991). This suggests that audit committees should focus on the 
length of time the auditor has been in place, paying particular attention to those 
auditors in place for a long period of time.  This is particularly important as Knapp 
(1991) has noticed the auditor-client relationship results in a learning curve effect and 
thus improves audit quality in the first few years of the relationship.  However, as the 
relationship matures, complacency and over reliance can result in less rigorous audits.  
Moreover, Schroeder et al. (1986) note that audit committee chairpersons perceive 
audit quality from a slightly different perspective to other audit committee members. 
They assign more importance to audit team factors such as the level of 
partner/manager attention given to the audit’ and ‘planning and conduct of audit team 
work’ as compared to reputation or the audit fee charged by the firm.   
 
Another area of interest is the behaviour of audit committees in situations where 
management is in dispute with external auditors over audit matters. In particular, 
frequently profound differences exist between the audit committee chair, 
management and external auditors on issues such as financial disclosure and 
discretionary accounting choices (Haka and Chalos, 1990).  Evidence suggests that 
audit committee members tend to support the external auditor in audit disputes 
between the auditor and management, especially on financial standard disputes and 
when the financial position of the audited firm is poor (Knapp, 1987). Audit committee 
support for auditors on issues involving earnings trends and precise measurement of 
accounting issues is seen to be even stronger from members qualified as Certified 
Public Accountants (CPA’s) and with greater relevant work experience (Dezoort et al., 
2003). Furthermore, audit committee members with greater experience as 
independent directors (i.e. multiple directorships) and auditing knowledge are also 
26 
 
more likely to support external auditors in an auditor management dispute (Dezoort 
and Salterio, 2001). More recently Bierstaker et al., (2012) in a US based experimental 
study involving six experienced audit committee members found that audit committee 
members are more likely to support the auditor in an accounting disagreement when 
audit committee compensation includes long-term stock options. 
 
In addition to the audit committee’s perception of audit quality and its role in auditor 
management conflict, a significant stream of literature focuses on its role in the choice 
of external auditor. Auditor selection, evaluation and even dismissal are some of the 
primary responsibilities of the audit committee (Mautz and Neumann, 1970; Braiotta, 
1994; BRC, 1999; Smith, 2003).  One aspect of concern to earlier researchers was the 
potential for audit committees to favour larger auditors as they may be perceived to 
be providing better audit quality (Knapp, 1991), however Bradbury (1990) found that 
this relationship does not hold.  More recent research on audit committees and 
auditor choice has sought to focus on two key areas; the choice of auditor (i.e. big 8 vs. 
non-big 8 audit firms or industry specialist auditors); and auditor retention/removal. 
Eichenseher and Shields (1985) found that companies with an audit committee are 
most likely to choose big 8 auditors.  Specifically in relation to former Arthur Andersen 
clients, Chen and Zhou (2007) found those firms with larger, more independent audit 
committees with financial expertise were more likely to choose a big 4 auditor.  
Industry specialist auditors have been favoured by audit committees which are more 
independent (i.e. those audit committee’s composed entirely of outside directors) and 
who hold at least two meetings per year (Abbott and Parker, 2000). However Chen et 
al., (2005), although agreeing with the impact of independence in favouring more 
specialised auditors, found that the number of meetings and financial expertise had no 
bearing on the choice of a specialist auditor.  The difference in results is most probably 
due to the selection of country and sample year chosen for analysis.  Abbott and 
Parker (2000) studied firms listed on US stock exchanges in 1994 however Chen et al. 
(2005) chose Australian listed companies in 2000. 
 
Linking this with auditor switching, Chen and Zhou (2007) found that audit committee 
independence and the audit committee’s financial expertise also played a role in firms 
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choosing to dismiss Arthur Andersen more quickly, than firms whose audit committee 
did not have these characteristics. In contrast, Carcello and Neal (2003a) suggest there 
was no significant association between the level of audit committees’ financial 
expertise and the likelihood of auditor change following a going concern report.  Lee et 
al (2004) argue that audit committees are likely to put more effort into working with 
the external auditor if they are more independent and have greater levels of financial 
expertise present. Referring specifically to suspicious auditor switching (i.e. removing 
auditors after receiving an unclean audit opinion or after disclosure of a reportable 
event), Archambeault and Dezoort (2001) suggest that those companies with less 
desirable audit committee characteristics, such as, committees with fewer members, 
fewer independent members, members with less expertise, holding fewer meetings  
were more likely to switch auditors. 
 
Other themes that emerge from the literature are around the areas of auditor 
ratification and audit restatement/adjustments. There have been some contrasting 
findings from studies in respect of auditor ratification. For example, Raghunandan and 
Rama (2003) found audit committee independence to be a key characteristic which 
aids auditor ratification.  However this has been rebutted by Krishnan and Ye (2005) 
who found audit committee independence and diligence did not matter.  Instead they 
found a link between audit fees, audit committee financial expertise and auditor 
ratification; with higher audit fees and better expertise equating to a higher likelihood 
of companies seeking shareholder ratification.   
 
The financial statements adjustment issue is usually at the cornerstone of 
management-auditor disputes (Knapp, 1987).  It has also been suggested that although 
financial statement fraud is more likely to be found in interim reporting (Beasley et al., 
2000), it has been found that adjustments are more likely to be recommended for 
year-end reports. It is therefore important to assess the role audit committee 
members play in auditor adjustment recommendations. Using source credibility theory, 
Dezoort et al. (2003a) argue that auditors who are consistent in calling for an 
adjustment are likely to have audit committee members support as they will be 
perceived as being more credible than management.  Prior studies have also found 
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that audit committee members tend to support auditors in the adjustment 
recommendations if they have more independent director experience and knowledge 
of auditing (Dezoort and Salterio, 2001); and if the auditor judgement is based on both 
quantitative and qualitative factors (Dezoort et al., 2003).  However, when faced with 
restatement decisions, audit committee members have been found to support 
management in opposition to such decisions, this opposition is further amplified when 
members of audit committees also hold multiple directorships as the restatement 
issue may raise questions about their independence due to the possibility that their 
focus is more on their own self-interest rather than stakeholder-interests (Hunton and 
Rose, 2008). Some common themes emerging refer to audit committee members who 
are also CPAs with studies showing that such members are less likely to recommend 
adjustments (Dezoort et al., 2003a). However this has changed post-SOX, with CPA 
members now more likely to support adjustments than non-CPA members (Dezoort et 
al., 2008). 
 
2.1.2 Audit Committees and Financial Statement Quality 
Audit committees are increasingly taking responsibility for the quality of corporate 
financial statements (SOX, 2002; Combined Code, 2008). This increasing focus on audit 
committee responsibilities has directed research to focus on the performance of audit 
committees by examining the impact of audit committee inputs (e.g. audit committee 
independence, expertise and meeting frequency) on financial reporting outputs (e.g. 
alleged fraud cases, misstatements or restatements (Beasley et al., 2009). The archival 
studies presented in table 2 have sought to capture the concept of financial reporting 
quality, in relation to the role of audit committees, in three ways.  First, a set of studies 
have focused on instances of alleged fraud and misstatements and/or restatements 
(Archambeault et al., 2008; Farber, 2005; Abbott et al., 2004; Song and Windram, 
2004).  Second, a reasonably dominant strand of enquiry has focused on analysing the 
actual reported numbers, commonly referred to as earnings quality (Kent et al., 2010; 
Baxter and Cotter, 2009; Vafeas, 2005) [This is considered in more detail in section 
2.2.3].  Finally, a number of researchers have examined the company’s stance on the 
mechanisms and level of disclosure (Kent and Stewart, 2008; Mangena and Pike, 2005). 
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The evidence available on the impact of audit committee existence and the occurrence 
of alleged fraud or irregularities shows that firms investigated for instances of financial 
statement fraud are less likely to have an audit committee (Beasley et al., 2000). 
Evidence also suggests that audit committees have a positive impact on financial 
statement quality as the presence of audit committees are associated with fewer 
lawsuits of alleged fraud from shareholders and fewer SEC enforcement actions 
(McMullan, 1996). However, this is in contrast to the study of Beasley (1996), who 
failed to find any association between financial statement fraud and the presence of 
an audit committee, although this study further documented that board composition 
was more important than audit committee formation.  
 
The stream of research focusing on the association between various characteristics of 
audit committees (noted by Bedard et al. (2008) as signals of its quality) and financial 
statement fraud also documents similar results. Analysis of US firms subject to 
allegations of fraud by the SEC shows that audit committees in these firms were less 
independent (Beasley et al., 2000), possessed less financial expertise (Farber, 2005), 
and were less active (Beasley et al., 2000).  Ultimately, these audit committees failed 
to fulfil their oversight role. Similarly, Song and Windram (2004), while reporting UK 
evidence, note that FRRP2 actions are more likely to be directed at companies whose 
audit committee members have lower levels of financial literacy, hold less frequent 
committee meetings and whose members possessed more other directorships. 
Martinez and Fuentes (2007) also noted that audit committees with fewer members 
and greater levels of member independence are less likely to receive an error or non-
compliance qualification. Goodwin and Seow (2002), in a Singapore based survey, also 
reported that audit committees with fully independent members and all with some 
financial expertise are more likely to prevent financial statement errors and detect 
incidences of fraud.  Literature on the different dimensions of financial expertise 
shows that the specific type of accounting expertise can influence the audit 
committee’s evaluation of financial reporting quality (McDaniel et al. 2002). For 
example, Krishnan and Lee (2009) find that firms experiencing greater litigation risks 
                                                          
2
 In the UK, action against companies by the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) for defective financial 
statements has been used as an equivalent signal to SEC Enforcement Actions in the US. 
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prefer accounting financial experts in their audit committees as compared to non-
accounting financial experts3. 
 
The occurrence of financial statement misstatement/restatement4 is not only costly to 
investors (Archambeault et al., 2008), it also has reputational consequences for audit 
committee members (Srinivasan, 2005). Recent evidence suggests that certain audit 
committee attributes, such as independence, activity and expertise, have a negative 
association with occurrences of restatements (Abbott et al., 2004). In addition, stock 
option grants for audit committee have been shown to have a positive association with 
the likelihood of accounting restatements (Archambeault, 2008). This is further 
confirmed in another US based experimental study (Magilky et al. 2009), which 
concluded that audit committee members are only objective in financial reporting 
when they are not remunerated with stock based compensation. In the same vein, 
Cullinan et al. (2008) report that independent boards with no option grants, are 
associated with a reduced probability of misstatement. They, however, failed to find a 
statistically significant association between audit committee independence and 
misstatements. For share options compensation, there seems to be an agreement on 
the view that share options decrease the effectiveness of audit committee members 
and hence reduce financial reporting quality. These findings clearly show that share 
option plans for audit committee members actually weaken the effectiveness of the 
audit committee in their monitoring and oversight of the financial reporting process. 
The issue of director option compensation has also received attention in the UK 
governance policy recommendations. Combined Code (2003, p12) clearly states that 
“non-executive directors should not hold options over the shares in their companies”.   
 
As overseeing the financial reporting process is the direct responsibility of audit 
committees, any occurrences of restatements can highlight possible weaknesses in this 
                                                          
3
 Based on the SEC’s narrow definition and DeFond et al. (2005), an accounting financial expert (AFE) is defined as a 
person who has previously held or currently holds a job directly related to accounting and auditing expertise. These 
experts include CPAs, CFOs, CAOs, controllers, and auditors. Non accounting financial experts (NAFEs) include those 
who have previously held or currently hold positions such as managing director in investment banking or venture 
capital firms, or accounting or finance professors (Davidson et al. 2004), as well as persons who have worked as 
CEOs or presidents of ‘‘a for-profit corporation’’ (DeFond et al. 2005). 
4
 The GAO (2002, 2006) reports that accounting restatements increased 145 percent and cost investors $100 billion 
during 1997-2002. 
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oversight role, thus exposing audit committee members to reputation and litigation 
risks. Srinivasan (2005), while examining the career consequences of audit committee 
members subsequent to accounting restatements, note that for severe restatements 
the total turnover of audit committee members is higher as compared to the other 
directors. The loss of positions on other boards is also higher for audit committee 
members as compared to other outside directors not members of the audit committee.  
 
A further area of significant interest is the impact of audit committee monitoring on 
firms’ earnings manipulation practices (discussed further in section 2.2.3). Since the 
worth of a company is directly related to its reported earnings figures, top 
management view earnings management5 as a device to meet earnings expectations 
for their companies (Loomis, 1999). Earnings management has always been a major 
concern6 and a central element of major regulatory reforms around the world (AARF, 
1997; BRC, 1999; Smith, 2003). Much of the research in this area has sought to 
examine the impact of various characteristics of audit committees on doctored records, 
by developing and empirically examining a variety of proxies for earnings management.  
These proxies typically include the use of various accruals based measures such as 
income increasing or decreasing accruals (Bedard et al., 2004; Peasnell 2005; Vafeas, 
2005), absolute accruals (Osma and Noguer, 2007; Baxter and Cotter; 2009), quarterly 
accruals (Yang and Krishnan, 2005) and intentional and unintentional accruals (Kent et 
al., 2010). Other measures used in the archival research are Penman and Zhang’s score 
(Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008) and transfer pricing manipulations (Lo et al., 2010). 
                                                          
5
 As defined by the SEC: ‘the practice of distorting the true financial performance of (a) company (SEC, 1999, p. 3). 
6
 Former US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Levitt (1998) expressed his serious concerns over 
earnings management in his famous “the Numbers Game” speech. He called for a fundamental cultural change for 
corporate management and strengthening corporate governance, especially improving the effectiveness of audit 
committee. 
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Table 2.2:   Audit Committees and Financial Statement Quality 
Author (Date) and Journal  Research Method Key Findings 
Beasley (1996) 
The Accounting review 
An analysis of 150 (75 fraud and 75 
non-fraud) public traded companies 
between 1980 and 1991. 
There is no significant affect of the presence of an AC on the reduction of instances of 
financial statement fraud.   
Dechow et al (1996) 
Contemporary Accounting Research 
92 firms subject to enforcement actions 
by the SEC between 1982 and 1992. 
These companies are more likely to have a management dominated board, are more likely 
to have a CEO who also serves as chairman and hardly any of the companies had an AC.  
McMullan D (1996) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory 
A sample of 219 companies from the 
Fortune 500 list from 1984 to 1988. 
 ACs are associated with fewer shareholder lawsuits alleging fraud, fewer SEC enforcement 
actions, fewer illegal acts and fewer instances of auditor turnover when there is an auditor-
client disagreement.  
Beasley et al (2000) 
Accounting Horizons 
Analysis of fraudulent financial 
reporting cases alleged by the SEC 
during the period 1987 to 1997. 
Not all fraud companies had ACs and an internal audit function in place. In the case of 
companies which had ACs, they were less independent and had fewer meetings.    
Goodwin and Seow (2002) 
Accounting and Finance 
A survey (using hypothetical cases) 
based on a sample size of 71 directors 
and 63 auditors from Singapore. 
A strong AC has a significant impact on audit effectiveness, on errors in financial statements 
and on the detection of management fraud.  However, this variable was not significant with 
regard to the strength of internal control.  
Klein (2002b) 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 
692 firm-years of publicly trading US 
firms between 1992 and 1993. 
Study finds a negative association between abnormal accruals and the proportion of outside 
directors on the AC. However, the results show no difference in abnormal accruals for firms 
with or without a wholly independent AC. 
McDaniel et al (2002) 
The Accounting Review 
An experimental study involving 20 
financial experts and 18 financial 
literates during 2000 and 2001. 
Literates (MBA graduates) are more likely to identify concerns about reporting treatments 
for activities that are prominent and are non-recurring in nature however experts (audit 
managers) are more likely to raise concerns about reporting treatments for less prominent 
and recurring activities. 
Carcello and Neal (2003b) 
Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 
An analysis of 138 firms (US) 
experiencing financial distress during 
1994.  
Financially distressed companies with a high percentage of affiliated directors on the AC 
have a significant positive association with optimistic disclosures. 
Xie et al (2003) 
Journal of Corporate Finance 
 
282 firm year observations from S&P 
500 companies in the years 1992, 1994, 
and 1996. 
Smaller discretionary current accruals are associated with firms whose AC members and 
board members have greater financial background. Also firms with more active ACs are 
associated with reduced levels of discretionary current accruals.  
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Author (Date) and Journal  Research Method Key Findings 
Abbott et al (2004) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory 
88 restatement firms listed on AMEX, 
NASDAQ and NYSE between 1991 and 
1999. 
Certain characteristics of ACs (activity, independence and expertise) show a significant and 
negative association (meaning high level of one linked with high level of another variable) 
with the occurrence of restatements. 
Bedard et al (2004) 
Auditing: A journal of practice and 
Theory 
Study of 300 US firms using data from 
the Compustat database in 1996. 
ACs which are independent (composed of outsiders) and have at least one member with 
financial expertise are better able to constrain earnings management. However this study 
finds no association between the activity and size of the ACs and the likelihood of aggressive 
earnings management. 
Song and Windram (2004) 
International Journal of Auditing 
The sample size consists of 54 
companies ( 27 FRRP cases and   27 
non-FRRP cases) between 1991 and 
2000. 
AC financial literacy and frequency of meetings are very important determinants of its 
effectiveness in financial reporting. This study also shows that ACs with outside 
directorships and small size boards are more effective and hence better able to enhance 
financial reporting quality and reduce the probability of financial reporting irregularities.  
Davidson et al (2005) 
Accounting and Finance 
434 firms listed on the ASX for the 2000 
financial year. 
A negative relationship between ACs comprising a majority of non executive directors and 
earnings management. However no relationship is found between earnings management 
and AC existence, its effectiveness (size and meetings) and use of a big 5 auditor. 
Farber (2005) 
The Accounting Review 
 
87 firms identified by the SEC as 
fraudulently manipulating their 
financial statements between 1982 and 
2000. 
Fraudulent firms have poor governance (low percentage of outside directors, less AC 
financial expertise, less AC meetings, small percentage of big 4 audit partners and have 
CEOs who are also chairmen of the board of directors). It further shows that firms that take 
actions to improve governance have superior stock price performance. 
Mangena and Pike (2005) 
Accounting and Business Research 
A random sample of 262 financial 
statements published in the period 
2001 to 2002 by companies listed on 
LSE. 
There is a significant negative association between the level of interim disclosure and the 
ownership of AC members; a significant positive association between interim disclosure and 
the financial expertise of the AC; no significant relationship between the level of interim 
disclosure and AC size.   
Peasnell et al (2005) 
Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting 
1271 firm-year observations for UK 
listed firms over the period 1993–1996. 
The presence of an AC does not affect the extent of income-increasing manipulations to 
meet or exceed thresholds. It also has no effect on the degree of downward manipulation 
when pre-managed earnings exceed the threshold by a large margin.  
Srinivasan (2005) 
Journal of Accounting Research 
 
An analysis of 409 firms that 
announced restatements between 
1997 and 2001 as provided in 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
[2002]. 
 
For the firms that overstate earnings, the likelihood of director departure increases with 
restatement severity, particularly for AC directors. In addition, directors of these firms are 
no longer present in 25% of their positions on other boards. This loss is greater for audit 
committee members and for more severe restatements.  
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Author (Date) and Journal  Research Method Key Findings 
Yang and Krishnan (2005) 
International Journal of Auditing 
896 US firm-year observations for the 
years 1996 to 2000. 
This study finds a negative relationship between the number of outside directorships held 
by AC directors and quarterly discretionary accruals. It also finds a positive association 
between independent AC directors and earnings management. Also the average tenure of 
audit committee directors is negatively associated with quarterly earnings management. 
Vafeas (2005) 
Contemporary Accounting Research 
An analysis of 252 U.S. firms between 
1994 and 2000. 
The length of board tenure and proportion of AC insiders are associated with lower earnings 
quality and AC meeting frequency is associated with higher earnings quality. Study also finds 
that committee member experience in other committees is associated with fewer small 
earnings increases.  
Koh et al (2007) 
Accounting and Finance 
933 firm-year observations from 1998 
to 2002, consisting of 337 distinct firms 
(Australia). 
This study finds a negative relationship between active and independent AC and income-
increasing abnormal accruals. 
Martinez and Fuentes (2007) 
Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 
An analysis of 137 Spanish firms in 
1999. 
AC size and independence have a significant influence on the likelihood of receiving a 
qualified audit report.   AC meetings and members’ shareholding are not significantly 
associated with audit reports containing error and non-compliance qualifications. 
Osma and Noguer (2007) 
Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 
An analysis of questionnaire data from 
large Spanish quoted companies 
(involves 155 firm-year observations 
from 1999 to 2001). 
Finds no evidence of any correlation between the presence of an independent AC and 
earnings management.  
Piot and Janin (2007) 
European Accounting Review 
An analysis of 102 non-financial firms 
which were included in the SBF-120 
Index during 1998–2002. 
Finds that abnormal accruals decrease when an AC is present but that AC independence has 
no effect on accruals measurement.   
Archambeault et al (2008 
Contemporary Accounting Research 
 
Analysis of 306 US public companies 
(using 153 restatements and 153 
matched non-restatements) from 1999 
to 2002. 
Finds a significant positive relationship between the short-term and long-term stock option 
grants and the likelihood of financial reporting failures or accounting restatements.   
 
Cullinan et al (2008) 
Advances in Accounting 
An analysis using a sample of 105 US 
firms that misstated their revenue 
between 1997 and 2002. 
The ‘Percentage of independent directors (SOX plus no options definition)’ is associated 
with a decreased probability of misstatement. Most of the corporate governance variables 
including AC independence level were not significantly associated with the probability of 
misstatement. 
Kelton and Yang (2008) 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 
 
An analysis of 284 firms listed on 
NASDAQ stock exchange during 2003. 
The results show that more independent directors, AC diligence and more members with 
financial expertise are more likely to consider internet financial reporting. 
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Author (Date) and Journal  Research Method Key Findings 
 
Kent and Stewart (2008) 
Accounting and Finance 
 
An analysis of 965 companies listed on 
the ASX in 2004. 
Finds a positive association between the frequency of AC meetings and the level of AIFRSs 
(Australian equivalents to IFRSs) disclosure.  AC size and expertise are negatively associated 
with disclosure level and no significant association exists between AC independence and 
disclosure level. 
 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) 
Contemporary Accounting Research 
 
 
929 observations from the S&P 500 
firms representing years 2000 through 
2002. 
Finds a positive association between an AC's accounting financial expertise and 
conservatism. This finding does not hold for non-accounting financial experts or non-
financial experts. Also finds that only accounting financial expertise is positively associated 
with Penman and Zhang's Q score, a measure of earnings quality. 
Baxter and Cotter (2009) 
Accounting and Finance 
 
Sample is drawn from the top 500 
Australian companies listed on the ASX 
with financial years ending during 2001. 
A positive association exists between the presence of an AC and an increase in earnings 
quality.  There is no significant association between the characteristics of an AC 
(independence, activity, expertise and size) and earnings quality. 
Krishnan and Lee (2009) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory 
An analysis of AC members of 802 
Fortune 1000 firms in 2004. 
Firms with higher potential litigation risk are more likely to appoint accounting financial 
experts to their audit committees. 
Magilke et al (2009) 
The Accounting Review 
A US based experimental design study, 
using 3 AC Members per session in 6 
different sessions. 
The study finds that AC members who do not receive stock-based compensation are the 
most objective.  However, AC members prefer biased reporting when compensated with 
stock-based compensation. 
Dhaliwal et al (2010) 
Contemporary Accounting Research 
An analysis of 770 firms during 2004 to 
2006. 
AC accounting experts who are independent, hold fewer directorships, and have lower 
tenure in their firms have a profound positive impact on accruals quality. Supervisory 
experts failed in complementing AC accounting or finance experts to enhance accruals 
quality. 
Kent et al (2010) 
Accounting and Finance 
Sample consists of 392 listed Australian 
companies in 2004. 
Study finds that size of the AC and Big 4 external audit firm are associated with higher 
discretionary accruals quality. More independent and more active ACs are associated with 
innate (non-discretionary) accruals quality. 
Lo et al (2010) 
Journal of Corporate Finance 
A sample of 266 companies listed on 
the Shanghai stock exchange in 2004. 
Results show that firms with higher board independence and financial experts on their audit 
committees are less likely to engage in transfer pricing manipulations. 
 
Lary and Taylor (2012) 
Managerial Auditing Journal 
 
A sample of 60 ASX listed companies 
reporting a restatement during the 
period 2004-2009. 
 
 
AC independence and financial expertise are significantly related to a lower incidence and 
severity of financial restatements. 
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Author (Date) and Journal  Research Method Key Findings 
 
Sun et al (2012) 
Managerial Auditing Journal 
 
The sample includes pubic traded stock 
insurance companies operating in the 
USA in 2003. 
 
Accounting, finance and insurance financial expertise are associated with more accurate 
loss reserve estimate. 
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Another important theme evident in this area of literature is the discussion of the role 
of audit committee characteristics in a firm’s disclosure practices. Studies have shown 
that the financial expertise of an audit committee plays a key role in its voluntary 
disclosure practices, for both interim (Mangena and Pike, 2005) and internet (Kelton 
and Yang, 2008) disclosure.  Kelton and Yang (2008) have further suggested that 
frequency of meetings and independence are also important variables in a firm’s 
decision to voluntarily disclose financial information and hence improve disclosure 
transparency. In contrast, Kent and Stewart (2008) analysed the disclosure behaviour 
of 965 Australian firms in their transition to IFRSs and found that the extent of financial 
expertise on the audit committee had a negative impact and the frequency of audit 
committee meetings had a positive impact on the level of financial disclosure. The 
findings related to audit committee size are also rather mixed as audit committee size 
is seen as having a positive impact on interim disclosure practices (Mangena and Pike, 
2005), while, on the other hand, shows a negative association with the disclosure 
behaviour of firms in the case of their transition to IFRSs (Kent and Stewart, 2008). In 
another study, while examining the impact of audit committee independence on 
disclosure levels of financially distressed companies, Carcello and Neal (2003) found 
that non-independent7 audit committee members were positively associated with the 
optimism of firms’ going-concern disclosures.  These findings supported their 
hypotheses that affiliated or non-independent audit committee members of financially 
distressed firms tend to support management in their decision not to include a going 
concern note. If they do, then they prefer to include a rather optimistic note on the 
going concern disclosure.  
 
2.1.3 Audit Committees and Market Reaction 
A further area of empirical research in the context of audit committees has been to 
examine the market reaction to specific audit committee issues.  Since research on 
market reaction focuses on changes to a company’s share price in light of specific 
“events”, it lends itself to studies of market reaction to appointments of new audit 
committee members and, more recently, focusing on their level of audit/accounting 
expertise.  In its most simple form, a positive share price reaction to audit committee 
                                                          
7
 The percentage of audit committee members classified as affiliated directors. 
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appointments or characteristics of appointees, suggests that investors believe the 
change is likely to be of future benefit to the company.  Of course, a negative share 
price reaction suggests a more pessimistic outlook, at least from the point of view of 
investors. Details and summarised findings of the studies in this stream of research are 
presented in table 2.3. 
 
Wild (1994; 1996) analysed 260 US firms, exploring the impact of audit committees on 
company performance and reported that earnings response coefficients 8  were 
significantly higher after the formation of an audit committee. In addition, Wild (1996) 
found that the stock market reaction to earnings reports was significantly higher 
subsequent to the formation of the audit committee. These findings suggest that 
investors recognise the important governance role of audit committees in enhancing 
managerial accountability to shareholders and hence increasing the quality of reported 
earnings. Taking a step further into the quality of audit committees, research has 
shown that those firms that are proactive in ensuring robust audit committees are 
associated with superior stock price performance (Farber, 2005). In the same vein, 
Bolton (2012) found that audit committee share ownership has a positive and 
significant impact on firm performance. This suggests that investors appear to value 
governance improvements.  
 
Focusing more specifically on the expertise of audit committee members, research 
shows that the appointment of such members’ with audit experience as compared to 
financial management experience (Davidson, 2004) and accounting financial expertise 
as compared to non-accounting expertise (Defond et al., 2004) generates a 
significantly higher market response, thus resulting in increased firm value. Chan and Li 
(2008) further documented that audit committees composed of a majority of expert 
independent directors9 provide higher firm value, and even suggested that a fivefold 
increase is expected if these audit committees include a finance trained director10. 
These findings not only reflect markets’ appreciation, over a sustained period, of these 
                                                          
8
 Standard capital market test procedure is used to check informativeness of earning reports. 
9
 An expert independent director is one who holds a top management position in another publicly traded firm. 
10
 A finance trained director meets one or more of the following criteria: (1) a business school professor; (2) a 
Certified Public Accountant; (3) a director or CEO of a firm in the finance industry; (4) a chief financial officer; (5) an 
accounting firm partner; (6) an investment firm partner; and (7) a former secretary of Treasury. 
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particular audit committee characteristics, they also show an over-whelming positive 
response by the market to new audit committee appointments with specific financial 
expertise. Similarly, firms preparing for an initial public offering (IPO) have also been 
found to have benefitted from the independence and financial expertise of audit 
committees, possibly as these characteristics resulted in a significant reduction in the 
level of under-pricing of these firms (Bedard et al., 2008). Moreover audit committees 
financial expertise are positively associated with firm performance during the recent 
global financial crises (Aldamen et al., 2012). These findings call for more support to 
the world-wide movement in legislation requiring that audit committees should be 
more independent and possess greater competence. 
 
Though the evidence so far is uniform, apart from Bedard et al., (2008) and Aldamen et 
al., (2012) the findings have been derived solely from US based studies. This paucity of 
research in other regulatory environments needs to be addressed, particularly as a 
recent study in Australia has shown contradictory results, finding no substantial impact 
of the existence of audit committees upon firm value (Henry 2008).  In addition, most 
of the studies reported here only analyse data prior to the SOX reforms in the US so 
the current applicability of this evidence remains in question.  For example, a recent 
US study using pre and post-SOX data, suggests that though the SOX Act led to 
increased board monitoring and higher firm performance, certain mandated minimum 
requirements, such as frequency of audit committee meetings, impose unnecessary 
costs on the firms and therefore serves to reduce firm value (Brick and Chidambaran, 
2010).  
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 Table 2.3:  Audit Committee and Market Reaction 
 
 
Author (Date) and Journal  
 
 
Research Method 
 
Key Findings 
Wild (1994) 
British Accounting Review 
Study is based on data from 260 US 
companies that formed an AC between 
1966 and 1980. 
Earnings are significantly more informative to market participants after formation of the AC.  
Wild (1996) 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and 
Finance 
Study is based on data from 260 US 
companies that formed an AC between 
1966 and 1980. 
Finds a significant increase in the market's reaction to earnings reports subsequent to the 
formation of the AC. Specifically, the reaction to earnings reports is more than 20 percent 
greater after the formation of the committee than before.  
Anderson et al (2004) 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 
A sample of 252 US firms taken from 
three different data sets between 1993 
and 1998. 
Study finds that independent and active (meeting frequency) ACs are associated with a lower 
cost of debt. Also shows that larger ACs are inversely associated with the cost of debt 
indicating that larger ACs are perceived to provide greater monitoring of the financial 
accounting process.  
 
Davidson W (2004) 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 
An analysis of appointment 
announcement data between 1990 -
2001 for 136 firms trading on US 
exchanges. 
The appointment of an AC member with financial expertise increases firm value. It also shows 
that the market perceives audit firm experience as more important than corporate financial 
management or financial statement analysis experience. 
Defond et al (2004) 
Journal of Accounting Research 
An analysis of 509 US corporations 
(involving 702 announcements) of newly 
appointed outside directors to ACs 
between 1993 and 2002. 
Finds a positive response from the market when an accounting/financial expert is appointed to 
the AC. No significant response to the appointment of a non-accounting/financial expert. Also 
finds that positive response applies only to those firms who had strong corporate 
governance*. 
*The strength of the governance environment is measured using a dichotomous variable that 
includes: (1) board size, (2) board independence, (3) AC size, (4) AC independence, (5) 
shareholders’ rights and (6) institutional ownership. 
Farber (2005) 
The Accounting Review 
 
87 firms identified by the SEC as 
fraudulently manipulating their financial 
statements between 1982 and 2000. 
Fraudulent firms have poor governance (low percentage of outside directors, less AC financial 
expertise, less AC meetings, small percentage of big 4 audit partners and have CEOs who are 
also chairmen of the board of directors). It further shows that firms that take actions to 
improve governance have superior stock price performance. 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) 
Journal of Accounting Research 
An analysis of management earnings 
forecasts made by 275 Fortune 500 
firms between 1995 and 2000. 
AC expertise and board independence are positively associated with market reaction to 
earnings forecast however AC size is negatively related to market reaction to forecasts. It 
further shows that effective ACs and boards are associated with higher forecast accuracy. 
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Author (Date) and Journal  Research Method Key Findings 
Bedard et al (2008) 
Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 
Study of a sample of 246 Quebec-based 
IPO’s during the period 1982 to 2002. 
Study shows that independence and the financial expertise of an AC significantly decrease the 
under-pricing of the IPO. However this study finds no link between the existence of an AC and 
the level of the under-pricing of IPO. 
Chan and Li (2008) 
Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 
An analysis of largest 200 publicly traded 
Fortune 500 firms in year 2000. 
Firm value increases only if ACs are composed of expert independent directors. The inclusion 
of a finance trained director in an expert independent AC increases firm value significantly 
(roughly 5 times more than just having an independent AC). 
Chen et al (2008) 
Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 
An analysis of 228 foreign registrants (77 
without AC and 151 with AC) from 1998 
to 2001, each matched with a US firm. 
Earnings response coefficients are lower in foreign firms without ACs compared to matched US 
firms. Also shows  an increase in earnings returns associations for foreign firms after 
establishing an AC. 
Henry (2008) 
Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting 
An analysis of 116 Australian listed 
firms, during the period from 1992 to 
2002. 
The results do not indicate that internal governance factors i.e. the existence of an AC, on an 
individual basis, substantially impact on firm value. 
 
Brick and Chidambaran (2010) 
Journal of Corporate Finance 
Sample consists of a broad panel of 
5,228 firm-year observations over a six-
year period from 1999 to 2005. 
The monitoring activity of the AC has a negative impact on firm value for the sample as whole. 
However, the results for the sub-periods show that there is a positive impact on firm value for 
the pre-SOX period but a (non-significant) negative impact in the post-SOX period.  
Aldamen et al (2012) 
Accounting and Finance 
The sample includes all firms listed on 
the S&P300 (Australia) during the period 
of the global financial crisis 2008–2009. 
Audit committees financial expertise and external directorships are positively associated with 
firm performance during the recent global financial crises. 
Bolton (2012) 
Accounting and Finance 
Final sample consists of 14,576 firm-year 
observations over a ten year period 
from 1998 to 2008. 
The results show positive and highly significant relationship between audit committee 
ownership and firm performance. 
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2.1.4 Audit Committees and the Internal Audit Function 
The corporate governance role of the internal audit function goes as far back as 1940 
(Gramling et al., 2004), however the renewed and expanded focus on the internal 
audit function in recent regulatory reports (Smith, 2003; SOX, 2002) has further 
increased the importance of the role it plays in ensuring the quality of corporate 
governance.   As audit committees are responsible for the monitoring and overseeing 
of the effectiveness of the internal audit function in the overall financial reporting 
process, much of the extant research is focused on the interaction between audit 
committees and the internal audit function, specifically investigating a variety of audit 
committee characteristics and the quality of internal auditing. Table 2.4 contains 
details of the key empirical studies in this area. 
 
Cohen et al. (2004) argue that a close relationship between the audit committee and 
the internal audit function improves the governance capabilities of both parties. The 
stream of research looking at this important relationship has focused on the 
interaction of these two governance mechanisms from a number of different 
perspectives; expectations and contributions of each other’s role in the corporate 
governance mosaic (Sarens and Beelde, 2006; Zain et al., 2006; Sarens et al., 2009); 
audit committee involvement in process issues (Scarbrough et al., 1998; Goodwin, 
2003; Gendron et al., 2004); the role of audit committees in negotiating resources for 
the internal audit function (Carcello et al., 2005; Abbott et al., 2010; Barua et al., 2010); 
and the association between audit committee characteristics and the disclosure and 
remediation of internal control weaknesses (Krishnan, 2005; Zhang et al., 2007; Goh, 
2009; Hoitash et al., 2009).  
 
The increasing scope and responsibilities of audit committee members in the oversight 
of the financial reporting process makes the evaluation of audit committee member’s 
perception of their assigned oversight responsibilities even more important. Audit 
committees perceive internal control evaluations as one of their most important 
responsibilities in the oversight process (Dezoort, 1997; Cohen et al., 2004), however, 
the measurement of such perception is not a trivial task. In a US based experimental 
study involving 87 audit committee members, Dezoort (1998) reports that general 
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domain (audit) and task specific (internal control) experience is very important for 
audit committee members as it means these members are not only consistent and 
insightful in their judgements but also make internal control judgements more like 
auditors, hence showing the importance of relevant expertise in the oversight of 
internal control. 
 
The results of a questionnaire survey of chief internal auditors, conducted by Zain et al. 
(2006), showed that audit committees which are independent and have accounting 
and auditing experience are positively associated with the internal auditors’ 
assessment of their contribution towards external audit. These findings suggest that 
organisations with appropriately constituted audit committees have the potential to 
benefit from the contributions made by the internal audit function in terms of financial 
statement audit.  Audit committees always seek the support of the internal audit 
function in areas such as internal audit control procedures. This is especially the case 
when companies lack formal risk management systems.  The embedded position of 
internal auditors within a company and their familiarity with the risk management 
system puts them in a unique position.  This places an expectation on them from the 
audit committees to perform a helpful role in the financial reporting process.  Findings 
from a Belgian case study show that the internal audit function more or less meets the 
internal control expectations of audit committees (Sarens and Beelde, 2006). 
Furthermore, the advising, supportive and facilitative role of internal auditors provides 
a great help and comfort to audit committees in their monitoring and improving 
internal control and risk management aspects of companies (Sarens et al., 2009).   
 
The bulk of empirical research seeking to investigate the impact of audit committee 
characteristics on the internal audit process has focused on issues of independence 
and financial expertise of audit committee members. Moreover, surveys seem to be 
the methodology of choice in this line of enquiry.  Scarbrough et al. (1998) surveyed 
Canadian firms and reported that audit committees composed solely of outside 
directors meet the chief internal auditor and review the work of the internal auditor 
more frequently compared to audit committees with employee directors. In a similar 
vein, Goodwin and Yeo (2001) surveying Singapore firms, found evidence that audit 
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committees composed solely of independent directors11 met more frequently and 
privately with chief internal auditors as compared to their counterparts. Similar 
findings have also been documented in studies of US firms (Raghunandan et al., 2001) 
and Australian/New Zealand firms (Goodwin 2003), where the audit committee had at 
least one member with accounting or finance experience.  These studies are thus 
suggestive of a positive link between audit committee independence and the 
frequency and privacy of meetings with the internal auditor. The privacy of these 
meetings enhances and protects the independence of internal auditors, as these 
internal auditors tend to discuss sensitive issues with audit committee members more 
freely in the absence of management (Scarbrough et al., 1998; Braiotta, 1999).  
Moreover, the chances of these meetings being private, increases if audit committee 
members are equipped with accounting expertise. In addition, the accounting 
expertise of the audit committee is also strongly associated with periodic reviews of 
the internal auditors work.  Hence, this validates the importance of accounting and 
finance knowledge by audit committee members in the assessment of work carried 
out by the firm’s internal audit function.  
 
The most discussed procedural issue in the internal audit literature is of meetings 
between audit committees and internal auditors. On answering ‘what goes into these 
meetings’ Gendron et al. (2004) suggests that both parties tend to discuss the 
effectiveness of internal controls, the use of wording and the accuracy of financial 
statements, and the quality of external audit.  Although the overwhelming evidence 
points to the importance of interaction between these functions, a point of caution 
must be observed. All these surveys focus only on the views of the internal auditors.  It 
would be interesting to see the perceptions of effectiveness and reliance audit 
committees and external auditors place on the internal audit function. Prior UK 
research has pointed to the lack of confidence shown by audit committees in seeking 
to challenge and question the findings of the internal audit function (Turley and Zaman, 
2007). This study acknowledged the limited impact audit committees had on the work 
                                                          
11
 The Best Practices Guide issued by the Singapore Exchange Limited (1999) defines independence as not having a 
relationship which would interfere with the exercise of independent judgement in carrying out the functions of the 
committee. Thus, all independent directors must also be non-executives but a non-executive director is not 
necessarily independent. 
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plan of the internal audit function and on matters such as internal control and audit. 
The members of the internal audit function remark that this limited role of audit 
committees is due to the lack of experience and detailed knowledge. However, the 
establishment of an informal link between the head of internal audit and the chair of 
audit committee is shown to be of significant importance as this improves the overall 
motivation of the head of internal audit function in carrying out its duties in proving 
their credibility to the audit committee chair as a valuable unit of the firm. 
 
Being an organ of the firm, the credibility or usefulness of the internal audit function is 
inevitably linked with its objectivity and independence from management. The role of 
audit committees is also of much importance in strengthening the independence of 
the internal audit function.  Goodwin and Yeo (2001) argue that audit committees 
provide an independent forum for internal auditors to discuss matters relating to their 
independence. Issues such as; the functional reporting lines for internal auditors; the 
use of internal audit function as a training ground for management; and, most 
importantly, the hiring and firing of the chief internal auditor; have been the subject of 
prior research.  The Institute of internal auditors (IIA, 2004) argue that reporting lines 
are the ultimate source of internal audit independence and are crucial for good 
corporate governance. They therefore encourage chief audit executives (CAE) to report 
directly to audit committees. A recent US survey suggests that lenders perceive that 
those internal audit departments that report directly to the audit committee are more 
able to deter and report financial statement fraud than internal audit departments 
reporting directly to company management (James, 2003). Moreover, no difference in 
users’ perceptions of financial statement and fraud prevention was recorded between 
in-house and outsourced internal audit functions (James, 2003). However, the use of 
the internal audit function to train future management personnel was found to be 
widespread, thus posing a threat to the objectivity of the internal auditor (Goodwin 
and Yeo, 2001).  
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Table 2.4:  Audit Committee and Internal Audit Function 
 
Author (Date) and Journal  Research Method Key Findings 
Dezoort (1998) 
Accounting, Organisations and 
Society 
An experimental study involving 87 AC 
members from US firms with and without 
experience of having completed an 
internal control oversight task. 
This study finds that general and specific experience of AC members is very important as 
members with experience were consistent in their judgements, were more insightful, and 
made internal control judgments more like auditors than their counterparts. 
Scarborough et al (1998) 
Accounting Horizons 
Data was collected by mailing 
questionnaires to the chief internal 
auditor of 398 Canadian companies. 
48% of ACs were involved in the chief internal auditor dismissal decision, 59% of ACs had 3 or 
more meetings with the chief internal auditor, and only 69% of ACs reviewed the internal 
auditor program and its charter.  
Goodwin and Yeo (2001) 
International Journal of Auditing 
Questionnaires sent to chief internal 
auditors of both listed and unlisted 
companies in Singapore (n=65). 
A strong relationship was found between the AC and the internal audit function, with the level 
of interaction being greater when the AC was comprised solely of independent directors.  
Raghunandan et al (2001) 
Accounting Horizons 
A survey of chief internal auditors of 114 
American public companies in 1999. 
ACs composed solely of independent directors and with at least one member having an 
accounting or finance background were more likely to: (1) have longer meetings with the chief 
internal auditor; (2) provide private access to the chief internal auditor; and (3) review internal 
audit proposals and results of internal auditing. 
 
Goodwin (2003) 
International Journal of Auditing 
 
A questionnaire survey of 109 chief 
internal auditors in Australia and New 
Zealand. 
AC independence is associated with a number of issues of process, such as the frequency and 
length of meetings with internal audit, the privacy of such meetings etc, while accounting 
experience is associated with the extent that the AC reviews the work of the internal audit 
function. 
James (2003) 
Accounting Horizon 
A US based survey study comprising 63 
useable survey instruments. 
This study finds that in-house internal audit departments that report to senior management 
are perceived as less able to provide protection against fraudulent reporting compared to in-
house departments that report solely to the AC. 
Gendron et al (2004) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory 
22 interviews with CEOs, CFOs, IA and AC 
chairman as well as AC members in 3 large 
Canadian firms in 2000/01. 
This study highlights the key matters that AC members emphasize during meetings. These 
matters include the accuracy of financial statements, internal control effectiveness, wording 
used in the financial reports and the quality of auditors’ work. 
Carcello et al (2005) 
Accounting Horizons 
Survey data from 217 mid size US 
companies was analysed during 2002. 
 
This study finds evidence of linkage between large IA budget and companies with ACs that 
review the IA budget. The nature of AC oversight is also associated with the variations in the IA 
budget. 
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Author (Date) and Journal  Research Method Key Findings 
Krishnan J (2005) 
The Accounting review 
An analysis of 256 US companies between 
1994 and 2000 (128 with internal control 
problems and 128 without problems) 
AC independence is negatively associated with the presence of internal control problems.  
Study also finds a negative relationship between the number of financial experts on the AC 
and the presence of internal control problems. 
Bronson et al (2006) 
Auditing: A journal of practice and 
theory 
An analysis of 397 annual reports filed by 
medium-sized firms with the SEC at the 
end of fiscal year 1998. 
Study finds that one third of the sample firms issued management report on internal control 
(MRICs) and a positive association exists between the likelihood of MRICs and size of the firm, 
AC meetings, and the level of institutional ownership. 
Sarens and Beelde (2006) 
International Journal of Auditing 
A case study involving 5 multinational 
firms from Belgium in 2005. 
In most cases, internal audit is able to meet the expectations of the AC, expectations that 
more or less are in line with those of senior management. In most cases the audit committee 
and senior management have more or less the same expectations with respect to the internal 
audit. 
 
Zain et al (2006) 
International Journal of Auditing 
 
A questionnaire survey of chief internal 
auditors of 76 Malaysian listed firms. 
Finds a positive relationship between AC characteristics (proportion of independent AC 
members, knowledge and experience of accounting and auditing, and the extent of AC review 
of internal audit programmes) and internal auditors’ assessment of their contribution to 
financial statement audits.  
Krishnan G and Visvanathan (2007) 
International Journal of Auditing 
A sample of 90 firms based on the 
regulatory filings with the SEC that 
reported material weaknesses in their 
internal controls in 2004. 
Finds that more active ACs are associated with reporting internal control weaknesses.  Also 
finds that ACs with a smaller proportion of financial experts are more likely to report internal 
control weaknesses.    
Zain and Subramaniam (2007) 
Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 
 
Using interview data from 11 heads of 
internal audit function (HIAFs) in 20 
randomly selected large listed Malaysian 
companies in 2003. 
HIAFs place significant trust in ACs to take up the key questioning role in more formal settings. 
Also shows that infrequent informal communications and limited private meetings between 
the HIAFs and ACs, and a need for clear reporting lines. 
 
Zhang et al (2007) 
Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy 
An analysis of 208 US firms with material 
internal control weaknesses between 
2004 and 2005. 
Firms are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their ACs have less 
financial expertise.   
Crawford et al (2008) 
Public Money and Management 
Questionnaire data collected from 32 
Scottish local authorities. 
The respondents perceive ACs as being quite effective in monitoring internal audit and the 
corporate governance framework of organisations.  However, ACs were not perceived as being 
effective in monitoring external audit and risk management.  
Christopher et al (2009) 
Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal 
A critical comparison of questionnaire 
results (chief audit executives of 34 
Australian firms) versus existing literature 
and best practice guidelines. 
AC seems to be creating indirect threats for IA function in a number of ways mainly due to 
inconsistent compliance with best practice guidance on issues such as IA function’s reporting 
procedure, AC composition, and powers to hire and fire the head of IA function. 
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Author (Date) and Journal  Research Method Key Findings 
Goh (2009) 
Contemporary Accounting Research 
Data from 208 unique US firms that 
disclosed at least one material weakness 
from July 2003 to December 2004 under 
SOX 302. 
Firms with more independent boards, larger ACs, and the proportion of AC members with 
financial expertise (only non accounting), is positively associated with firms' timeliness in the 
remediation of material weaknesses.    
 
Hoitash et al (2009) 
The Accounting Review 
Study sample contains of 5480 firm-year 
observations and data on 19673 AC 
members collected between 2004 and 
2006 (US). 
Finds that both accounting and supervisory expertise are associated with higher quality 
internal controls. However, AC meetings are positively associated with material weaknesses 
(MW) and AC size is not associated with MW disclosure. 
 
Naiker and Sharma (2009) 
The Accounting Review 
An analysis of 1224 firms using the 
Compustat database for the 2004 fiscal 
year. 
Study finds that affiliated former audit partners (AFAPs) are negatively associated with 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, and AFAPs appointed to the AC within and after 
the three-year ‘cooling-off’ period are negatively associated with ICDs. 
Sarens et al (2009) 
The British Accounting Review 
Interview data from 4 Belgian companies 
in 2005, involving internal auditors, chief 
audit executives and the head of the ACs. 
Finds that the internal audit function’s advising, supportive and facilitative roles provide 
reassurance to the AC. For those companies that lack a formal risk management system, the 
internal audit function’s role in formalising the risk management system is also a crucial source 
of comfort to the AC. 
Abbott et al (2010) 
Accounting Horizons 
A survey of 134 chief internal auditors 
from Fortune 1000 firms in fiscal year 
2005. 
Study finds a strong, positive association between AC oversight variable and the amount of IAF 
budget allocated to internal-controls-based activities. 
Barua et al (2010) 
Journal of Accounting and Public 
policy 
An analysis of 181 SEC registrant firms 
that: (a) responded to a survey, per 
Carcello et al. (2005) and (b) had available 
data about AC in proxy statements. 
Internal audit budget is negatively related to the presence of an auditing expert on the 
committee and the average tenure of AC members. Internal audit budget is positively related 
to the number of AC meetings. 
 
Cullinan et al (2010) 
International Journal of Auditing 
An empirical analysis of a sample of 243 
US firms using data collected from proxy 
statements in 2004 and 2005. 
Results show that firms that have stock option plans for their AC members are significantly 
more likely to report material weaknesses in their internal control than firms that do not have 
a stock option plan for AC members.  
Sarens and Abdolmohammadi (2011) 
International Journal of Auditing 
Analysis of IAF data (questionnaire) 
obtained from 73 Belgian firms. 
This study shows that the proportion of independent board members has a negative effect on 
IAF size. This study does not find a significant relationship between the AC activity and the 
relative size of the IAF. 
Anderson et al (2012) 
Accounting Horizons 
A survey of 212 public and private US 
companies from 2007 to 2008. 
Audit committee size, audit committee meetings with the chief audit executives and audit 
committee that approves the internal audit budget has a positive and significant impact on 
internal audit size.  
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It has also been argued that the involvement of audit committees in the replacement 
of the chief internal auditor also reduces the influence of management and 
consequently adds empowerment to the internal audit function (Scarbrough et al., 
1998; Goodwin & Yeo, 2001; Goodwin, 2003). The evidence, however, suggests that 
audit committees do not always provide sufficient protection to the chief internal 
auditor against the threat of dismissal as Scarbrough et al. (1998) found. This study 
reported that only 48 per cent of audit committees were involved in the chief internal 
auditor appointment decision. This percentage improved to 72 per cent for a 
Singapore survey (Goodwin and Yeo, 2001), but a similar survey in Australia and New 
Zealand reported a drop in this percentage to 52 per cent (Goodwin, 2003).  
 
The role of audit committees in the allocation of resources to the internal audit 
function has also been the focus of much attention in recent research.  The approval of 
resources from management can actually hinder the independence of the internal 
auditor as it limits the scope of the internal audit function. The findings of recent 
surveys show that audit committees’ commitment to monitoring and oversight is 
positively associated with the size of the internal audit budget (Carcello et al., 2005; 
Abbott et al., 2010).  In addition, research focusing on the impact of audit committee 
independence (Sarens and Abdolmohammadi, 2011) and auditing expertise (Barua et 
al., 2010) on internal audit investment suggests that both these characteristics were 
viewed as alternative monitoring mechanisms and have a substitution effect on the 
size of the internal audit budget.  The study by Barua et al. (2010) further found that 
the frequency of audit committee members meetings was positively related with the 
size of the internal audit budget, suggesting the diligence of audit committee members 
is linked to greater demands for high quality internal audit, and hence higher 
commitment to the financial reporting process .   In the same vein, Anderson et al., 
(2012) while investigating the internal audit resources in terms of the number of 
internal audit employees found that audit committee size, audit committee meetings 
with the chief audit executives and audit committee that approves the internal audit 
budget has a positive and significant impact on internal audit size. 
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A final area of interest that has attracted the attention of prior research is of the 
association between audit committee quality and its impact on the disclosure of 
material weaknesses within a company’s internal controls. Audit committees are 
expected to develop and maintain sound internal controls (BRC, 1999; Carcello et al., 
2002) and recent regulatory requirements in the US (SOX, 2002) have made it 
mandatory for public companies to disclose material weaknesses.  Auditing Standard 
No. 2 defines a material weakness as ‘‘a significant deficiency, or combination of 
significant deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material 
misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or 
detected.’’ The empirical evidence shows that audit committee independence and 
financial expertise are associated with better internal control quality (Krishnan, 2005; 
Zhang et al., 2007; Hoitash et al., 2009). The evidence on the accounting and non- 
accounting expertise of audit committees is rather mixed. Hoitash et al. (2009) report 
that accounting expertise are more important in enhancing internal control quality, 
however, Goh et al. (2009), in another US based study, reported that it is actually the 
non-accounting expertise of audit committee members that have a positive association 
with the remediation of internal control problems. 
 
Audit committee meeting frequency and option plans are negatively related with 
internal control quality (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2007; Hoitash et al., 2009; Cullinan 
et al., 2010).  However, prior to SOX, (2002), when management reports on internal 
controls were not mandatory, Bronson et al (2006) reported a positive association 
between the frequency of audit committee meetings and the inclusion of management 
reports on internal control in annual financial statements. This suggests that audit 
committees, that hold more meetings, are more concerned with internal control 
quality and hence financial reporting quality. An interesting point to note is that all of 
the above studies which have provided evidence on the association of audit committee 
characteristics with the quality of internal control are US based. Therefore there is a 
need for research in other regulatory environments to help understand fully the 
interaction between audit committee characteristics and the quality of internal control.  
 
 
51 
 
2.1.5 Summarising the Governance role of Audit Committees 
Over the past twenty years, the governance role of audit committees has received a 
very significant amount of attention.  Much of this has come from regulators who view 
audit committees as an important governance mechanism with the potential to 
significantly improve the quality of companies’ financial disclosures and, in so doing, 
ensure greater transparency both for markets and individuals.  The academic interest 
in audit committees has developed in parallel with regulatory developments and the 
nature of academic enquiry has been greatly influenced by regulators’ 
pronouncements on the use and usefulness of audit committees and their role in the 
emerging governance mosaic.  In particular, the academic literature has moved on 
from its earlier focus on whether companies possessed audit committees and, if so, 
what was the impact of their presence on a range of company characteristics and 
behaviour.  More recent work acknowledges that audit committees are now quasi-
mandatory in many countries so academic interest has switched to issues such as their 
composition, their expertise, and their relationships with other elements of 
governance within firms.   
 
This chapter has sought to review the ever expanding academic literature on audit 
committees by seeking to segregate the literature into a number of categories.  First, 
the relationship between audit committees and statutory audit was discussed.  This 
begins with a discussion of some work that has attempted to understand what audit 
committee members themselves understand by the notion of audit quality.  Of 
particular interest here is the association audit committees seem to make between 
audit quality and both audit tenure and auditor-type. Specifically, there is some 
evidence that audit committees view length of auditor tenure negatively related to 
audit quality, while other audit committee members associate audit quality with using 
one of the large audit firms or, auditors who are perceived as specialists in a particular 
industry.  Overall, there is evidence that more independent and active audit 
committees may also be more likely to influence auditor selection.  A crucial role that 
audit committees play is in mediating differences between company management and 
external auditors.  The available evidence seems to suggest that audit committees 
tend to support external auditors on issues of interpretation of standards and disputes 
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involving the exercise of earnings management by the audit client.  The support for 
auditors seems even stronger when the financial condition of the client company is 
poor. 
 
A second strand of research looks at the role of audit committees and financial 
statement quality.  There is clear evidence that companies subject to allegations of 
fraud and related offences by regulators are less likely to possess an audit committee.  
Furthermore, there is also clear international evidence that more independent, more 
active and those audit committees with greater expertise are associated with fewer 
instances of reporting (or alleged) irregularities.  A small number of studies have 
examined the stock market reaction to relevant audit committee announcements. Of 
interest here is whether investors react positively or negatively to company news.  A 
couple of trends have emerged: the announcement of audit committee formation has 
a positive stock market reaction; the appointment of members with audit, accounting 
or finance experience also has a positive announcement effect.  Taken together, these 
findings suggest that investors appreciate the benefits of companies’ possessing an 
audit committee and differentiate the potential contribution of certain member 
characteristics to future company value. 
 
The final area of research reviewed is the relationship between audit committees and 
the internal audit function.  Research in this field is largely undertaken via surveys 
and/or interviews, predominantly focusing on the views of internal auditors and their 
perception of their company’s audit committee.  Overall, there does seem to be a 
consensus that more independent audit committees meet more frequently and 
privately with internal auditors compared to less independent ones.  There is also 
some evidence that audit committees with greater financial expertise have a better 
on-going interaction with the internal audit function.  A further issue in this research is 
the extent to which the internal audit function is independent from company 
management, ideally reporting and accountable to the audit committee.  There is also 
a related issue of resourcing the internal audit function with strong support for the link 
between a better resourced internal audit function and higher quality internal auditing 
being undertaken. Finally, there is evidence that more independent audit committees 
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and those with greater levels of accounting/finance experience are associated with 
more effective internal auditing. 
 
2.2 Financial Reporting Quality 
This section examines the empirical literature related to financial reporting quality and 
provides a general overview of both audit quality and earnings quality.  Financial 
reporting quality is linked to two main aspects; ensuring the audit itself is of good 
quality and the quality of the reported earnings is of acceptable standard.  This section 
therefore explains both audit quality and earnings quality as components of financial 
reporting quality.  Each of the sections firstly provides an overview of the concept and 
then explains how they relate to the role of audit committees. 
 
2.2.1 Audit Quality 
Audit quality has been defined as the joint probability that an existing material error is 
detected and reported by an auditor (DeAngelo, 1981).  As this has a direct impact on 
the financial reporting, audit quality can further by defined as the ability of an auditor 
to provide an independent audit free from misstatement, error and fraud.  Moreover, 
Watkins et al. (2004) provide a comprehensive overview of the different ways in which 
audit quality has been defined in the prior literature.  It is viewed as, the accuracy of 
the information reported on by auditors (Davidson and Neu, 1993); the probability that 
an auditor will not issue an unqualified report for statements containing material 
errors (Lee et al., 1999); and the market assessed probability that the financial 
statements contain material errors and that the auditor will discover and report them 
(DeAngelo, 1981).   
 
There are a number of factors which can affect the quality of an audit, FRC (2008) 
suggest these could be (a) the culture within the audit firm, (b) skills and personal 
qualities of audit partners and staff, (c) the audit process, (d) usefulness of the audit 
reporting and (e) factors outside the control of the auditors. The GAAP outlines 
important elements such as competence, independence and exercise of due 
professional care as measures for the quality of the external auditor’s performance.  
Wooten (2003) also notes that audit firms, audit teams and professional judgement 
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are central elements to audit quality.  Consequently, audit quality has a very multi-
dimensional nature and cannot be understood with reference to a single factor.  It is 
not easily defined or observable even for those actors who are very close to the audit 
process (Simunic and Stein, 1987; Balsam et al., 2003; Lin and Hwang, 2010).  
 
Due to its complex and unobservable nature a key issue in audit quality literature has 
been identifying the methods of measuring audit quality.  A number of proxies have 
been devised that can help operationalise audit quality. A common proxy that has 
been used is identifying the brand name of the audit firm, i.e. if the audit firm is one of 
the ‘big 4’ auditing firms, equating brand reputation with better quality audits.  With 
Clarkson and Simunic (1994) suggesting that in this instance audit quality and auditor 
quality becomes synonymous.  However, this has been refuted by Balsam et al. (2003) 
who argue that because auditor quality is multidimensional and inherently 
unobservable, no single auditor characteristic can be used to proxy for it.  This 
argument suggests that a number of different factors should be considered when 
examining proxies for audit quality.   
 
In addition to examining effects of brand name (e.g. Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 
1999; Lin et al., 2006; Bédard et al., 2004; Davidson et al., 2005), prior studies have 
examined the effects of industry specialization, auditor tenure, provision of various 
services by the auditor and auditor independence (e.g. Beattie and Fearnly, 2002; 
Frankel et al., 2002; Chung and Kallapur, 2003, Raghunandan et al., 2003; Zaman et al., 
2011) on a number of issues directly or indirectly related to financial reporting (Lin and 
Hwang, 2010).  This thesis breaks down audit quality in terms of the effort of the 
auditor and the independence of the auditor, or in other words, as the probability that 
an auditor (a) detects errors and (b) reports detected errors.  This is consistent with 
Caramanis and Lennox (2008, p116), who noted “audit effort affects the probability 
that the auditor detects an existing problem, whereas auditor independence affects 
the probability that the auditor reports a detected problem”.  The following sections 
provide a brief overview of auditor effort and auditor independence. 
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2.2.1.1 Audit Effort (audit fees) 
The probability that an auditor detects any material errors can be directly linked to the 
audit effort, i.e. the amount of time, scope, coverage and resources contributed to 
detecting such errors.  Although, it is extremely difficult to measure effort expended, 
Caramanis and Lennox (2008) tested the effect of audit effort in terms of hours worked 
on audits in Greece. However, this approach is difficult to apply in the UK due to 
unavailability of large datasets of audit hours. A more common proxy for audit effort is 
linked to the amount of audit fees paid.  If the level of conflict is high between 
management and owners, then there may be greater demand for audit to be of high 
quality (Watkins, et al. 2004).  Consequently, this suggests that more effort may be 
expended and more costs (e.g. audit fees) may be incurred by the firm in ensuring this 
high quality audit (Simunic, 1980; Craswell et al., 1995; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002).  
Moreover, it has been empirically tested that audit fees have a positive relationship 
with planned audit quality (Elitzur and Falk, 1996) and higher audit fees increase the 
auditor’s effort and result in a higher audit quality (Hoitash et al., 2007).   
 
2.2.1.2 Auditor Independence (non-audit fee ratio) 
Auditor independence is an important issue which has been examined extensively 
within studies of audit quality.  Auditor independence is fundamental to public 
confidence in the reporting and auditing process as well as the reliability of the 
auditors’ report (Turley et al., 2011).  Yet, it is a very elusive and intangible concept, 
and has often been described as a ‘state of mind’ rather than in practical terms (Page 
and Spira, 2005). Due to its indefinable characteristics, regulatory authorities have 
provided numerous code of ethics and professional codes of conduct for their 
members to abide by, in the hopes to maintain independence.  As a result, measures 
of independence are also equally as difficult to find.  An important proxy for measuring 
auditor independence has been the purchase of non-audit services and the 
corresponding non audit fees.  The argument for using this proxy is that the provision 
of non-audit services can create dependence on the auditor, which can then hamper 
auditor independence.  Although, critics of this argument would suggest the provision 
of non-audit services allows economic benefits especially when knowledge of the 
business gained during the provision of non-audit services can be transferred in 
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delivering an efficient audit and vice versa (Porter et al., 2003; Simunic, 1984).  It must 
be stated that most companies purchase non audit services, therefore their existence 
is in itself not an issue.  The concern is the amount that is spent on these non audit 
services and the subsequent ratio of non-audit fees in relation to audit fees.  Although 
Beattie and Fearnly (2002) argue there is very little support for the view that joint 
provision of audit and non audit services impairs independence, they also agree that 
joint provision adversely affects the perception of independence; hence the ratio of 
non-audit fees to audit fees can be regarded as a measure of perceived independence 
of the auditor.   
 
2.2.2 The Role of Audit Committees in Maintaining Audit Quality 
The literature on the relationship between certain audit committee characteristics and 
audit fees has shown mixed results. This variation may be due to the perceived dual 
role of audit committees (Collier and Gregory, 1996).  In order to protect their 
reputational capital (Carcello et al., 2002b), audit committees enhance the quality of 
financial reporting through their choice of quality auditors (Abbott and Parker, 2000) 
or by increasing the scope and coverage of audit work (Abbott et al., 2003a), this 
inevitably results in higher audit fees. In the same vein, audit committees are also 
responsible for strengthening the internal control procedures of companies (Wallace, 
1984; Collier, 1992) through improvements in the internal audit function. This role 
should in contrast, reduce the work done by the external auditor and thereby result in 
lower fees.    
 
The literature has found there to be a multitude of relationships between the different 
characteristics of audit committees and audit fee. Some studies have shown positive 
links between specific audit committee characteristics such as; size (Abbott et al., 
2003a; Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Zaman et al., 2011), 
independence (Abbott et al., 2003a; Carcello et al., 2002; Mitra et al., 2007; Zaman et 
al., 2011) and expertise (Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003a; Vafeas and 
Waegelein, 2007; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Zaman et al., 2011; Engel et al., 2010) 
and the audit fee. This correlates with the view that an audit committee with these 
characteristics is likely to seek a higher level of audit assurance and thereby could 
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demand a greater level of audit coverage resulting in higher audit fees. The expertise 
of audit committee members have been analysed from different perspectives in the 
extant literature.  These measures include; governance expertise i.e. audit committee 
members with experience of serving on another audit committee (Vafeas and 
Waegelein, 2007), financial expertise i.e. broader definition of financial expertise 
provided by SEC (Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003a; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; 
Zaman et al., 2011), accounting financial expertise (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009; 
Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009), and non accounting and supervisory financial expertise 
(Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009).   
 
The literature on the impact of audit committee expertise on audit fee shows that 
audit fees are positively associated with audit committee members with experience of 
serving on another audit committee (Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007), financial expertise 
(Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003a; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Zaman et al., 
2011), accounting financial expertise (Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009), and supervisory 
financial expertise (Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009).   In contrast, Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2009) found financial expertise to be negatively related to audit fee, when the 
definition of expertise is restricted to accounting financial expertise. They argue that 
auditors see the accounting financial expertise of the audit committee members as 
mitigating the control risk and audit risk and hence result in lower audit fee. More 
recently Chan et al., (2012) have also documented a negative association between the 
proportion of audit committee members serving longer on the board and audit fee. 
The findings in relation to audit committee diligence show that audit committee 
meetings has a positive and significant impact on audit fees (Goodwin and Kent, 2006; 
Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Engel et al., 2009). However in some other studies no links 
have been found between the number of meetings audit committees hold and the 
audit fee (Abbot et al., 2003a; Carcello et al., 2002). Moreover, O’Sullivan (1999) also 
found no link between corporate governance mechanisms such as board and audit 
committee characteristics and auditors’ pricing decisions. 
 
The role of audit committees in the provision of non-audit services is also of key 
interest in recent research. Arthur Levitt (Levitt, 2000), former chair of the SEC, 
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expressed his concerns on the provision of non audit services when he stated 
“consulting and other services shorten the distance between the auditor and 
management” and therefore have a direct negative impact on auditor independence.  
Audit committees are responsible for ensuring auditor independence and therefore 
are directly or indirectly involved in the decisions taken with regards to the provision 
of non-audit services. Abbott et al. (2003b), in an analysis of 538 US firms, note that 
audit committees which are fully independent and hold at least four meetings every 
year are associated with lower non-audit fee ratio. In another study, Hoitash and 
Hoitash (2009) found that audit committee size and meetings frequency is negatively 
associated with non-audit fee ratio. These findings suggest that non-audit fees 
authorized by stronger audit committees lead to a smaller proportion of non audit fees 
in relation to audit fees.  Zaman et al. (2011), while examining UK evidence, note a 
negative association between independence and expertise of audit committees and 
non-audit fees. This suggests that certain audit committee characteristics perceive a 
high level of non-audit services fees in a negative light.  However, Zaman et al. (2011), 
while measuring the association between audit committee effectiveness12 and non 
audit services fee, noted that audit committees of larger clients are positively 
associated with non-audit services fees. This finding raises an important question as to 
whether complex activities of larger clients are the determinants of the provision of 
higher non-audit services fee or audit committees in the UK are less concerned about 
the perceived impact on auditor independence.   
 
It has further been suggested that audit fees are higher when a company has an audit 
committee, discloses higher levels of financial risk management and lower levels of 
compliance risk management (Knechel and Willikens, 2006). Furthermore the extent of 
regulation within a firm also plays a key role in the audit fees paid out, with 
suggestions that regulated companies have lower audit fees and also exhibit a weaker 
association between audit fees and audit committee independence and size (Boo and 
Sharma 2008).  These findings are consistent with the notion that regulatory oversight 
partially substitutes the external audit as a monitoring mechanism in those companies. 
 
                                                          
12
 This is a composite measure of audit committee size, independence, expertise and meeting frequency. 
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2.2.3 Earnings Quality 
Earnings quality refers to the quality of the reported earnings numbers. Since the 
worth of a company is directly related to its reported earnings figures, top 
management view earnings management as a device to meet earnings expectations 
for their companies (Loomis, 1999). Earnings management has always been a major 
concern and a central element of major regulatory reforms around the world (AARF, 
1997; BRC, 1999; Smith, 2003).  Former US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Chairman, Levitt (1998), expressed his serious concerns over earnings management in 
his famous “the Numbers Game” speech. He called for a fundamental cultural change 
for corporate management and strengthening corporate governance, especially by 
improving the effectiveness of audit committee. 
 
Schipper (1989, p 368) defines earnings management as ‘a purposeful intervention in 
the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain’. 
Similarly, Mulford and Comiskey (1996, p 360) note that ‘earnings management is the 
active manipulation of accounting results for the purpose of creating an altered 
impression of business performance’, with the SEC (1999, p 3) saying it is: ‘the practice 
of distorting the true financial performance of (a) company. Likewise Healy and 
Wahlan (1999, p 368) explain earnings management as management using ‘judgement 
in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers'.  Although there may be some differences on the exact definition of earnings 
management, the main essence of the above definitions is that managers tend to 
report earnings as they wish rather than as the true financial position of a firm.  For 
that reason, reported earnings in the financial statements do not reflect the actual 
underlying economic substance of the firm. This also suggests that accruals accounting 
plays an important role in earnings management, as it relies on assumptions and 
management judgement to provide information on the economic performance of the 
firm.  Consequently, from an agency perspective, earnings management can be linked 
to the opportunistic behaviour of management (Healey and Wahlen, 1999). 
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The actual practice of earnings manipulation can either be linked to the choice of 
accounting methods, or the use of discretionary accruals.  The former can involve the 
manipulation of; revenue recognition methods, inventory cost calculations, research 
and development or investment accounting. The latter is linked to the manipulation of 
accruals, e.g. provisions for doubtful accounts and obsolete inventories, deferred tax 
and variation in the useful economic life of depreciated long-term assets. Management 
may have a number of reasons for engaging in the manipulation of earnings with Healy 
and Wahlen (1999) identifying three main situations, namely, capital market, 
manager’s contracts written in terms of accounting numbers and political and 
regulatory requirements.  These are discussed below.  
 
2.2.3.1 Earnings Management Motivations 
Capital market motivations are linked to a desire to prevent earnings losses, boost 
expectations and influence share prices (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Barth et al., 
1999).  Healy (1985) found that management had an economic incentive to manipulate 
earnings if this had a direct impact on their cash compensation.  This often occurs in 
instances where the performance of the firm is linked to managerial compensation.   In 
addition, capital market incentives for manipulations can also occur at the time of 
initial public offerings (Teoh et al., 1998a; Yoon and Miller, 2002) and prior to stock 
mergers (Erickson and Wang, 1999).   
 
Contract motivations occur when management seek to manipulate the terms of 
compensation contracts between themselves and others to their advantage.  To limit 
agency problems and constrain management opportunistic behaviour, firms often 
have a multitude of contracts between shareholders and managers, as well as lending 
agreements and debt covenants between managers and lenders.  These contracts are 
often tied to accounting numbers, whereby management are encouraged to increase 
earnings and receive increased cash compensation in return (Healy, 1985).  This could 
also lead management to transfer earnings to the next accounting period if their 
earnings exceed their compensation target (Holthausen et al., 1995).  In contrast, 
although prior research on accounting choices motivated by debt covenant concerns 
has been found to be inconclusive by Fields et al. (2001), a more recent study by 
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Beatty and Weber (2003) found convincing evidence that borrowers are more likely to 
make income increasing rather than income-decreasing changes in light of debt 
covenants. 
 
Political and regulatory motivations are also an important consideration.  Corporate 
firms have a multitude of regulation, i.e. tax laws etc, they must abide by and a 
number of oversight bodies.  Often, this scrutiny of a firm begins with its accounting 
numbers (Revsine et al., 2002) and putting pressure on firms to smooth their income.  
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argue that firms had an incentive to manage earnings in 
a downward direction to avoid anti-trust investigations or other adverse political 
consequences.  This is consistent with Cahan (1992) who found firms under 
investigation for anti-trust violations reported income-decreasing abnormal accruals in 
the investigation years.  Similarly, Black et al., (1998) found strong evidence of earnings 
management in the UK before the changes in the accounting standard on asset 
revaluation. 
    
2.2.3.2 Measurement of Earnings Management 
There are a number of ways that have been used to measure earnings management in 
the prior literature such as transfer pricing (Lo et al., 2010) and accounting 
conservatism (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008) however the most prominent measure 
of earnings management has been the use of accruals based earnings management 
models (Bedard et al., 2004; Peasnell et al., 2005; Vafeas, 2005; Dhaliwal et al., 2010; 
Ghosh et al., 2010).    Accrual accounting provides important and useful information on 
companies’ financial performance however the process itself is based on assumptions 
such as judgement and accounting discretion.  Managers use accruals to estimate 
earnings, as firstly any subsequent change in the accruals estimation does not require 
the restatement of financial statements; and secondly, it is difficult for external 
auditors to label ‘judgement’ as a wilful act to manipulate earnings.  
 
Healey (1985) developed the initial accruals based method of measuring earnings 
management. He assumed systematic earnings management occurred in every period 
and defined accruals as the difference between reported earnings and cash flow from 
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operations.  This model was subsequently built on by a number of researchers (see 
DeAngelo, 1986 and Dechow and Sloan, 1991), the most notable of which was the 
model presented by Jones (1991) as it controlled for changes in a firms economic 
conditions by accounting for both discretionary and non-discretionary components. 
The model assumed that while sales growth controls a firm's non-discretionary 
working capital, the level of property, plant, and equipment controls the firm's non-
discretionary depreciation expense (Bernard and Skinner, 1996).  Jones (1991) first 
developed a proxy to detect earnings management.  This model has been 
subsequently built upon by a number of other studies.  Jones (1991) calculated the 
discretionary and non-discretionary components of accruals by proposing the 
following formulae: 
TAi,t/Ait-1 = αi[1/Ait-1] + β1i[ΔREVit/Ait-1] + β2i[PPEit/Ait-1] + εi,t (1)  
[Where: TAi,t = Total accruals in year t for firm i; Total Accruals = net income after extraordinary items – 
net cash flow from operations; Ait-1 = Total assets in year t - 1 for firm i; ΔREVit = Revenues in year t less 
revenues in year t - 1 for firm i; PPEit = Gross property, plant and equipment in year t for firm i; εi,t = Error 
term in year t for firm i.] 
 
The firm specific coefficients are generated by using ordinary least squares regression 
for equation (1). Jones (1991) used these firm specific coefficients for αi, β1i and β2i. to 
estimate the level of non-discretionary accruals for each sample firm using the 
following model:  
NDAit = ai[1/Ait-1] + b1i[ΔREVit/Ait-1] + b2i[PPEit/Ait-1] (2)  
[Where; NDAit = Non-discretionary accruals in year t for firm i; Ait-1 = Total assets in year t - 1 for firm i; 
ΔREVit = Revenues in year t less revenues in year t - 1 for firm i; PPEit = Gross property, plant and 
equipment in year t for firm i.] 
 
The above calculated non-discretionary accruals are then used in the equation (3) 
given below to estimate the discretionary component of accruals. This value is used as 
a proxy for the extent of earnings management. 
DAit = TAi,t/Ait-1 - NDAit  (3)  
[Where: DAi t= Discretionary accruals in year t for firm i; TAi,t = Total accruals in year t for firm i; Ait-1 = 
Total assets in year t - 1 for firm i; NDAit = Non-discretionary accruals in year t for firm i from equation 
(2).]  
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Four years later, Dechow et al. (1995) made an adjustment to the above Jones (1991) 
model and proposed that a change in receivables be also included in the test period of 
the estimation of the level of non-discretionary accruals. The original Jones model 
assumed that all the revenues are non-discretionary but Dechow et al., (1995) argued 
that managers are more likely to manipulate account receivable amounts (credit sales) 
as compared to cash sales. This new version of the model (equation 4) is as follows.  
TAi,t/Ait-1  = ai[1/Ait-1] + b1i[ΔREVit - ΔRECit /Ait-1] + b2i[PPEit/Ait-1]  (4)  
[Where: TAi,t = Total accruals in year t for firm i; Total Accruals = net income after extraordinary items – 
net cash flow from operations; Ait-1 = Total assets in year t - 1 for firm i; ΔREVit = Revenues in year t less 
revenues in year t - 1 for firm i; ΔRECit = Net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t - 1 for firm 
i; PPEit = Gross property, plant and equipment in year t for firm i.] 
 
A decade later Kothari et al., (2005) suggested that by controlling for a firm’s return on 
assets (ROA) the modified Jones model could be further improved.   The proposed 
addition reflects in the formula as follows;  
TAi,t/Ait-1 = ai[1/Ait-1] + b1i[ΔREVit - ΔRECit /Ait-1] + b2i[PPEit/Ait-1] + [ROAt]  (5)  
[Where: TAi,t = Total accruals in year t for firm i; Total Accruals = net income after extraordinary items – 
net cash flow from operations; Ait-1 = Total assets in year t - 1 for firm i; ΔREVit = Revenues in year t less 
revenues in year t - 1 for firm i; ΔRECit = Net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t - 1 for firm 
i; PPEit = Gross property, plant and equipment in year t for firm i; ROA = Return on assets in year t.] 
 
The Jones (1991) model and its variations had faced criticism by researchers for not 
capturing true earnings management (Bernard and Skinner 1996; Guay et al., 1996; 
Hansen, 1999; Schipper and Vincent, 2003; Francis et al., 2005).  In response Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) developed another model to capture earnings quality, this time 
using the association between the current period working capital accruals and 
operating cash flows from different time periods. This measure defines the quality of 
accruals as the extent to which they map into past, current, and future cash flows; 
ΔWCt = b0 + b1CFOt-1 + b2CFOt + b3CFOt+1 + εt   (1) 
[Where Δ in working capital in year t (ΔWCt) =   ΔAccounts receivable + ΔInventory - ΔAccounts payable - 
ΔTaxes payable + ΔOther assets (net), this can also be calculated as (ΔCurrent Assets – ΔCurrent 
Liabilities) – ΔCash; CFOt-1 represents ‘Cash flows from operations in year t – 1’; CFOt represents ‘Cash 
flows from operations in year t’ and CFOt+1 represents ‘Cash flows from operations year in year t + 1’.] 
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The Dechow and Dichev (2002) model uses the standard deviation of residuals as a 
firm-level measure of accruals and earnings quality: with a low standard deviation 
representing a high match between accruals and cash flows and, hence high quality 
accruals and earnings. Building on this model McNichols (2002) argued the inclusion of 
two variables from the original Jones (1991) model would strengthen both models and 
provide a more robust measure of earnings quality. These two extra variables were the 
change in current sales and the level of property plant and equipment.  Her model did 
indeed find that this modified approach provided more explanatory power to each of 
the models.  The proposed McNichols (2002) model is as follows; 
ΔWCt = b0 + b1CFOt-1 + b2CFOt + b3CFOt+1 + b4ΔSalest + b5PPEt  + εt    (2)  
[Where Δ in working capital in year t (ΔWCt) =   ΔAccounts receivable + ΔInventory - ΔAccounts payable - 
ΔTaxes payable + ΔOther assets (net), this can also be calculated as (ΔCurrent Assets – ΔCurrent 
Liabilities) – ΔCash;  CFOt-1 represents ‘Cash flows from operations in year t – 1’; CFOt represents ‘Cash 
flows from operations in year t’ and CFOt+1 represents ‘Cash flows from operations year in year t + 1’; 
ΔSalest represents ‘Sales in year t – Sales in year t – 1’ and PPEt represents ‘Gross property, plant and 
equipment in year t’.  All variables shown above are scaled by total assets.] 
 
This measure captures both biased ‘‘discretionary’’ accruals and unintentionally poorly 
estimated accruals, hereby disregarding management intent in measurement of 
accruals. Francis et al., (2005) using several indicators of the firm’s business 
environment proposed a new model and separated McNichols measure of earnings 
management into its discretionary and non-discretionary elements. Francis et al. (2005) 
compute the components of accruals (i.e. both discretionary and non-discretionary) by 
estimating a regression of firms’ innate factors affecting accruals quality. To determine 
the discretionary components of accruals quality, the regression equation is as follows;  
AQ = α + b1SIZE + b2 LOSS + b3OPCYC + b4ϭCFO + b5ϭREV + et (2)  
[where AQ is the accruals quality (absolute value of accruals quality from equation 1); SIZE is the natural 
log of total assets, ; LOSS is the number of years in which a loss was recorded for last three years; OPCYC 
is the natural log of average age of inventory plus the average age of receivables (in days), ϭCFO is the 
standard deviation of cash flow from operation over last five years (scaled by total assets) and ϭREV is 
the standard deviation of operating revenue over the last five years (scaled by total assets).]  
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Overseeing the financial reporting process and more specifically maintaining the 
integrity of the financial statements is the fundamental responsibility of the audit 
committee. Consequently, an effective audit committee should deter management 
from making intentional errors and also motivate management to exercise greater 
care in reducing unintentional errors, resulting in higher accruals quality (Dhaliwal et al. 
2010). Therefore for the purpose of this study, the composite model put forward by 
McNichols (2002) and Francis et al., (2005) model are being utilised as proxies for 
earnings quality.  
  
2.2.4 The Role of Audit Committees in Maintaining Earnings Quality 
Much of the research in this area has sought to examine the impact of various 
characteristics of audit committees on doctored records, by developing and empirically 
examining a variety of proxies for earnings management.  These proxies typically 
include the use of various accruals based measures such as income increasing or 
decreasing accruals (Bedard et al., 2004; Peasnell et al., 2005; Vafeas, 2005), absolute 
accruals (Osma and Noguer, 2007; Baxter and Cotter; 2009), quarterly accruals (Yang 
and Krishnan, 2005) and intentional and unintentional accruals (Kent et al., 2010). 
Other measures used in the archival research are Penman and Zhang’s score (Krishnan 
and Visvanathan, 2008) and transfer pricing manipulations (Lo et al., 2010). 
 
The three most discussed characteristics of audit committees in the empirical 
literature are the independence of audit committees; the number of meetings they 
hold annually and their financial expertise. The evidence from the earnings 
management literature shows that audit committee independence levels (Lo et al., 
2010; Kent et al., 2010; Koh et al., 2007; Vafeas, 2005; Yang and Krishnan, 2005; 
Davidson et al., 2005; Bedard et al., 2004; Xie et al., 2003; Klein, 2002), and its financial 
expertise (Lo et al., 2010; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008; Bedard et al., 2004; Xie et 
al., 2003) has a positive influence on firms earnings quality13. Other studies, such as 
Baxter and Cotter, 2009; Piot and Janin, 2007; Osma and Noguer, 2007; have failed to 
report any such impact of these characteristics. An overarching picture that emerges 
from these studies is that all US based studies show very strong support for earnings 
                                                          
13
 Earnings quality is inversely related to earnings management. 
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quality. However the impact of these characteristics on earnings quality in other 
corporate environments, mainly from Australia, is more mixed.    
 
In addressing the controversial question of ‘what constitutes a financial expert’, 
Dhaliwal et al., (2010) analysed 770 firms between 2004 and 2006.  They highlighted 
that accounting experts who fulfil the criteria of being independent, recently 
appointed and less busy, have a profound positive impact on accruals quality. This 
study also highlights the role of finance experts in complementing accounting experts.  
However, in the same study, supervisory experts were seen to be of no use in assisting 
accounting or finance experts in constraining earnings management.  Similar findings 
were reported in another study by Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) who examined 
S&P 500 firms.  They reported a positive association between accounting expertise and 
earnings quality and conservatism, a core property of financial statements. The 
literature examining the association between different dimensions of financial 
expertise with financial reporting quality has mainly used the definition provided by 
the SEC in which an audit committee member is deemed to be a financial expert if the 
member has: (a) accounting expertise, from work experience as a certified public 
accountant, auditor, chief financial officer, financial controller, or accounting officer; (b) 
finance expertise, from work experience as an investment banker, financial analyst, or 
any other financial management role; or (c) supervisory expertise, from supervising the 
preparation of financial statements (e.g., chief executive officer or company president). 
 
In addition to the above attributes, prior research has also provided evidence of the 
impact of other audit committee variables on the likelihood of earnings management.  
With regards to mere existence, earlier studies have found there to be no association 
(Klein, 2002; Davidson et al., 2005; Peasnell et al., 2005) however more recent 
evidence suggests a negative relationships exists between audit committee existence 
and earnings management (Baxter and Cotter, 2009; Piot and Janin, 2007).  Board 
members’ experience on other boards has been the focus of much academic attention 
(O’Sullivan, 2005; 2009), with Useem (1984) arguing it broadens directors’ experience. 
Similarly, this review also highlights the specific importance of other directorships held 
by the audit committee members in constraining earnings management practices 
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(Yang and Krishnan, 2005; Vafeas, 2005).  In a similar vein, governance expertise 
gained by serving longer on the same board was also found to have a positive impact 
on the earnings quality of a firm (Yang and Krishnan, 2005).  
 
The two most disputed variables found in prior work are audit committee size and 
extent of activity. The literature on the relationship between audit committee size and 
earnings management has shown no evidence of an association (Baxter and Cotter, 
2009; Davidson et al., 2005; Bedard et al., 2004).  The exception is an Australian study 
where Kent et al (2010), while examining 302 Australian listed firms, reported that 
larger audit committees are linked with higher earning quality. Other studies linking 
the frequency of audit committee meetings and their impact on earnings management 
have also shown mixed results.  Some studies such as Kent et al., (2010); Koh et al., 
(2007); Vafeas, (2005); and Xie et al., (2003) have documented a negative association 
between meeting frequency and earnings management while studies such as Baxter 
and Cotter, (2009); Davidson et al., (2005); and Bedard et al., (2004) did not find any 
association between these variables.  
 
2.3 Summary   
From the earlier discussion on financial reporting quality, it can be seen that much 
work has investigated the relationship between audit committees and the company’s 
external auditor.   Two aspects of this have attracted most attention: the link with 
audit fees and the extent of non-audit services simultaneously purchased from the 
auditor. The findings in respect of the impact of audit committees on audit fees are 
very mixed, with audit committee characteristics having both positive and negative 
impacts depending on both the jurisdiction and time period being studied.  Of course, 
the reported findings may actually reflect the double-edged nature of the expected 
relationship, in any case, with arguments linking strong and independent audit 
committees with both a greater and lesser demand for auditing.  It appears from the 
available evidence that more independent audit committees and committees that 
meet more frequently are associated with lower non-audit fees, suggesting a greater 
anxiety to safeguard the independence of the audit process through keeping a vigilant 
watch on the mix of audit and non-audit services purchased from auditors.  
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Furthermore, a vast majority of research also focuses on the link between audit 
committees and their characteristics and the incidence and nature of earnings 
management.  There is significant evidence that more independent audit committees 
and those with greater accounting/financial expertise have a positive impact on 
earnings’ management quality.  There is also evidence that positive audit committee 
attributes do encourage better quality interim and annual financial reporting. The 
audit committee can therefore directly influence financial reporting quality in terms of 
both ensuring quality audits and the quality of the earnings. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHOD 
 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research method employed in the study.  The chapter begins 
by explaining the theoretical paradigm in which this thesis is located. This section 
discusses the use of agency theory as a basis for understanding the role of corporate 
governance and its assumptions which underpin the present research. The chapter 
also outlines the research question to be investigated and discusses the development 
of the specific hypotheses this study is seeking to investigate. This draws heavily from 
the literature reviewed in the previous chapter in establishing an academic rationale 
for the various aspects of enquiry being pursued. In particular, hypotheses related to 
financial reporting quality and audit committee size, expertise, independence, 
meetings, tenure, share ownership, busyness and overall effectiveness are presented. 
Once the hypotheses are outlined and justified an explanation and justification for 
choice of sample is outlined and the principal sources of data for the study are 
explained.  Since this is a quantitative empirical study, a significant portion of this 
chapter is devoted to identifying and justifying the dependent and independent 
variables used in the subsequent empirical analysis. The chapter explains in detail how 
the dependent variables (i.e. financial reporting quality) are measured, both in terms 
of audit quality and in terms of earnings quality.  The measurement of independent 
variables are also discussed here (i.e. audit committee size, expertise, meetings, 
independence, tenure, share ownership, busyness and audit committee effectiveness. 
The chapter concludes with an explanation of the regression models employed to 
examine audit committee characteristics and both audit quality and earnings quality.  
For audit quality, audit effort is measured using audit fee paid to the auditor and audit 
independence is measured using the audit to non-audit fee ratio.  For earnings quality, 
this study employs McNichols (2002) and Francis et al., (2005) models as its measures 
of earnings quality. The statistical techniques used in the univariate and bivariate 
analysis are also explained.   
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3.1 Research Paradigm 
The corporate governance model stems from the original work of Berle and Means 
(1932), who examined the separation of ownership and control in listed companies.  
This model of corporate governance and subsequent research focused on resolving 
conflicts of interest between corporate management and shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and has largely adopted an agency theory approach. Agency theory 
contextualises the relationship between owners (principals/shareholders) and 
management (agents) as a conflict of interests, which arises because the managers are 
not owners.  The theory rationalises that corporate managers are self-serving, 
individualistic and opportunistic in nature, are motivated by their own personal 
interests and hence exploit the firm for their own interests rather than working for the 
interests of shareholders and focusing on maximising shareholder wealth.  As a result, 
there is almost always a divergence of objectives between the goals of the 
management and those of the shareholders. Therefore, agency theory posits that to 
reduce any ‘agency costs’ associated with this conflict of interests, owners/ 
shareholders need to impose strict monitoring controls over management to protect 
their own interests. Such agency problems are known to exist in diversification and 
investing decisions and in decisions relating to mergers and acquisitions (Lane et al, 
1998). 
 
One of the major causes for this agency problem is due to the information 
asymmetries which exist between the two parties. Information asymmetry exists 
because management are more closely involved in the business and for a longer time 
than the owners and thus have more information about the business than its owners 
individually (Aboody and Lev, 2000). Hence, differences in the nature and scope of 
information between the two parties exacerbate agency problems. The existence of 
information asymmetries result in two major agency problems, namely, moral hazard 
and adverse selection.  Moral hazard is linked to hidden actions; as owners cannot 
observe management actions and this situation gives agents the opportunity to 
undertake self-interested behaviour, often the consequence of which is suboptimal 
decision making on the part of managers. Adverse selection on the other hand is linked 
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to owners hiring agents who do not have the adequate skills or expertise to sufficiently 
carry out their role.   
 
A number of mechanisms have been devised to reduce agency problems and negate 
their impact on firms.   Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that agency problems can 
be reduced by incurring agency costs, which consist of bonding costs and monitoring 
costs.  Bonding costs are those which are incurred due to the contract between owners 
and management. These mechanisms include incorporating numerous restrictive 
clauses into the contracts between agents and owners and using incentives, in 
particular linking management performance to compensation and providing other 
incentives and company benefits to enhance performance.  These well designed 
compensation contracts can also help align manager and owner objectives, Mallin 
(2013, p198) argues that "share options and other long term incentives are a key 
mechanism by which shareholders try to ensure congruence between directors' and 
shareholders' objectives".  Monitoring costs are the costs that are incurred during the 
course of implementing various governance mechanisms over agents.  These costs 
occur due to appointing appropriate oversight functions, both externally, such as 
external auditors, or internally, including the board of directors, the internal audit 
function, and various board committees.  Within a corporate entity, the board of 
directors acts on behalf of shareholders by representing their interests and overseeing 
the activities of management.  They are the primary decision makers and have the 
power to compensate entire decisions made by top management (Fama and Jensen, 
1983).  It has been argued that the role of the board is best explained by agency theory, 
as not only it clarifies the function of the board of directors (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), it 
also highlights the importance of their monitoring role (Hung, 1998).   
 
The Audit Committee has been featured considerably in recent discussions on 
corporate governance and has emerged as the main sub-committee of the board with 
the remit of ensuring accountability and integrity in the reporting functions of the firm. 
Pincus et al. (1989, p265) looked at the creation of audit committees from the 
perspective of agency theory and concluded that agency costs were the significant 
factors in their creation. They argue that audit committees reduce agency costs by 
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'enhancing the quality of information flows between the principal and the agent'. 
Following agency theory, as an important governance mechanism, the audit 
committee have non-executive directors' representation and these non-executive 
directors should have no personal relationship with management. The inclusion of 
non-executive directors is important as they provide an unbiased assessment that is 
“stockholder-oriented” and that establishes a best practice of “checks and balance” on 
management's actions (Vance, 1983, p 46).  In addition, Donaldson (1990, p376) 
suggests that it is also important for the chairperson of the board to be independent 
and for the chief executive officer and executive directors to have their personal 
interests aligned with shareholders through stock ownership. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) also argue that management and owner interests can be better aligned by 
increasing management share ownership, however this can lead to the adverse effect 
of management entrenchment (Lane et al, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), whereby 
management share ownership is so substantial that they wield significant power to 
influence the composition of the board of directors.  Consequently, this can facilitate 
management shirking and excessive consumption of perks.   
 
Moreover, it has been suggested in the empirical literature that in addition to having 
non-executive directors, the size, specific knowledge, experience and a greater 
frequency of meetings of both the board and audit committee help enhance the 
corporate governance of firms (Chen and Zhou, 2007; Monks and Minow, 2008; 
Dezoort, 1998; Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003a, Krishnan and Lee, 2009; 
Menon and Williams, 1994; Vafeas, 1999; Abbott et al., 2004).  This committee helps 
provide assurance on the quality of financial reporting produced by management.  
Consequently, in this thesis, the governance role of the audit committee is studied as a 
mechanism that mitigates agency conflicts in influencing financial reporting quality.  
These issues have been outlined in chapter 2 and are discussed in depth in the 
hypothesis development of chapter 3. 
 
Agency theory provides the main theoretical underpinnings for this study and 
determines to a great extent the approach used in the study.  It also influences the 
formulation of the study hypotheses as popular agency cost variables relevant to the 
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study are examined.  Consequently, this ‘agency’ view of the relationship between 
management and owners has implications for the methodological approach adopted 
by researchers. This has a subsequent impact on the sector chosen for research and 
the analytical techniques applied to investigate issues of corporate governance 
(Brennan and Solomon, 2008).  Research into corporate governance has traditionally 
been grounded in an objective ontology and positivist epistemology, hence the 
dominant use of quantitative methods.  Watts and Zimmerman (1986) are staunch 
supporters of agency theory and positivism and have argued for accounting research 
to retain its traditional quantitative focus and for it to remain ‘true’ to its origins.  
Dollery et al., (1996, p157) also argue that positivism promotes the credibility of 
accounting research, stating “research in accounting must at the very least be highly 
quantitative, or it simply is not viewed as scholarly by the key players in academia”.  
Thus, this research employs a positivist approach using the agency theory perspective 
when exploring the research questions set. 
 
3.2 Main Research Questions  
The purpose of this research study is to examine the impact of audit committee 
characteristics on financial reporting quality in a large sample of UK listed companies. 
Considering the purpose of this study and the literature review findings, this study 
investigates the following research questions; 
  
Do audit committee characteristics (including: size, independence, expertise, meetings, 
busyness, share ownership and tenure) influence the quality of external audit in UK 
companies? 
 
Do audit committee characteristics (including: size, independence, expertise, meetings, 
busyness, share ownership and tenure) influence the quality of earnings in UK 
companies? 
 
3.3 Hypothesis Development 
The following section discusses the development of each of the hypotheses to be 
investigated in the study. 
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3.3.1 Audit Committee Size and Financial Reporting Quality 
The size of the audit committee is an important factor in enhancing financial reporting 
quality as larger audit committees are likely to have the advantage of relying on a 
wider knowledge base and varied expertise and thereby undertake their role more 
effectively (Vafeas, 2000).   The evidence provided by empirical studies is rather 
interesting on the association between audit committee size and financial reporting 
quality. Prior studies (such as Abbott et al., 2003a; Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007; 
Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Zaman et al., 2011) found a positive association between 
the audit committee size and audit fee. Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) have also found 
that audit committee size is negatively associated with non-audit fee ratio highlighting 
the importance of audit committee size in maintaining auditor independence.  
Similarly, Lin et al. (2006, p930) note that ‘larger audit committees seem to improve 
earnings quality by reducing the probability of restating financial statements and 
hence provide more oversight over the financial reporting process’. Moreover, Yang 
and Krishnan (2005) and Kent et al. (2010) found a negative association between audit 
committee size and earnings management. Some studies (such as O’Sullivan, 1999; 
Abbott et al., 2004; Baxter and Cotter, 2009) show no significant association between 
audit committee size and financial reporting measures. However, none of the above 
studies have examined the optimal size of audit committees for overseeing the 
financial reporting process. The studies that suggest an appropriate audit committee 
size in relation to other financial reporting outcomes find inconclusive and conflicting 
results.  For example, some studies have shown larger audit committees are more 
likely to withstand pressures of management collusion (Dezoort and Salterio, 2001) 
and being able to pay more attention to the overall financial accounting process 
(Anderson et al., 2004), other studies conceive larger audit committees as increasing 
the risk of material misstatement (Boo and Sharma, 2008).    
  
Regulatory bodies also deem audit committee size as an integral attribute in 
controlling the accounting process. The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) in the US, ASX 
Corporate Governance Council (2003) in Australia and Combined Code (2008) in the UK 
put great emphasis on the size of audit committees, and all recommend at least three 
members within audit committees. The suggestions of a minimum number of 
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members on the audit committee, without an upper limit, suggests the bodies place 
great emphasis in ensuring the audit committees are sufficiently staffed.  However the 
lack of clear guidance on a preferable size gives rise to uncertainty as to what size audit 
committee better serve the interests of shareholders in enhancing the overall financial 
reporting process.  For this reason, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1: The number of audit committee members is positively associated with audit quality. 
H2: The number of audit committee members is positively associated with earnings 
quality. 
 
3.3.2 Audit Committee Expertise and Financial Reporting Quality  
Experience and expertise of audit committee members is an important aspect of audit 
committee effectiveness in overseeing the financial reporting process. Vafeas and 
Waegelein (2007) argue that governance expertise are important in maintaining audit 
quality and documented a positive and significant association between governance 
expertise and audit fee. They define audit committee governance expertise as the 
audit committee members' experience of serving on another audit committee. It has 
also been argued that audit committee members with financial expertise are more 
likely to be able to deal with complexities of financial reporting than members without 
such expertise (Dezoort and Salterio, 2001; Davidson et al., 2004) and demand better 
monitoring of the financial reporting process (Engel et al., 2010).   
 
Due to the complex nature of financial reporting, governance regulators have also 
shown a considerable interest in the financial expertise of audit committee members. 
In the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) mandates audit committees to 
include at least one financial expert and requires the rest of the members to be 
financially literate. In the United Kingdom, the Combined Code (2008) recommends 
that ‘at least one member of the audit committee should have significant, recent and 
relevant financial experience’, for example as an auditor or a finance director of a 
listed company. It is highly desirable for this member to have a professional 
qualification from one of the professional accountancy bodies, however the right mix 
of skills and qualifications is even more important (Smith Report 2003, p9). The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act avoids a requirement for a qualification but demands an extensive 
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list of accounting knowledge and skills.  The Smith Report has found this to be unduly 
prescriptive as they believe individual businesses will have different requirements.  
Complex businesses will find members with an accounting qualification to be essential, 
however smaller businesses may not require this.  Therefore, the Smith report 
suggests that it would be wrong for the guidance to also require it, rather adding this 
as a highly desirable recommendation.  
 
As there is no agreed definition of ‘financial expertise’ so far, empirical research 
suggests a variety of measures to operationalise financial expertise.  Farber (2005), 
using SEC’s broad definition of financial expertise, reported that fraudulent firms have 
fewer financial experts on their audit committees. Similarly Xie et al. (2003), Abbott et 
al. 2003a; Abbott et al. (2004), Bedard et al. (2004) and Lo et al. (2010) note that the 
presence of financial expertise on the audit committee has a significant positive 
association with financial reporting quality measures.  Yet, Carcello and Neal (2003) 
and Zaman et al. (2011) did not report any benefit of such expertise.  Other than 
examining the mere presence of financial expertise on the audit committee regardless 
of the nature of expertise, the literature examining the association of different 
dimensions of financial expertise with financial reporting quality has often used the 
definition provided by the SEC.  According to the definition an audit committee 
member is deemed a financial expert if the member has: (a) accounting expertise, 
from work experience as a certified public accountant, auditor, chief financial officer, 
financial controller, or accounting officer; (b) finance expertise, from work experience 
as an investment banker, financial analyst, or any other financial management role; or 
(c) supervisory expertise, from supervising the preparation of financial statements (e.g., 
chief executive officer or company president). 
 
DeFond et al. (2005) note that the market views the appointment of accounting 
financial experts (SEC definition) in a positive manner. Krishnan (2005) and Dhaliwal et 
al. (2010) show that accounting financial expertise are associated with less earnings 
management. Similarly, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) provide evidence of a strong 
positive association between accounting financial expertise and earnings quality. 
Baxter and Cotter (2009) document a significant negative association between the 
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audit committee accounting expertise variable (members with accounting qualification) 
and earnings management, hence improving financial reporting quality and also 
providing support for the Smith Report (2003) recommendations for the audit 
committee financial expert  having a professional accounting qualification. Bedard and 
Gendron (2010, p177) state that “having the ‘right people’ as audit committee 
members is an important input to audit committee effectiveness”. Empirical research 
or regulatory initiatives has paid little or no attention to the general or domain specific 
expertise of audit committee members and the subsequent impact of this type of 
expertise on financial reporting quality. This study, in order to answer the controversial 
question of ‘what constitutes an audit committee expert’, seeks to examine the 
efficacy of the monitoring role of such different type of expertise.  
From the above discussion, the following hypotheses are proposed; 
H3: The proportion of audit committee members with financial expertise is positively 
associated with audit quality; 
H4: The proportion of audit committee members with financial expertise is positively 
associated with earnings quality; 
 
3.3.3 Audit Committee Independence and Financial Reporting Quality 
The independence14 of the audit committee is another key characteristic for effective 
monitoring of the financial reporting process (Krishnan, 2005; Koh et al., 2007). It is 
assumed that independent directors within the audit committee are better at 
monitoring than their insider counterparts (DeFond and Francis, 2006) and are more 
likely to report questionable managerial financial reporting practices to appropriate 
                                                          
14
 The Higgs Report was consulted in defining independent non-executive directors. According to the Higgs Report 
(2003) “Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors”, “A non-executive director is considered 
independent when the board determines that the director is independent in character and judgement, and there 
are no relationships or circumstances which could affect, or appear to affect, the director’s judgement.  Such 
relationships or circumstances would include where the director:  is a former employee of the company or group 
until five years after employment, or any other material connection, has ended; has, or has had within the last three 
years, a material business relationship with the company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or 
senior employee of a body that has such a relationship with the company;  has received or receives additional 
remuneration from the company apart from a director’s fee, participates in the company’s share option or a 
performance-related pay scheme, or is a member of the company’s pension scheme;  has close family ties with any 
of the company’s advisers, directors or senior employees; holds cross-directorships or has significant links with 
other directors through involvement in other companies or bodies;  represents a significant shareholder; or has 
served on the board for more than nine years. 
The board should identify in its annual report the non-executive directors it determines to be independent. The 
board should state its reasons if a director is considered independent notwithstanding the existence of relationships 
or circumstances which may appear relevant to its determination.” (p.81). 
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authorities (Baxter and Cotter, 2009).  The independence of the audit committee is 
also a subject of increasing regulatory interest. One common focus of their efforts has 
been to increase audit committee independence. The Combined Code (2008) 
recommends and the SOX Act (2002) requires all listed companies to establish and 
maintain a fully independent audit committee. 
 
The available empirical evidence (Klein, 2002a; Carcello and Neal, 2000, 2003; Zain et 
al., 2006; Martinez and Fuentes, 2007; Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007; Mangena and 
Tauringana, 2008; Zaman et al. 2011) document the benefits associated with higher 
levels of audit committee independence. However, Baber et al. (2005); Osma and 
Noguer (2007); Baxter and Cotter (2009) have failed to find any significant association 
between audit committee independence and financial reporting quality measures.   
Abbott et al. (2003a), Carcello et al., (2002) and Mitra et al., (2007) found that 
independent audit committees are positively associated with the audit fee. Zaman et 
al. (2011), while examining UK evidence, note a negative association between audit 
committee independence and non-audit fees.  Abbott et al. (2003b), in an analysis of 
538 US firms, note that audit committees which are fully independent are associated 
with lower non-audit fee ratio.  Similarly Koh et al. (2007) and Kent et al. (2010) 
noticed that higher audit committee independence is associated with higher accruals 
quality and hence improved financial reporting quality.   An important point to note 
here is that prior research, with a few exceptions (e.g. Bedard et al., 2004; Bronson, 
2009; Lin and Hwang, 2010), has not provided a clear guidance on how much audit 
committee independence is enough. Bronson (2009) reported that benefits of audit 
committee independence are consistently achieved only when the audit committee is 
completely independent, providing support for the Combined Code (2008) and SOX 
(2002) requirements. 
In light of the above discussion, the following hypotheses are proposed; 
H5: The proportion of independent audit committee members are positively associated 
with audit quality; 
H6: The proportion of independent audit committee members are positively associated 
with earnings quality. 
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3.3.4 Audit Committee Meetings and Financial Reporting Quality 
The activity level of audit committees plays an important role in overseeing and 
monitoring the financial reporting process. It is argued that the frequency of audit 
committee meetings is a key determinant of its effectiveness (Song and Windram, 
2004) and plays a crucial role in addressing important agency problems associated with 
managerial power vesting through greater ownership (Sharma et al, 2009).  The Smith 
report (2003) argues that audit committee meetings are at the heart of its work and 
the committee must have as many meetings as the audit committee’s role and 
responsibilities require. It further recommends a minimum number of three meetings 
per annum.  
 
The findings of prior research (Abbott et al., 2003b; Vafeas, 2005; Goodwin and Kent, 
2006: Stewart and Munro, 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2007; Hoitash et al., 2009; 
Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Engel et al., 2010; Kent et al., 2010; Zaman et al. 2011) lend 
support to the importance currently attached to audit committee activity levels and 
highlight the benefits associated with higher levels of audit committee diligence. These 
studies have found support of higher audit committee meetings frequency in relation 
to audit fee, non-audit fee ratio and earnings quality. However, empirical studies such 
as Abbott et al., (2003a), Bedard et al. (2004) and Baxter and Cotter (2009) found no 
significant association between the frequency of meetings and financial reporting 
quality measures. The results of a recent meta-analysis study of Lin and Hwang (2010) 
also support the above findings by documenting a significant negative relationship 
between the number of audit committee meetings and earnings management. 
Therefore this study hypothesises the relationship to be as follows; 
H7: The frequency of audit committee meetings is positively associated with audit 
quality; 
H8: The frequency of audit committee meetings is positively associated with earnings 
quality. 
 
3.3.5 Audit Committee Tenure and Financial Reporting Quality 
The tenure of audit committee directors on the board is another important factor in 
determining the effectiveness of audit committees in performing their monitoring role. 
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The tenure refers to the length of time the audit committee member has served on the 
board. There are several views on the impact of tenure length of audit committee 
members on their ability to fulfil their duties competently and effectively. A view taken 
in earlier empirical studies (Pfeffer, 1983; Kosnik, 1990) was that longer board service 
allows directors to gain more firm specific knowledge and better equip themselves to 
deal with complicated committee proceedings, hence resulting in improved 
performance in protecting shareholder’s interests. Beasley (1996) found strong 
support for the above argument and report that average tenure of outside directors 
has a significant negative association with the instances of fraud. In contrast, Vafeas 
(2003) argues that longer board service might compromise audit committee directors’ 
independence by bringing directors and management closer resulting in directors 
‘befriending’ management. Vafeas (2005) documents a positive association between 
the mean tenure of audit committee members and poor earning quality measure, 
showing an inverse relationship between the average tenure and earnings quality. 
Chan et al., (2012) have also documented a negative association between the 
proportion of audit committee members serving longer on the board and audit fees.  
 
Similarly, governance regulators in the UK do not support the excessive lengthy tenure 
of audit committee directors, the Combined Code (2008, p12) states that:  
“any length of service beyond six years for a Non-Executive Director should be 
subject to particularly rigorous review and should take into account the need 
for progressive refreshing of the Board. Non-executive directors may serve 
longer than nine years (e.g. three three-year terms), subject to annual re-
election. Serving more than nine years could be relevant to the determination 
of a non-executive director’s independence”.  
This is much more important and could be of greater concern for those non-executive 
directors who serve on the audit committee. In light of the above discussion, this study 
proposes the following hypotheses; 
H9: The proportion of audit committee members with longer tenure (over 9 years) is 
negatively associated with audit quality; 
H10: The proportion of audit committee members with longer tenure (over 9 years) is 
negatively associated with earnings quality. 
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3.3.6 Audit Committee Share Ownership and Financial Reporting Quality 
The potential effects of audit committee members’ share ownership on the monitoring 
of the financial reporting process have been the subject of many studies. The empirical 
evidence suggests there is a potential association between share ownership and the 
effectiveness of the financial reporting process.  On one hand, it has been argued that 
independence of audit committee members with high shareholdings can be 
questioned as they may seek greater levels of influence in the operations of the firm in 
order to protect their investments (Forker, 1992; Lavelle, 2002).  Carcello and Neal 
(2003) found that in firms where audit committee members' share ownership was high, 
audit committee members were more likely to dismiss an external auditor after issuing 
a going concern report to protect their vested interest. 
 
Alternatively, it has been argued that share ownership can result in greater vigilance by 
audit committee members, as they have more of a stake in ensuring the company 
performs well (Jensen, 1989; Shivdasani, 1993).  Thus, a high shareholding by audit 
committee members (as NEDs) can actually help improve the financial reporting 
process by motivating them to monitor more effectively.   From the agency theory 
perspective, this argument holds more sway because agents will always seek to further 
their own objectives.  Therefore by increasing their stake in the organisation, they will 
have more incentive to ensure the firm is performing.  Directors with greater 
shareholding will have more incentive to monitor and challenge management 
reporting (Jensen, 1993).  Jensen (1993) argues this incentive is usually greater for 
corporate directors compared to short-term investors as they are likely to have a long-
term orientation.  In-fact, Beasley (1996) found that the likelihood of fraud decreases 
as stock ownership by outside directors (not necessarily audit committee directors) on 
the board increases.  Subsequently, both Vafeas (2005) and Martinez and Fuentes 
(2007) found a positive association between the equity held by the audit committee 
member and financial reporting quality.  
From the above discussion, this study hypothesises the relationship to be as follows; 
H11: The proportion of equity held by audit committee members is positively 
associated with audit quality. 
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H12: The proportion of equity held by audit committee members is positively 
associated with earnings quality. 
 
3.3.7 Audit Committee Busyness and Financial Reporting Quality 
The issue of holding multiple directorships not only remains a major concern for  
governance regulators but also remains a focus of research attention, stretching from 
the empirical evidence on the determinants of multiple directorships (O’Sullivan, 2005; 
O’Sullivan, 2009) to the impact of such directors on various financial matters (Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006). A common view among policy advocates is that serving on 
numerous boards can result in overstretched directors that may not be effective 
monitors on any board. In the UK, the Combined Code (2003) recommends that 
‘executives should be discouraged from holding more than one non-executive 
directorship in another listed company’. Similarly in the US, the National Association of 
Corporate Directors (1994) guidelines recommend that ‘senior corporate executives 
and CEOs should hold no more than three outside directorships’. In spite of this, the 
holding of multiple directorships by the non-executive board members is still 
untouched by the regulatory authorities around the world. 
 
Fama and Jenson (1983) maintain that additional directorships are positively 
correlated with the reputation of directors as monitoring expert, thus showing that 
busy directors may be more capable directors than their counterparts. A number of 
studies document the benefits associated with holding additional directorships 
(Shivdasani, 1993; Ferris et al., 2003; Carcello et al., 2002b; Bedard et al., 2004; Yang 
and Krishnan, 2005). However, several studies argue that board monitoring requires 
substantial time and effort and do not support the beneficial impact of additional 
directorships on firm performance (Booth & Deli, 1996; Beasley, 1996).  Core et al. 
(1999) found a strong correlation between directors with other appointments and 
excess CEO compensation; showing that such directors may not be very good monitors 
of their management. Moreover, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) note that multiple 
directorships may have a negative impact on the effectiveness of outside directors as 
corporate monitors. Recent empirical research also reports a strong negative 
relationship between the presence of directors holding multiple directorships and firm 
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performance (Miwa and Ramseyer, 2000; Maloney, 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). 
Specifically, while examining the impact of additional directorships on earnings 
management, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) document that audit committee members 
(accounting experts) with fewer directorships are associated with less earnings 
management.  In view of the above argument I think that higher number of 
directorships will be associated with adverse financial reporting quality related 
outcomes.  Therefore for the purpose of this research, this study proposes the 
following hypothesis; 
H13: The busyness of the audit committee members is negatively associated with audit 
quality; 
H14: The busyness of the audit committee members is negatively associated with 
earnings quality; 
 
3.3.8 Audit Committee Effectiveness and Financial Reporting Quality 
The word ‘effective’ is defined by The Oxford Dictionary as: ‘the degree to which 
something is successful in producing a desired result’. Audit committee effectiveness 
remains the focus of attention for all those stakeholders interested in the maintenance 
of the integrity of the financial reporting process. The individual role of the audit 
committee characteristic in this regard is of fundamental importance.  However, 
Zaman et al. (2011) argue that interaction and joint effect of these characteristics also 
plays an important role in enhancing audit quality. In their study linking corporate 
governance characteristics and audit and non-audit fees, Zaman et al. (2011) 
document a positive significant association between the audit committee effectiveness 
measure and audit fee and non-audit fee. These findings clearly suggest that effective 
audit committees are associated with better quality audit. As there is no agreed 
measure of the term ‘effectiveness’, the challenge of coding audit committee 
effectiveness remains far from over.  
 
Prior literature measured the effectiveness of audit committees in terms of its 
independence from management (Ng and Tan, 2003), duration of meetings (Collier 
and Gregory, 1999) and by examining the performance of audit committee members 
during audit committee meetings (Gendron and Bedard, 2004).  More recently, Abbott 
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et al., (2007) measured audit committee effectiveness by using a composite variable 
which includes independent directors, minimum four meetings and at least one 
financial expert. Similarly, Zaman et al. (2011) also quantified audit committee 
effectiveness by using a composite measure that includes independence of audit 
committee members, financial expertise of audit committee members, the diligence 
(frequency of meetings) of the audit committee, and size of the audit committee. This 
study uses an enhanced construct of audit committee effectiveness initially developed 
by Zaman et al. (2011) and in the light of above discussion proposes the following 
hypotheses; 
H17: The presence of an effective audit committee is positively associated with audit 
quality; 
H18: The presence of an effective audit committee is positively associated with 
earnings quality. 
 
3.4 Sample Selection 
The past decade witnessed a significant change in the governance characteristics of UK 
listed companies. This study covers the period of 2007 to 2010, following the 
recommendations laid down by the Audit Committees Combined Code Guidance 
(2003): A report and proposed guidance by an FRC appointed group chaired by Sir 
Robert Smith. The committee chaired by Sir Robert Smith reported on five main areas 
of the Audit Committee. These are (1) Purpose, (2) Membership, procedure and 
resources, (3) Relationship with the board, (4) Roles and responsibilities and (5) 
Communications with shareholders.  The report states that while ‘all directors have 
duty to act in the interest of the company, the audit committee has a particular role, 
acting independently from the executive, to ensure that the interest of shareholders 
are properly protected in relation to financial reporting and internal control’ (Smith 
Committee, 2003: p 3). In light of the above statement, the time period covered in this 
study (2007-2010) allows us to examine the influence of refined rules regarding audit 
committee characteristics in relation to measures chosen to investigate the quality of 
financial reporting.   
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The population for the study consists of FTSE 350 firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange.  As the period of selection for this study was 2007 – 2010, this study 
includes only those companies that existed throughout this period.  The LSE database 
automatically generates a list of only those companies which are still in operation, 
discarding all those companies which are either dead, merged or not in operation for 
any other reason. The starting point for this analysis was the identification of 
companies who were in the FTSE-350 for the duration of the study period, between 
2007 and 2010. This is important since current governance recommendations in the UK 
make a distinction between FTSE-350 firms and other listed firms whereby the latter 
have a less onerous set of governance recommendations.  Of relevance to this study, 
for example, is that non-FTSE-350 firms are required to possess a minimum of two 
audit committee members as opposed to three for FTSE-350 firms.   
 
In common with most studies in this area this study excludes all financial firms, 
principally insurance companies and banks, as they have different regulatory 
environments as well as different reporting conventions to other companies.  The 
decision to use the largest 350 firms was made because these firms represent a large 
share of aggregate market capitalization and therefore receive great interest among 
regulators and investors. It also provides a manageable sample in terms of the amount 
of data that needs to be collected and analysed.  The focus on these larger firms is also 
likely to be more effective in allowing us to check the impact of corporate governance 
characteristics on financial reporting quality. The process of sample selection and 
distribution of firms by years and industry is summarised in tables below. The firms 
from the financial sector and those with missing audit committee and financial data 
were dropped from the final sample. Similarly a small number of observations with the 
extreme audit fee values were also dropped from the sample. The final sample for the 
audit committee and audit fee analysis equals 991 firm observations15. However a 
number of firms do not purchase any non-audit services and hence these firms are not 
included in the final sample of audit committee and non-audit fee ratio analysis. 
Therefore final sample for the non-audit fee ratio analysis equals 948 firm observations.  
                                                          
15
 The outliers in relation to audit fee data were identified using SPSS box plots and extreme values were removed 
from the sample.  
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Table 3.1  Sample selection process - Audit quality  
 
Description 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
FTSE350 350 350 350 350 1400 
Financial firms 70 70 70 70 280 
Missing AC and DataStream information 13 13 12 12 50 
FTSE dropout  0 8 13 15 60 
Outliers 6 4 4 5 19 
Final sample size for the audit fee analysis 246 248 249 248 991 
Firms that pay zero non-audit fee 9 13 11 10 43 
Final sample size for the non-audit fee ratio 
analysis 
237 235 238 238 948 
 
Table 3.2  Industry distribution – Audit quality  
 
Industry Name N Percentage 
Consumer Goods 218 (208) 21.99 (21.94) 
Industrials 296 (284) 29.86 (29.96) 
Mineral extraction 79 (74) 7.97 (7.80) 
Services 342 (331) 34.51 (34.92) 
Utilities 56 (54) 5.65 (5.70) 
Final Sample Size 991 (948) 100 (100) 
 
 
This study also looks at the association between the audit committee characteristics 
and earnings quality and this forms the second empirical aspect of this thesis. The 
sample choice for the second empirical of this study - earnings quality - is slightly 
different from the first empirical investigation of audit quality issues. In line with the 
prior literature in this area (Peasnell et al. 2005; Ghosh, 2010), to provide an unbiased 
measure of accrual quality this study excludes industries with less than 10 observations 
in any given year. The industries that were excluded from the study sample are; 
aerospace and defence, chemicals, forestry, general industrials, personal goods, 
pharmaceutical and bio-technology, technology hardware and equipment, tobacco and 
utilities. A number of outliers in relation to accruals quality measure were identified 
using box plots and dropped from the sample. This reduced the pooled sample size 
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from 1400 observations to 69116. The sample selection procedure is given in the tables 
below. 
 
Table 3.3 – Sample selection process - Earnings quality 
 
Description 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
FTSE350 350 350 350 350 1400 
Financial and regulated firms 70 70 70 70 280 
Missing AC and DataStream information 32 32 30 30 124 
Industries smaller than 10 55 55 55 55 220 
FTSE dropout 0 3 5 8 32 
Outliers 13 12 14 14 45 
Final Sample Size  171 173 174 173 691 
 
 
Table 3.4 -  Industry distribution-Earnings quality 
 
Industry Name N Percentage 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 40 5.78 
Food and Beverages producers 62 8.97 
General Retailer 100 14.47 
Household Goods 40 5.78 
Industrial Engineering 40 5.78 
Media 40 5.78 
Mining 43 6.22 
Oil and Gas Producers 36 5.21 
Software and Computer Services 51 7.38 
Support Services 139 20.12 
Travel and Leisure 100 14.47 
Final Sample Size 691 100 
 
 
3.5 Data Sources 
The main sources of information for the study are companies' published annual report 
and accounts for the years 2007 to 2010. These annual reports are either obtained 
directly from the companies’ websites or accessed using FAME database. The audit 
                                                          
16
 The outliers were identified using SPSS box plots and extreme values were removed from the sample. 
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committee variables and other board variables data are collected by hand. This study 
also uses the Hemmington Scott Guru and LSE databases to collect and cross check 
variables such as expertise and busyness of audit committee members and director’s 
share ownership etc. For the purpose of this study a substantial amount of time and 
effort is invested to identify, extract and cross check audit committee variables. For 
example, the information on the audit committee size, independence and meetings 
was collected by hand using the corporate governance section of annual reports of 
each company. The biographical data disclosed in the annual reports for members of 
the audit committee was perused to identify those serving on other audit committees 
and with financial expertise i.e. accounting and non-accounting expertise or members 
with professional accounting qualifications. This information was then cross checked 
with Hemmington Scott Guru database to make sure that all the information was 
complete and up to date. The information on the tenure of audit committee members 
was collected by looking at the biographical details i.e. the appointment date of the 
audit committee members disclosed in the annual reports of each company. The 
information on additional directorships of audit committee members is gathered from 
annual reports by making a note of directorships held by each audit committee 
member and then cross checking these directorships with the listings provided by the 
London Stock Exchange for the UK Main Market and the International Main Market in 
the year of the publication of the annual report. DataStream, Thomson One Banker 
and FAME databases are used to collect the various financial statement data items 
used to calculate the earnings quality variables explained in the next section. 
 
3.6 Measurement of Dependent Variables 
3.6.1 Audit Quality 
In view of the multi-dimensional nature of the term ’audit quality’ and the various 
definitions provided in the review of the literature to gauge audit quality, this study 
explores the two key aspects of audit quality, auditor effort and auditor independence, 
by employing two measures namely audit fee and non-audit fee ratio respectively. In 
the UK, Cadbury (1992) argued that appropriately structured audit committees have 
the potential to improve both the quality of companies’ financial reporting, as well as 
ensuring the independence of the statutory external audit. The provision of higher 
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quality audit adds additional costs to the audit firm and consequently these costs are 
passed on to the client.   The signalling hypothesis provides the linkage between the 
audit quality and audit fee. Numerous prior studies relate higher audit fee with better 
audit quality as it compensates for the increased audit effort or audit coverage 
(Simunic, 1980; Craswell et al., 1995; Collier and Gregory, 1996; O’Sullivan, 2000; 
Carcello et al., 2002b; Abbott et al., 2003a; Bedard and Johnstone, 2004; Mitra et al., 
2007; Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Bliss, 2011). More 
recently Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) while investigating US firms, Zaman et al., 
(2011) while analysing UK firms and Chan et al., (2012) in an analysis of Australian 
firms have also utilised audit fee as a surrogate of audit quality.   The Company Act 
(1991) requires all the listed companies to provide the amount of audit fee paid to the 
external auditor in their financial statements. Consequently, this study extracts the 
audit fee amount from the company’s annual financial statements and utilises it as the 
first proxy to measure audit quality.  
 
The dual provision of non-audit services has continuously been controversial due to 
their potential impact on auditor independence (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002; Frankel et 
al., 2002; Larcker and Richardson, 2004).  An independent audit function is crucial in 
establishing a reliable overall financial reporting process. The nature and the amount 
of non-audit service fees have been seen as a major threat to auditor objectivity and 
independence (Kida, 1980; DeAngelo, 1981; Beattie et al., 1999; Gul et al., 2006; 
Beaulieu and Reinstein, 2010).  Empirical evidence shows that the economic bonding 
between the auditor and the client hampers the overall financial reporting process 
(Francis & Ke, 2004; Krishnan et al., 2005; Knechel et al., 2012).   Regulators also fear 
that non-audit service fees, especially when the non-audit fee is higher than the audit 
fee, create a dependency of the auditors on their clients and this economic bonding 
results in decreasing financial reporting quality. Arthur Levitt (Levitt, 2000), former 
chair of the SEC, expressed his concerns on the provision of non-audit services when 
he stated that ‘consulting and other services shorten the distance between the auditor 
and management’ and therefore have a direct negative impact on auditor 
independence. The Companies Act (1991) also requires companies to state the 
remuneration paid to the auditor for their non-audit services in the annual financial 
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statements. Following Abbott et al., (2003b) and Zaman et al., (2011) this study uses 
the non-audit to audit fee ratio as its second proxy for audit quality.  
 
3.6.2 Earnings Quality 
This study will use two accruals based earnings management models to capture the 
construct of financial reporting quality. The construct of financial reporting quality will 
be measured by developing two proxy measures for earnings quality from these 
models. The following section provides a brief description of these models and the way 
these models will be used in the current study. Schipper (1989, p.368) defines earnings 
management as ‘a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, 
with the intent of obtaining some private gain’. Similarly, Mulford and Comiskey (1996, 
p360) note that ‘earnings management is the active manipulation of accounting results 
for the purpose of creating an altered impression of business performance’. Likewise 
Healy and Wahlan (1999, p368) explain earnings management as management using 
‘judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers'.  Although there may be some differences on the exact 
definition of earnings management, the main essence of the above definitions is that 
managers tend to report earnings as they wish rather than as the true financial 
position of a firm.  For that reason, reported earnings in the financial statements do 
not reflect the actual underlying economic substance of the firm.   
 
Accrual accounting provides important and useful information on companies’ financial 
performance however the process itself is based on assumptions such as judgement 
and accounting discretion.  Managers use accruals to estimate earnings, as firstly any 
subsequent change in the accruals estimation does not require the restatement of 
financial statements; and secondly, it is difficult for external auditors to label 
‘judgement’ as a wilful act to manipulate earnings. Overseeing the financial reporting 
process and more specifically maintaining the integrity of the financial statements is 
the fundamental responsibility of the audit committee. Consequently, an effective 
audit committee should deter management from making intentional errors and also 
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motivate management to exercise greater care in reducing unintentional errors, 
resulting in higher accruals quality (Dhaliwal et al., 2010).  
 
Accruals quality can be damaged by both intentional and unintentional errors. 
Consistent with prior research in earnings management (e.g. Francis et al. 2005; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2010), this study measures earnings quality by employing the model 
proposed by McNichols (2002), which is a modification of the original Dechow and 
Dichev (DD) 2002 model. To capture accruals quality, some prior studies have also 
used the Jones model (1991) or its variants. However, a criticism of the Jones model 
(1991) is that it measures accruals quality in an indirect manner (Schipper and Vincent, 
2003; Francis et al., 2005). This problem can be overcome by using a direct approach 
to measure earnings quality. Aboody et al. (2005, p. 365) note that the DD measure ‘is 
a relatively more direct measure of a company’s information environment derived 
from fundamental accounting data contained in its financial statements’. McNichols 
(2002) use industry level pooled cross-sectional regressions with the total current 
accruals as the dependent variable and the cash flows in previous, current, and 
subsequent years as well as the changes in revenue and PPE as independent variables. 
McNichols (2002) shows that by adding changes in revenue and PPE to the cross-
sectional DD regression significantly increases its explanatory power, thus reducing 
measurement error. Specifically, the proxy for accruals quality is measured by 
estimating the following regression by industry and year;  
ΔWCt = b0 + b1CFOt-1 + b2CFOt + b3CFOt+1 + b4ΔRevt + b5PPEt + εt (1) 
[Where Δ in working capital in year t (ΔWCt) = (ΔCurrent Assets – ΔCurrent Liabilities) – ΔCash; CFOt-1 
represents ‘Cash flows from operations in year t – 1’; CFOt represents ‘Cash flows from operations in 
year t’ and CFOt+1 represents ‘Cash flows from operations year in year t + 1’; ΔRevt represents ‘Sales in 
year t – Sales in year t – 1’ and PPEt represents ‘Gross property, plant and equipment in year t’. All 
variables shown above are scaled by total assets.] 
 
Operationally, this model measures accrual quality for each firm by using the absolute 
value of the residual as the measure of accrual quality (Srindhi and Gul, 2007; Baxter 
and Cotter, 2009). The high value of absolute residual for each sample company 
signifies the low quality of earnings. The second measure of earnings management is 
the discretionary component of accruals and this study uses the Francis et al., (2005) 
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model to capture the discretionary component of accruals. Francis et al., (2005) 
separates McNichols (2002) measure of earnings management into its discretionary 
and non-discretionary elements. Francis et al., (2005) compute the components of 
accruals (i.e. both discretionary and non-discretionary) by estimating a regression of 
firms’ innate factors affecting accruals quality. To determine the discretionary 
components of accruals quality, the regression equation will be as follows;  
AQ = α + b1SIZE + b2 LOSS + b3OPCYC + b4ϭCFO + b5ϭREV + εt (2)  
[where AQ is the accruals quality (absolute value of accruals quality from equation 1); SIZE is the natural 
log of total assets, ; LOSS is the number of years in which a loss was recorded for last three years; OPCYC 
is the natural log of average age of inventory plus the average age of receivables (in days), ϭCFO is the 
standard deviation of cash flow from operation over last five years (scaled by total assets) and ϭREV is 
the standard deviation of operating revenue over the last five years (scaled by total assets).] 
 
Earnings management can be used to both increase or decrease earnings but this 
research is not concerned with whether earnings are being negatively or positively 
manipulated.  Any manipulation in earnings has an adverse affect on the financial 
reporting quality, hence only the absolute value calculated will be used.  The residual 
from (2) is the estimate of the discretionary component of firm’s accrual quality. The 
higher the absolute residual for each sample company, the lower is the quality of 
earnings. 
 
 
3.7 Measurement of Independent Variables 
This study uses a number of variables to proxy for audit committee characteristics. It is 
possible since current governance disclosures in the UK make explicit 
recommendations in relation to specific audit committee characteristics (i.e. size, 
independence, meeting frequency and expertise) and also require details of 
compliance with these recommendations to be disclosed in the annual report 
(Combined Code, 2003; 2006; 2008 and UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010). 
Consequently, this study utilises these disclosures to construct the key independent 
variables necessary for this investigation. The main independent variables of interest 
and their measurement constructs are as follows. 
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3.7.1 Audit Committee Size 
Audit committee size is a continuous variable and is measured in absolute terms as 
well as dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committee contains three 
or more members. This study further develops an alternative measure of audit 
committee size representing those audit committees that have above median size. The 
information on the audit committee size was collected by hand using corporate 
governance section of annual reports of each company.  
 
3.7.2 Audit Committee Expertise 
The essence of audit committee expertise is captured using the governance expertise 
i.e. audit committee members’ service on other audit committees and four different 
measures of financial expertise of its members. Audit committee governance expertise 
is a continuous variable and measured as a percentage of audit committee members 
serving on the other audit committees. Audit committee’s financial expertise is again a 
continuous variable, measured as the proportion of audit committee members with 
overall financial expertise as well as dummy variable indicating instances where the 
audit committees fulfil the requirement of having a financial expert. The notion of 
overall financial expertise is measured using the current SEC definition of financial 
expertise which includes members with work experience as a certified public 
accountant, auditor, chief financial officer, financial comptroller or accounting officer. 
This also includes members with work experience such as an investment banker, 
financial analyst, or any other financial management role and/or a chief executive 
officer, chairman or company president.  This suggests that the term financial 
expertise could entail the accounting and finance expertise, as well as any expertise in 
the preparation of financial statements. 
 
Audit committee accounting expertise is again a continuous variable measured as the 
proportion of audit committee members with accounting expertise. The notion of 
accounting expertise is measured by using a strict definition proposed by the SEC and 
later used by Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008), Krishnan and Lee (2009) and Dhaliwal 
et al., (2010). The SEC defines the accounting expert as ‘a member with experience as 
a certified public accountant (CPA), auditor, chief financial officer (CFO), chief financial 
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controller or chief accounting officer’.  Audit committee non accounting expertise is 
also a continuous variable measured as the proportion of audit committee members 
with non-accounting expertise i.e. finance and supervisory expertise. These members 
include people with work experience as an investment banker, financial analyst, or 
members with experience of supervising the preparation of financial statements (e.g. 
chief executive officer or company president).  The biographical data disclosed in the 
annual reports for members of the audit committee was perused to identify those 
serving on other audit committees and with financial expertise i.e. accounting and 
non-accounting expertise. This information was then cross checked with Hemmington 
Scott Guru database to make sure that all the information was complete and up to 
date.  
 
3.7.3 Audit Committee Independence 
Audit committee independence is a continuous variable, measured as the proportion 
of audit committee members declared as independent by the board. Audit committee 
independence is also measured using a dichotomous variable; value of 1 is used if the 
audit committee is composed of all independent non-executive directors and 0 
otherwise. The Higgs Report was consulted in defining independent non-executive 
directors. According to the Higgs Report (2003, p81), ‘A non-executive director is 
considered independent when the board determines that the director is independent 
in character and judgement, and there are no relationships or circumstances which 
could affect, or appear to affect, the director’s judgement’. 
 
3.7.4 Audit Committee Meetings 
Audit committee meetings is also a continuous variable, measured as the number of 
audit committee meetings held for the whole year as well as dummy variables 
indicating instances where the audit committee members hold 3 or more meetings. 
Another binary variable has also been used to represent audit committee meetings 
above the median value of audit committee meetings. The information on audit 
committee meetings was handpicked and collected using the corporate governance 
section of the annual report of each company. 
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3.7.5 Audit Committee Tenure 
Audit committee tenure is quantified using two continuous variables.  Audit committee 
tenure is measured using the proportion of audit committee members with over 9 
years tenure on the board as well as a variable representing the proportion of audit 
committee members with over 6 years tenure on the board. The information on the 
tenure of audit committee members was collected by looking at the biographical 
details i.e. the appointment date of the audit committee members disclosed in the 
annual reports of each company. 
 
3.7.6 Audit Committee Share Ownership 
Audit committee share ownership is again a continuous variable measured as the 
proportion of equity held by the audit committee members. This information was 
collected by consulting the remuneration and directors report section of the annual 
report of each company. 
 
3.7.7 Audit Committee Busyness 
The busyness of the audit committee as a whole and its individual members is 
captured using a variety of variables. The first variable capturing audit committee 
busyness is a continuous variable measured as the average directorships held by the 
audit committee members17. Audit committees are also categorised as being busy 
(proportion of members with at least one other directorship), more busy (proportion 
of members with at least two other directorship) and too busy (proportion of members 
with at least 3 other directorship). These categories measured using continuous 
variables, measured as the proportion of audit committee members with at least one 
or more, two or more and three or more directorships. This information was gathered 
from annual reports by making a note of directorships held by each audit committee 
member and then cross checking these directorships with the listings provided by the 
London Stock Exchange for the UK Main Market and the International Main Market in 
the year of the publication of the annual report. 
 
                                                          
17
 This study only includes directorships of companies listed on the London International Stock Exchange (excluding 
directorships in AIM). 
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3.7.8 Audit Committee Effectiveness 
Audit committee effectiveness constructs are composite measures consisting of audit 
committee size, audit committee independence, audit committee financial expertise, 
audit committee meetings frequency. First, a dummy variable representing those firms 
whose audit committees satisfy all four of the recommended characteristics i.e. size, 
meetings, independence and expertise (ACE1) and then this dummy variable is 
extended to include both the presence of an accounting expert and the absence of 
members with excess of nine years’ tenure (ACE2).  The third (ACE3) and fourth (ACE4) 
measures of audit committee effectiveness include variables representing the 
accumulated score for each of these four and six variables used in ACE1 and ACE2 
respectively. 
 
3.8 Empirical Research Models and Tests 
This study utilises four different empirical proxies to test the hypotheses set out for 
this study. The first two proxies, i.e. audit fee and non audit fee ratio, investigate the 
association between audit committee characteristics and audit quality and the next 
two proxies, i.e. McNichols (2002) and Francis et al., (2005) measures of earnings 
quality, investigate the role audit committee characteristics play in constraining the 
earnings management practices.  
 
3.8.1 Audit Committee Characteristics and Audit Quality Models 
This stage of the study utilizes four main empirical models. In model 1 this study uses 
the dummy variables for each of the four audit committee characteristics currently 
recommended as best practice for UK listed companies (Combined Code, 2006 and 
2008; UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010) while in model 2 these dummy variables 
are substituted with corresponding variables containing the absolute values for each of 
these four variables. In models 3 and 4 this study employs variables capturing audit 
committee effectiveness: in model 3 a dummy variable representing those firms whose 
audit committees satisfy all four of the recommended characteristics (ACE1) and in 
model 4 dummy variable is extended to include both the presence of an accounting 
expert and the absence of members with excess of nine years’ tenure (ACE2).  The 
empirical models testing the relationship between the audit committee characteristics 
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and audit quality using audit fee and non-audit fee ratio as proxies to measure audit 
quality are as follows. 
 
3.8.1.1 Audit Fee Models 
Model 1: LOG(AF) = β0 + β1ACSIZE + β2AC%IND + β3ACMEETINGS + β4AC%FINEXP + 
β5AC%SHAREOWN + β6ACAVEDIRECTORSHIPS +  β7BOARDINDDUMMY + 
β8BOARDMEETINGS + β9LOGTOTALASSETS + β10LOGSUBS + β11LOGSUBSDUMMY + 
β12BIG4 + β13LONDON + β14LOGDELAY + β15%DEBTORS + β16%STOCK + β17ROA + 
β18LOSS + β19%GEARING + β20%BLOCKOWN + β21INDUSTRY +  β22TIME + ε. 
 
Model 2: LOG(AF) = β0 + β1ACSIZEDUMMY + β2ACINDDUMMY + 
β3ACMEETINGSDUMMY + β4AC%FINEXPDUMMY + β5AC%SHAREOWN + 
β6ACAVEDIRECTORSHIPS +  β7BOARDINDDUMMY + β8BOARDMEETINGS + 
β9LOGTOTALASSETS + β10LOGSUBS + β11LOGSUBSDUMMY + β12BIG4 + β13LONDON 
+ β14LOGDELAY + β15%DEBTORS + β16%STOCK + β17ROA + β18LOSS + β19%GEARING 
+ β20%BLOCKOWN + β21INDUSTRY +  β22TIME + ε. 
 
Model 3: LOG(AF) = β0 + β1ACE1 + β2AC%SHAREOWN + β3ACAVEDIRECTORSHIPS +  
β4BOARDINDDUMMY + β5BOARDMEETINGS + β6LOGTOTALASSETS + β7LOGSUBS + 
β8LOGSUBSDUMMY + β9BIG4 + β10LONDON + β11LOGDELAY + β12%DEBTORS + 
β13%STOCK + β14ROA + β15LOSS + β16%GEARING + β17%BLOCKOWN + β18INDUSTRY 
+  β19TIME + ε. 
 
Model 4: LOG(AF) = β0 + β1ACE2 + β2AC%SHAREOWN + β3ACAVEDIRECTORSHIPS +  
β4BOARDINDDUMMY + β5BOARDMEETINGS + β6LOGTOTALASSETS + β7LOGSUBS + 
β8LOGSUBSDUMMY + β9BIG4 + β10LONDON + β11LOGDELAY + β12%DEBTORS + 
β13%STOCK + β14ROA + β15LOSS + β16%GEARING + β17%BLOCKOWN + β18INDUSTRY 
+  β19TIME + ε. 
 
3.8.1.2 Non Audit Fee ratio Models 
Model 1: NAF RATIO = β0 + β1ACSIZE + β2AC%IND + β3ACMEETINGS + β4AC%FINEXP + 
β5AC%SHAREOWN + β6ACAVEDIRECTORSHIPS + β7BOARDINDDUMMY + 
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β8BOARDMEETINGS +β9BIG4 + β10LONDON + β11LOGSUBS + β12LOGSUBSDUMMY + 
β13LOGTOTALASSETS + β14ROA + β15LOSS + β16%GEARING + β17%BLOCKOWN + 
β18INDUSTRY + β19TIME + ε. 
 
Model 2: NAF RATIO = β0 + β1ACSIZEDUMMY + β2ACINDDUMMY + β3ACMEETINGS 
DUMMY + β4ACFINEXPDUMMY + β5AC%SHAREOWN + β6ACAVEDIRECTORSHIPS + 
β7BOARDINDDUMMY + β8BOARDMEETINGS +β9BIG4 + β10LONDON + β11LOGSUBS + 
β12LOGSUBSDUMMY + β13LOGTOTALASSETS + β14ROA + β15LOSS + β16%GEARING + 
β17%BLOCKOWN + β18INDUSTRY + β19TIME + ε. 
 
Model 3: NAF RATIO = β0 + β1ACE1 + β2AC%SHAREOWN + β3ACAVEDIRECTORSHIPS + 
β4BOARDINDDUMMY + β5BOARDMEETINGS +β6BIG4 + β7LONDON + β8LOGSUBS + 
β9LOGSUBSDUMMY + β10LOGTOTALASSETS + β11ROA + β12LOSS + β13%GEARING + 
β14%BLOCKOWN + β15INDUSTRY + β16TIME + ε. 
 
Model 4: NAF RATIO = β0 + β1ACE2 + β2AC%SHAREOWN + β3ACAVEDIRECTORSHIPS + 
β4BOARDINDDUMMY + β5BOARDMEETINGS +β6BIG4 + β7LONDON + β8LOGSUBS + 
β9LOGSUBSDUMMY + β10LOGTOTALASSETS + β11ROA + β12LOSS + β13%GEARING + 
β14%BLOCKOWN + β15INDUSTRY + β16TIME + ε. 
 
Dependent variable: 
1 - LOG(AF) = the natural log of audit fee and 2 - NAF Ratio = non-audit fee/audit fee 
 
Independent variables: Log Total Assets = the natural logarithm of total assets; Log Subs = the natural 
logarithm of total consolidated subsidiaries; US Subs dummy = dummy variable indicating US subsidiaries; 
Debtors = percentage of total assets represented by debtors; % Stock = percentage of total assets 
represented by stock; Log Delay = the natural logarithm of audit delay; ROA = return on assets; % 
Gearing = percentage of total long-term finance represented by long term debt; Loss = dummy variable 
representing the firm incurring loss in last two years; London = dummy variable representing firms 
audited by a London based auditor; Big4 = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit was 
carried out by a Big4 audit firm; % Block Own = percentage of equity owned by the block holders; % Log 
Non Audit Fee = the natural logarithm of non audit fee; Board Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating 
instances where boards comprised of majority independent directors; Board meetings = the number of 
meetings held by the board during the year; AC % Share own = percentage of equity held by audit 
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committee members; AC Ave Directorships = average directorships held by the audit committee 
members; AC Size dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committee contains 
three or more members; AC Meetings dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit 
committee held at least three meetings; AC Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the 
audit committee had solely independent non-executive directors; AC Fin Exp dummy = dummy variable 
indicating instances where the audit committees had financial expertise; AC Size = number of audit 
committee members; AC Meetings = Number of audit committee meetings held during the year; AC % 
Ind = Percentage of audit committee members who are independent non-executive directors; AC % Fin 
Exp = Percentage of audit committee members who are financial experts; ACE1 = dummy variable 
representing instances where audit committees comprise at least three members, contained at least one 
financial expert, all members being independent and met at least three times during the financial year; 
ACE2 = dummy variable representing instances where audit committees comprise at least three 
members, contained at least one financial expert, all members being independent and met at least three 
times during the financial year, contains one accounting expert and has no member with more than 9 
years tenure; Industry = type of industry; Time = year. 
 
The control variables can be broadly categorized between those used in existing audit 
pricing studies and those focusing specifically on audit committee characteristics.  
Therefore, under the first category, this study follows the existing literature in 
identifying suitable proxies for company size, complexity, risk, auditor characteristics 
and the provision of non-audit services.  UK legislation requires companies to disclose 
both the fees paid to auditors for audit services as well as the fees paid for non-audit 
services.  I use the log of these variables in this analysis.  In common with a number of 
other studies, the log of assets is included as the most appropriate size variable and 
the log of the number of subsidiaries is used to represent complexity (Cobbin, 2002; 
Hay et al., 2006).  A further refinement is offered to the classification of subsidiaries by 
including a separate variable to indicate cases where the audit client has a subsidiary in 
the US since the audit of US subsidiaries is likely to expose auditors to greater risk due 
to the more litigious nature of US stakeholders (Seetharaman et al., 2002; O’Sullivan, 
2009).  Consistent with previous studies, a number of variables are used to represent 
auditor risk: the proportion of total assets represented both by inventory and accounts 
receivable, the level of financial gearing and the firm’s return on assets (Cobbin, 2002; 
Hay et al., 2006; Zaman et al., 2011).   
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Earlier research studies have used proportion of non-executive directors as proxy for 
board independence (O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002; Zaman et al., 2011). This 
study uses boards comprised of majority independent directors as well as the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors serving on the board of directors to 
represent board independence and the number of board meetings to represent board 
diligence. It should be noted that this study utilizes governance disclosures subsequent 
to Higgs (2003) and now it is possible to identify independent non-executives rather 
than just non-executives as used in O’Sullivan (2000) and Zaman et al., (2011).  
Following O’Sullivan (2000), this study also includes a variable representing the log of 
the number of days between a company’s financial year-end and the date in which the 
audit report is signed. O’Sullivan (2000) suggests that longer delays may indicate more 
troublesome audits and consequently lead to higher audit fees.  Two variables are 
included to represent auditor characteristics: a binary variable to differentiate 
between Big-4 and non-Big-4 auditors, since a number of previous studies have 
reported evidence suggesting that larger auditors may charge a premium for their 
audits (Craswell et al., 1995; Moizer, 1997; Francis, 2004), and a binary variable to 
indicate audits undertaken by London-based auditors since a number of UK studies 
have found that such audits are more expensive compared to audits undertaken by 
regional auditors (Chan et al., 1993; O’Sullivan, 2000). 
 
3.8.2 Audit Committee Characteristics and Earnings Quality Models 
This stage of the study also utilizes four main empirical models. Similar to the first 
phase of this study,  in model 1 this study uses the dummy variables for each of the 
four audit committee characteristics currently recommended as best practice for UK 
listed companies, while in model 2 these dummy variables are substituted with 
corresponding variables containing the absolute values for each of these four variables. 
In model 3 a dummy variable representing those firms whose audit committees satisfy 
all four of the recommended characteristics (ACE1) and in model 4 dummy variable is 
extended to include both the presence of an accounting expert and the absence of 
members with excess of nine years’ tenure (ACE2).  The empirical models to test the 
relationship between the audit committee characteristics and earnings quality using 
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earnings management models developed by McNichols (2002) and Francis et al., (2005) 
as proxies to measure earnings quality are as follows.  
 
3.8.2.1 McNichols (2002) Models 
Model 1: EQMCNICHOLS = β0 + β1ACSIZE + β2AC%IND + β3ACMEETINGS + 
β4AC%FINEXP + β5AC%SHAREOWN + β6ACAVEDIRECTORSHIPS + β7BOARDINDDUMMY 
+ β8BOARDMEETINGS + β9BIG4 + β10LOGDELAY + β11LOGTOTALASSETS + 
β12%GEARING + β13ROA + β14CFO + β15LOSS + β16%BLOCKOWN + β17INDUSTRY +   
β18TIME + ε. 
 
Model 2: EQMCNICHOLS = β0 + β1ACSIZEDUMMY + β2ACINDDUMMY + 
β3ACMEETINGSDUMMY + β4ACFINEXPDUMMY + β5AC%SHAREOWN + 
β6ACAVEDIRECTORSHIPS + β7BOARDINDDUMMY + β8BOARDMEETINGS + β9BIG4 + 
β10LOGDELAY + β11LOGTOTALASSETS + β12%GEARING + β13ROA + β14CFO + β15LOSS 
+ β16%BLOCKOWN + β17INDUSTRY +   β18TIME + ε. 
 
Model 3: EQMCNICHOLS = β0 + β1ACE1 + β2AC%SHAREOWN + 
β3ACAVEDIRECTORSHIPS + β4BOARDINDDUMMY + β5BOARDMEETINGS + β6BIG4 + 
β7LOGDELAY + β8LOGTOTALASSETS + β9%GEARING + β10ROA + β11CFO + β12LOSS + 
β13%BLOCKOWN + β14INDUSTRY +   β15TIME + ε. 
 
Model 4: EQMCNICHOLS = β0 + β1ACE2 + β2AC%SHAREOWN + 
β3ACAVEDIRECTORSHIPS + β4BOARDINDDUMMY + β5BOARDMEETINGS + β6BIG4 + 
β7LOGDELAY + β8LOGTOTALASSETS + β9%GEARING + β10ROA + β11CFO + β12LOSS + 
β13%BLOCKOWN + β14INDUSTRY +   β15TIME + ε. 
 
3.8.2.2 Francis et al., (2005) Models 
Model 1:  EQFRANCIS = β0 + β1ACSIZE + β2AC%IND + β3ACMEETINGS + β4AC%FINEXP 
+ β5AC%SHAREOWN + β6ACAVEDIRECTORSHIPS + β7BOARDINDDUMMY + 
β8BOARDMEETINGS + β9BIG4 + β10LOGDELAY + β11LOGTOTALASSETS + 
β12%GEARING + β13ROA + β14CFO + β15LOSS + β16%BLOCKOWN + β17INDUSTRY +   
β18TIME + ε. 
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Model 2: EQFRANCIS = β0 + β1ACSIZEDUMMY + β2ACINDDUMMY + 
β3ACMEETINGSDUMMY + β4ACFINEXPDUMMY + β5AC%SHAREOWN + 
β6ACAVEDIRECTORSHIPS + β7BOARDINDDUMMY + β8BOARDMEETINGS + β9BIG4 + 
β10LOGDELAY + β11LOGTOTALASSETS + β12%GEARING + β13ROA + β14CFO + β15LOSS 
+ β16%BLOCKOWN + β17INDUSTRY +   β18TIME + ε. 
 
Model 3: EQFRANCIS = β0 + β1ACE1 + β2AC%SHAREOWN + β3ACAVEDIRECTORSHIPS + 
β4BOARDINDDUMMY + β5BOARDMEETINGS + β6BIG4 + β7LOGDELAY + 
β8LOGTOTALASSETS + β9%GEARING + β10ROA + β11CFO + β12LOSS + 
β13%BLOCKOWN + β14INDUSTRY +   β15TIME + ε. 
 
Model 4: EQFRANCIS = β0 + β1ACE2 + β2AC%SHAREOWN + β3ACAVEDIRECTORSHIPS + 
β4BOARDINDDUMMY + β5BOARDMEETINGS + β6BIG4 + β7LOGDELAY + 
β8LOGTOTALASSETS + β9%GEARING + β10ROA + β11CFO + β12LOSS + 
β13%BLOCKOWN + β14INDUSTRY +   β15TIME + ε. 
 
Dependent variable:   
EQMCNICHOLS = absolute value of the residual from equation (1)
18
 as a measure of accruals quality and 
EQFRANCIS = residual value from equation (2)
19
 as the estimate of the discretionary component of the 
firms accruals quality 
 
Independent variables: Big4 = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit was carried out by a 
Big4 audit firm; Log Delay = the natural logarithm of audit delay; Log Total Assets = the natural 
logarithm of total assets; % Gearing = percentage of total long-term finance represented by long term 
debt; ROA = return on assets; CFO = cash flow from operations; Loss = dummy variable representing the 
firm incurring loss in last two years; % Block Own = percentage of equity owned by the block holders; 
Board Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where boards comprised of majority 
independent directors; Board meetings = the number of meetings held by the board during the year; AC % 
Share own = percentage of equity held by audit committee members; AC Ave Directorships = average 
directorships held by the audit committee members; AC Size dummy = dummy variable indicating 
instances where the audit committee contains three or more members; AC Meetings dummy = dummy 
                                                          
18
 ΔWCt = b0 + b1CFOt-1 + b2CFOt + b3CFOt+1 + b4ΔRevt + b5PPEt + εt (1) 
 
19
 AQ = α + b1SIZE + b2 LOSS + b3OPCYC + b4ϭCFO + b5ϭREV + et (2)  
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variable indicating instances where the audit committee held at least three meetings; AC Ind dummy = 
dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committee had solely independent non-executive 
directors; AC Fin Exp dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committees had 
financial expertise; AC Size = number of audit committee members; AC Meetings = Number of audit 
committee meetings held during the year; AC % Ind = Percentage of audit committee members who are 
independent non-executive directors; AC % Fin Exp = Percentage of audit committee members who are 
financial experts; ACE1 = dummy variable representing instances where audit committees comprise at 
least three members, contained at least one financial expert, all members being independent and met at 
least three times during the financial year; ACE2 = dummy variable representing instances where audit 
committees comprise at least three members, contained at least one financial expert, all members being 
independent and met at least three times during the financial year, contains one accounting expert and 
has no member with more than 9 years tenure; Industry = type of industry; Time = year. 
 
After discussing the association of various audit committee variables and earnings 
quality in the previous sections, it was important to include control variables that could 
be associated with audit committees and earnings quality. The board of directors, the 
external auditors and the audit committee each contribute to effective corporate 
governance and ultimately the quality of financial reporting (BRC 1999). This study 
includes several control variables. Auditor type is included as a dummy variable to 
represent audits undertaken by Big 4 auditors since larger auditors are expected to be 
more effective than smaller audit firms in enhancing financial reporting quality (Becker 
et al., 1998, Geiger and Rama, 2006). The study includes total assets since larger firms 
are more likely to exploit accounting policies to reduce political costs (Warfield et al., 
1995). This study also includes a measure of company leverage since prior research 
documents higher debt as an incentive to manage earnings (Defond and Jiambalvo, 
1994). Finally, return on assets is included as a measure of company performance. This 
study has also included the fixed effects of both the industry and years. 
 
In addition, this study presents various robustness tests of the impact of various audit 
committee variables on audit quality and earnings quality by utilising different 
variations of these variables such as expertise, busyness and tenure etc. This part of 
the analysis, tests of robustness, extends our understanding of the impact of these 
variations on financial reporting quality. 
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Table 3.5 - Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Label Definitions 
Audit fee Audit fee 
Log Audit Fee Log of audit fee 
Non Audit Fee Ratio Non audit fee / Audit Fee 
Non Audit Fee Dummy Dummy Variable (=1 if non-audit fee is higher than the audit fee; = 0 
otherwise)  
EQ McNichols Earnings quality measure calculated using McNichols (2002) model 
EQ Francis Earnings quality measure calculated using Francis et al., (2005) model. 
ACE1 Dummy variable (=1 if audit committee has 3 or more members; 
contains 1 expert; comprises only independent directors and has held 3 
or more meetings during the year; = 0 otherwise) 
ACE2 Dummy variable (=1 if audit committee has 3 or more members; 
contains one expert; comprises only independent directors; has held 3 
or more meetings during the year; contains one accounting expert and 
has no member with more than 9 years tenure; = 0 otherwise) 
ACE3 A scale out of four points, one point for each of the following variables: 
if audit committee has 3 or more members; contains 1 expert; 
comprises only independent directors and has held 3 or more meetings 
during the year. 
ACE4 A scale out of six points, one point for each of the following variables:  if 
audit committee has 3 or more members; contains 1 expert; comprises 
only independent directors; has held 3 or more meetings during the 
year;  contains one accounting expert and has no member with over 9 
years tenure. 
AC % Fin Exp  Percentage of audit committee members who are financial experts 
AC Fin Exp Dummy Dummy variable (=1 if audit committee has at least one expert member; 
=0 otherwise) 
AC % Acc Exp Percentage of audit committee members who are accounting experts* 
*A member with experience as a certified public accountant (CPA), 
auditor, chief financial officer (CFO), chief financial controller or chief 
accounting officer 
AC % Non Acc Exp  Percentage of audit committee members who are non-accounting 
experts* 
*These members include people with work experience as an investment 
banker, financial analyst, or members with experience of supervising the 
preparation of financial statements (e.g. chief executive officer or 
company president).   
AC % Gov Exp Percentage of audit committee members who served on the audit 
committee of another FTSE listed company at the same time 
AC Size Number of audit committee members 
AC Size Dummy Dummy variable (=1 if there are 3 or more members on audit 
committee; =0 otherwise) 
 
AC % Ind Percentage of audit committee members who are independent non-
executive directors 
AC Ind Dummy Dummy variable (=1 if all members of audit committee are independent 
non-executive directors; =0 otherwise) 
AC Meetings Number of audit committee meetings held during the year 
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Variable Label Definitions 
AC Meetings Dummy Dummy variable (=1 if number of audit committee meetings are 3 or 
greater; =0 otherwise) 
AC % Tenure 9 Percentage of audit committee members who have served on the board 
of directors for more than 9 years 
AC % Tenure 6 Percentage of audit committee members who have served on the board 
of directors for more than 6 years 
AC Ave Directorships Average additional directorships held by audit committee members 
AC % Addirs1plus Percentage of audit committee members with at least one additional 
directorship  
AC % Addirs2plus Percentage of audit committee members with at least two additional 
directorships  
AC % Addirs3plus Percentage of audit committee members with at least three additional 
directorships20  
AC % Share own Percentage share ownership of audit committee members 
Board Ind Dummy Dummy variable (=1 if majority of the board is comprised of 
independent non-executive directors21; = 0 otherwise) 
Board Meetings Number of board meetings held during the year 
Total Assets Total Assets 
Log Total Assets Log of total assets 
Big4 Dummy variable (=1 if audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, 
Deloitte and Touche or Ernst & Young; = 0 otherwise)  
London Dummy variable (=1 if audit undertaken by London-based auditor; = 0 
otherwise) 
Audit Delay Audit delay is the number of days between the financial year-end date 
and date when the audit report is signed by the auditor 
Log Delay Log of audit delay 
Log Subs Log of total subsidiaries  
US Subs Dummy Dummy variable indicating US subsidiaries (=1if subsidiaries include at 
least one based in US; = 0 otherwise) 
% Debtors Percentage of total assets represented by debtors  
% Stock Percentage of total assets represented by stock  
ROA Return on assets  
CFO Cash flow from operations 
Loss Dummy variable (=1 if firm has experienced loss; = 0 otherwise) 
% Gearing Percentage of long-term finance represented by long term debt  
% Block own Percentage of shares held by the block holders (owning 3% or more) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 This study only includes directorships of companies listed on the London International Stock Exchange (excluding 
directorships in AIM). 
21
 Refer to p76. 
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3.9 Statistical Techniques used to conduct Univariate and Bivariate Analysis 
To begin with, the descriptive analysis is performed first that includes sample values 
such as the mean, median and standard deviation as well as skewness and kurtosis of 
the sample variables. This then follows by the Pearson correlation matrix to investigate 
the bivariate association amongst the variables. After going through the correlation, to 
investigate the mean differences of various variables for large and small firms a 
Univariate analysis is performed using independent t – tests and Mann Whitney test.  
Then OLS multivariate regression technique is employed to examine the relationship 
between a single dependent variable and various explanatory variables. Prior literature 
suggests that the sample has to fulfil five fundamental assumptions for the OLS 
regression analysis to be valid (Chen et al., 2003; Hair et al., 2010). These assumptions 
include: (1) Normality - The errors (residuals) should be normally distributed (2) 
Linearity - The relationship between the predictors and the response variable should 
be linear. (3) Homoscedasticity - The error variance should be constant (4) 
Independent - The errors associated with one observation should not be correlated 
with the errors of other observations. (5) Multicollinearity - There should be no exact 
collinearity among predictors.   The literature also highlights that mild violations of 
these five assumptions are robust and unaffected in many situations (Glass and 
Hopkins, 1984; Newman et al., 1989). Therefore, the multivariate regression analysis is 
performed using OLS regression analysis technique. Finally robust analysis is carried 
out using yearly predictors and the big and small firms. Various other tests are also 
performed to check for the multicollinearity and hetroscedasticity. The statistical 
software SPSS has been used to conduct the above statistical analysis. 
 
3.10 Summary 
This chapter outlines the research method employed in the study.  Beginning with the 
theoretical paradigm, this chapter discusses the use of agency theory as a basis for 
understanding the role of corporate governance and its assumptions which underpin 
the present research. The chapter also outlines the main research question to be 
investigated and discusses the development of the specific hypotheses this study is 
seeking to investigate. Considering the purpose of this study the main research 
questions are as follows; 1) Do audit committee characteristics (including: size, 
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independence, expertise, meetings, busyness, share ownership and tenure) influence 
the quality of external audit in UK companies? 2) Do audit committee characteristics 
(including: size, independence, expertise, meetings, busyness, share ownership and 
tenure) influence the quality of earnings in UK companies? This draws heavily from the 
literature reviewed in the previous chapter in establishing an academic rationale for 
the various aspects of enquiry pursued. In particular, hypothesis related to financial 
reporting quality and audit committee size, expertise, independence, meetings, tenure, 
share ownership, busyness and overall effectiveness are outlined and justified. After 
this an explanation and justification for choice of sample is outlined and the principal 
sources of data for the study are explained.  The population for the study consists of 
FTSE 350 firms that are listed on the London Stock Exchange.  As the period of 
selection for this study is 2007 – 2010, this study includes only those companies that 
exist throughout this period. This final sample for the audit committee and audit fee 
analysis equals 991 firm observations and final sample for the non-audit fee ratio 
analysis equals 948 firm observations. The sample choice for the second empirical of 
this study examining earnings quality is slightly different from the first empirical 
investigation of audit quality issues. In line with the prior literature in this area 
(Peasnell et al. 2005; Ghosh, 2010), and to provide an unbiased measure of accrual 
quality, this study excludes industries with less than 10 observations in any given year. 
This reduces the pooled sample size from 1400 observations to 691 when examining 
earnings quality.  Since this is a quantitative empirical study, a significant portion of 
this chapter is devoted to identifying and justifying the dependent and independent 
variables used in the subsequent empirical analysis. The chapter explains in detail how 
the dependent variables (i.e. financial reporting quality) are measured, both in terms 
of audit quality and in terms of earnings quality.  The measurement of independent 
variables are also discussed here (i.e. audit committee size, expertise, meetings, 
independence, tenure, share ownership, busyness and audit committee effectiveness). 
The chapter concludes with an explanation of the regression models employed to 
examine audit committee characteristics and both audit quality and earnings quality.  
For audit quality, audit effort is measured using audit fee paid to the auditor and audit 
independence is measured using the non-audit to audit fee ratio.  For earnings quality, 
this study employs McNichols (2002) and Francis et al., (2005) models as its measures 
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of earnings quality. The statistical techniques used in the univariate and bivariate 
analysis are also explained.   
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CHAPTER 4: AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS AND AUDIT QUALITY 
– EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter begins by outlining the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in 
the first empirical analysis investigating the influence of audit committee 
characteristics on audit pricing. The descriptive analysis includes; a comprehensive 
analysis of the overall sample, a detailed analysis based on four corresponding years 
and finally a detailed outlook on the statistics at industry level.  The chapter then 
presents the results of the univariate analysis. The univariate analysis contains 
statistics from both the independent t-test and Mann-Whitney test, highlighting the 
significant differences in the mean and mean rank values of various audit committee 
variables for firms that are large in size compared to firms that are small in size.  This is 
followed by a correlation matrix showing a two way Pearson correlation between the 
variables included in this study. Correlations are important in this type of study as they 
highlight the associations between audit and non- audit fee ratio and the explanatory 
variables but also identify the significant correlations among the independent variables.  
The chapter then presents the results of a detailed multivariate regression analysis 
(pooled dataset) that investigates the hypotheses set out in the previous chapter. The 
multivariate analysis includes a robust investigation of the impact of various audit 
committee characteristics on audit fee and non-audit fee ratio. This chapter also 
includes a separate analyses for large and small firms. In the non-audit fee ratio 
section the study also includes a logistic regression analysis to investigate the impact of 
audit committee characteristics on firms paying higher non-audit services fees 
compared to audit fees. Finally, this chapter ends by summarizing the results of the 
first empirical analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 contains descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this study.  The 
mean audit fee is £1.681 million with a median of £606,000.  The mean non-audit fee 
paid to the auditor is £1.210 million with a median of £400,000. 
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Table 4.1 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Audit Fee (000) 1681325 606000 3179448 34000 26400000 4.573 24.847 
Log Audit Fee 5.850 5.782 0.545 4.53 7.42 0.379 -0.199 
Non Audit Fee (000) 1210107 400000 2564253 0.00 24225000 5.324 35.487 
Non Audit Fee Ratio 0.930 0.583 1.129 0.01 12.84 4.706 35.243 
Non Audit Fee Dummy 0.280 0 0.448 0.00 1.00 0.995 -1.012 
AC Size 3.398 3 0.860 2.00 8.00 0.975 1.932 
AC Size Dummy 0.905 1 0.293 0.00 1.00 -2.770 5.682 
AC Meetings 3.904 4 1.227 1.00 12.00 1.364 3.929 
AC Meetings Dummy 0.940 1 0.237 0.00 1.00 -3.729 11.926 
AC % Ind 95.285 100 12.793 0.00 100.00 -2.923 9.368 
AC Ind Dummy 0.866 1 0.341 0.00 1.00 -2.149 2.625 
AC % Tenure 9 7.249 0 16.675 0.00 100.00 2.694 8.191 
AC % Tenure 6 23.533 25 26.420 0.00 100.00 0.910 0.120 
AC % Fin Exp 78.389 75 23.891 0.00 100.00 -0.886 0.136 
AC Fin Exp Dummy 0.988 1 0.109 0.00 1.00 -8.935 77.995 
AC % Acc Exp 34.850 33.333 21.908 0.00 100.00 0.361 0.224 
AC % Non Acc Exp 43.540 40 25.640 0.00 100.00 0.070 -0.327 
AC % Gov Exp 24.292 25 24.474 0.00 100.00 0.743 -0.062 
Ac Ave Directorships 0.725 0.667 0.558 0.00 4.00 0.992 1.673 
AC % Addirs1plus 46.193 50 28.781 0.00 100.00 0.089 -0.675 
AC % Addirs2plus 18.514 0 22.079 0.00 100.00 1.095 0.950 
AC % Addirs3plus 6.590 0 14.357 0.00 100.00 2.231 4.961 
AC % Share own 0.356 0.016 3.322 0.00 52.18 12.851 170.553 
ACE1 0.748 1 0.435 0.00 1.00 -1.143 -0.696 
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Variables 
 
Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
ACE2 0.532 1 0.499 0.00 1.00 -0.128 -1.988 
ACE3 3.699 4 0.560 1.00 4.00 -1.816 2.827 
ACE4 5.332 6 0.860 2.00 6.00 -1.316 1.436 
Board Ind Dummy 0.573 1 0.495 0.00 1.00 -0.296 -1.916 
Board Meetings 8.817 8 2.865 1.00 26.00 1.327 4.354 
Big 4 0.955 1 0.208 0.00 1.00 -4.374 17.162 
London 0.610 1 0.488 0.00 1.00 -0.454 -1.798 
Audit Delay 64.190 62 16.408 25.00 152.00 1.248 3.805 
Log Delay 1.794 1.792 0.107 1.40 2.18 -0.024 1.375 
Total Assets (000s) 4094918 915110 11308102 32794 155952000 7.826 84.651 
Log Total Assets 9.037 8.961 0.662 7.52 11.19 0.478 -0.111 
% Debtors 16.054 13.778 12.558 0.00 67.09 1.343 2.223 
% Stock 11.305 6.917 15.775 0.00 96.42 2.934 10.602 
ROA 9.055 7.545 10.786 -83.57 118.56 1.511 21.882 
% Gearing 19.264 16.866 16.879 0.000 80.670 -0.340 -0.442 
Loss 0.140 0 0.343 0.00 1.00 2.124 2.517 
Log Subs 1.221 1.255 0.389 0.00 2.23 -0.319 0.131 
US Subs Dummy 0.544 1 0.498 0.00 1.00 -0.177 -1.973 
% Block own 38.333 38.19 17.816 0.00 92.40 0.214 -0.221 
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The average non-audit fee ratio stands at 0.93:1 with a median ratio of 0.58:1. The 
range of non-audit fee ratio starts from as low as 0.01:1 to and goes as high as 12.84:1. 
The statistics also reveal that 28 per cent of firms pay more towards non audit fees 
compared to their audit fees. Of particular interest to this study are the descriptive 
statistics in relation to the audit committee characteristics.  Audit committees have, on 
average, 3.4 members with a median composition of 3.  The requirement for a 
minimum of three members in the various UK Corporate Governance Codes seems to 
be largely adhered to with 90.5 per cent of firms meeting these recommendations.  
Audit committees in this study meet on average 3.90 times during the year with a 
median of 4 meetings per year.  94 per cent of audit committees meet at least three 
times per year as currently recommended by regulators.  Zaman et al., (2011), using 
data from 2001 to 2004, reported that only 21 per cent of audit committees had at 
least three meetings during the year. This suggests that the level of audit committee 
diligence has improved significantly since the enactment of the Smith Report (2003). 
87 per cent of audit committees are comprised only of independent non-executives 
with the average proportion of independent members at 95.3 per cent. In terms of the 
additional proxy for independence, the mean presence of members with more than 
nine years’ tenure is only 7.76 per cent.  However the mean presence of members with 
more than six year tenure is 23 per cent. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) 
requires non-executive directors not to serve more than nine years on a company’s 
board as it can become detrimental to their independence and also requires 
companies to a have a rigorous review of non-executives serving longer than six years. 
 
98.8 per cent of audit committees have at least one financial expert while the average 
proportion of financial experts on audit committees is 78.39 per cent.  This study uses 
the financial expertise definition provided by the SEC, in which an audit committee 
member is deemed to be a financial expert if that member has: (a) accounting 
expertise from work experience as a certified public accountant, auditor, chief financial 
officer, financial controller or accounting officer; (b) finance expertise from work 
experience as an investment banker, financial analyst or any other financial 
management role; or (c) supervisory expertise from supervising the preparation of 
financial statements (e.g. chief executive officer or company president). The average 
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proportion of audit committee members who are accounting experts is 34.85 per cent 
and 43.54 per cent of audit committee members are non-accounting experts.  The 
number of audit committees with at least one member with financial expertise has 
increased considerably in last few years as prior evidence from the UK suggests that 
only 70 per cent of audit committees had a financial expert (Zaman et al., 2011). 
Abbott et al., (2003) while examining US evidence, report that 80 per cent of audit 
committees had at least one member with financial expertise.  The average proportion 
of governance experts i.e. audit committee member with other audit committee 
experience on audit committees is 24.3 per cent.  
 
In addition to audit committee characteristics recommended by governance regulation, 
this study also captures the ownership of audit committee members since there is a 
strong argument, as well as some supporting evidence, that audit committee members 
with an equity stake in their companies may be more effective in their oversight of the 
financial reporting process. As expected, the summary statistics presented in table 4.1 
show that the ownership levels of the average audit committee is quite low at 0.356 
per cent with an even lower median of only .016 per cent. This study also investigates 
the impact of holding multiple directorships on audit committee’s monitoring 
effectiveness. The average additional directorship held by audit committees in this 
study is .725 with a median of .667 with a range from 0 to a maximum of 4 
directorships. This study also constructs variables representing the proportion of audit 
committee members with one or more, two or more or three or more additional 
directorships, with mean values for these variables of 46.19 per cent, 18.51 per cent 
and 6.59 per cent respectively. 
 
ACE1, which shows compliance with all four aspects of recommended best practice for 
audit committees, reveals that 74.8 per cent of audit committees are in full compliance 
while the mean score of compliance (i.e. ACE3) is 3.69 out of 4.  When the composite 
variables are extended to include both the presence of an accounting expert and the 
absence of members with excess of nine years’ tenure, the proportion of companies in 
compliance reduces to 53.2 per cent with the mean score of compliance (ACE4) at 5.33 
out of a maximum 6. 
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For board of director variables, the independence level of corporate boards in the UK 
has shown some improvement as O’Sullivan (2000) reports this percentage to be at 
41.17 per cent. This study also finds that 57.3 per cent of FTSE 350 boards are 
comprised of majority independent directors as required by the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010). The average frequency of board meetings is 8 meetings per 
year with a median of 8 meetings. The average board meeting frequency is similar to 
prior UK and US studies such as Zaman et al., (2011) and Abbott et al., (2003).  Of the 
other audit fee determinants, 54.4 per cent of firms have at least one US subsidiary; 
the mean ROA of firms is 9.05 per cent; gearing levels are on average 19.26 per cent 
and 38.33 per cent of equity is owned by the block holders.  Zaman et al., (2011) 
reported gearing level at 15 per cent, which is significantly lower than this study. This 
could be due to the changing risk levels for UK firms in the recent years. However the 
finding in relation to block holder ownership is similar to prior UK evidence as 
O’Sullivan (2000) reported block holder ownership at 31.92 per cent.  The average 
company size based on total assets is £4094 million; 16 per cent and 11 per cent of 
total assets are represented by debtors and stock respectively. Audit delay is averaging 
at 64 days; 61 per cent of audits are undertaken by London-based auditors; and 95.5 
per cent of audits are undertaken by one of the big 4 auditing firms.  O’Sullivan (2000) 
using 1992 data, recorded audit delay at 85 days, audits undertaken by London based 
auditors at 57 per cent and audits conducted by big 6 auditors at 86 per cent.  The 
latter figure reflects the continued domination of this segment of the listed company 
audit market by big 4 auditors.   
 
 
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics – Year wise 
Table 4.2 contains descriptive statistics on a yearly basis. The average audit fee paid to 
the auditor from 2007 to 2010 is £1.596million, 1.638million, 1.724million and £1.766 
million respectively. The non-audit to audit fee ratio in this period remains 1.1, 0.87, 
0.84 and 0.92 respectively. The analysis also shows that 31 per cent of firms in 2007, 
25 per cent of firms in 2008, 29 per cent of firms in 2009 and 26 per cent of firms in 
2010 have paid more towards non-audit compared to audit fees. The study reveals a 
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continuous increase and a large scale adherence to various UK Corporate Governance 
Code requirements in relation to audit committee size, independence, meetings and 
expertise level. From 2007 to 2010, audit committees fulfilling the size requirement of 
a minimum of three members have increased from 87 per cent to 95 per cent, meeting 
at least three or more times have increased from 91.5 per cent to 95.6 per cent and 
comprised of all independent directors have increased from 94 per cent to 96 per cent. 
Audit committee members with over nine year tenure have slightly reduced from 7.76 
per cent to 6.47 per cent in the four year period from 2007 to 2010 however members 
with over six year tenure have increased from 23 per cent to 25 per cent in the same 
period. Percentage of audit committee members with governance expertise i.e. 
experience of serving on other audit committees have increased from 20.78 per cent 
to 25.54 per cent during the sample period. Average directorships held by the audit 
committee members remain the same between 2007 and 2010 and same is the case 
with members with at least 1, two or more and three or more directorships.  The 
composite measures of audit committee effectiveness (i.e. ACE1 to ACE4) show a 
continuous upward trend of compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2010), revealing an increase of 70 per cent to 79 per cent for audit committees 
complying with all four aspects of recommended best practice (i.e. ACE1) with the 
mean score of compliance going up from 3.61 to 3.76 out of 4 (i.e. ACE3).  Similarly 
when the composite variable includes both the presence of an accounting qualified 
person and the absence of members with excess of nine years’ tenure (i.e. ACE2), the 
proportion of companies in compliance increased from 46.7 per cent to 58.9 per cent 
and mean score of compliance (i.e. ACE4) has gone up from 5.21 to 5.43 out of a 
maximum 6. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics - year wise 
 
Variables 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Audit Fee (000) 1596238 616569 1637652 600000 1724451 654000 1766100 617000 
Log Audit Fee 5.815 5.790 5.846 5.778 5.870 5.816 5.869 5.790 
Non Audit Fee (000) 1275757 400000 1183764 300000 1232992 356915 1148352 400000 
Non audit Fee Ratio 1.101 0.645 0.873 0.250 0.828 0.290 0.921 0.260 
Non audit Fee Dummy 0.31 0 0.25 0 0.29 0 0.26 0 
AC Size 3.350 3.000 3.363 3.000 3.406 3.000 3.472 3.000 
AC Size Dummy 0.874 1.000 0.887 1.000 0.908 1.000 0.952 1.000 
AC Meetings 3.813 4.000 3.931 4.000 3.964 4.000 3.907 4.000 
AC Meetings Dummy 0.915 1.000 0.944 1.000 0.956 1.000 0.948 1.000 
AC % Ind 94.119 100 95.917 100 95.509 100 95.585 100 
AC Ind Dummy 0.837 1.000 0.883 1.000 0.871 1.000 0.871 1.000 
AC % Fin Exp 75.920 75.000 77.288 75.000 80.509 100 79.812 80 
AC Fin Exp Dummy 0.988 1.000 0.988 1.000 0.988 1.000 0.988 1.000 
AC % Acc Exp 33.215 33.333 34.709 33.333 35.891 33.333 35.565 33.333 
AC % Non Acc Exp 42.705 33.333 42.579 36.667 44.618 50.000 44.246 50.000 
AC % Gov Exp 20.783 16.667 24.130 25.000 26.670 25.000 25.544 25.000 
AC % Tenure 9 7.761 0.000 7.392 0.000 7.380 0.000 6.465 0.000 
AC % Tenure 6 23.026 0.000 22.312 20.000 23.766 25.000 25.025 25.000 
Ac Ave Directorships 0.713 0.667 0.728 0.667 0.754 0.667 0.706 0.667 
AC % Addirs1plus 44.896 40.000 47.365 50.000 47.030 50.000 45.469 40.000 
AC % Addirs2plus 18.276 7.143 18.557 0.000 19.290 20.000 17.927 0.000 
AC % Addirs3plus 6.159 0.000 6.258 0.000 7.423 0.000 6.512 0.000 
AC % Share own 0.437 0.014 0.262 0.015 0.254 0.016 0.471 0.017 
ACE1 0.703 1.000 0.742 1.000 0.759 1.000 0.786 1.000 
ACE2 0.467 0.000 0.532 1.000 0.538 1.000 0.589 1.000 
ACE3 3.614 4.000 3.702 4.000 3.723 4.000 3.758 4.000 
ACE4 5.211 5.000 5.327 6.000 5.357 6.000 5.431 6.000 
Board Ind Dummy 0.512 1.000 0.540 1.000 0.598 1.000 0.641 1.000 
Board Meetings 8.561 8.000 9.065 9.000 8.992 9.000 8.649 8.000 
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Variables 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Big 4 0.951 1.000 0.952 1.000 0.952 1.000 0.964 1.000 
London 0.602 1.000 0.613 1.000 0.594 1.000 0.633 1.000 
Audit Delay 65.024 63.000 64.552 62.000 63.823 62.000 63.367 61.000 
Log Delay 1.800 1.799 1.797 1.792 1.791 1.792 1.789 1.785 
Total Assets (000) 3264807 722850 4077188 932450 4419420 909200 4610253 980650 
Log Total Assets 8.961 8.859 9.046 8.970 9.058 8.959 9.081 8.992 
% Debtors 11.673 7.458 11.582 7.085 10.994 6.440 10.976 6.527 
% Stock 16.888 13.998 16.526 14.506 15.320 13.467 15.490 13.675 
ROA 26.088 27.087 27.194 29.333 26.930 29.223 24.977 27.370 
% Gearing 11.529 9.392 8.573 7.242 6.760 6.097 9.388 7.555 
Loss 0.09 0.000 0.13 0.000 0.12 0.000 0.20 0.000 
Log Subs 1.202 1.217 1.231 1.279 1.215 1.230 1.237 1.267 
US Subs Dummy 0.524 1.000 0.532 1.000 0.550 1.000 0.569 1.000 
% Block own 38.855 38.350 38.041 38.650 37.028 36.450 39.418 39.210 
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The study also shows that 51 per cent of the boards were comprised of majority 
independent directors in 2007 and this figure has increased to 64 per cent in 2010. The 
average number of board meetings recorded between 2007 and 2010 remain 8 to 9 
meetings per year. Of the other audit fee determinants; audits conducted by big 4 
auditors have increased from 95.1 per cent to 96.4 per cent; audits performed by 
London based auditors have increased from 60 to 63 per cent and the audit delay has 
decreased from 65 to 63 days. The mean of total assets has increased considerably 
from £3264 million to £4610 million; Percentage of total assets represented by debtors 
and stock has remained the same over the four year period; ROA and gearing levels 
have decreased marginally from 26.08 per cent to 27.37 per cent and 11.52 per cent to 
9.38 per cent respectively; number of firms experiencing loss have increased from 9 
per cent to 20 per cent; and the number of firms with at least one US subsidiary has 
increased from 52 to 57 per cent.    
 
4.1.2 Descriptive Statistics – Industry wise 
Table 4.3 contains industry level descriptive statistics.  Following Zaman et al., (2011) 
the London Stock Exchange classification list of industries was consolidated and five 
industry categories were derived.  The results show that general industrial sector pays 
substantially more audit and non-audit fee as compared to other four sectors. The 
mean value of audit and non-audit fee for general industrial sector is £4.15 million and 
£3.02 million respectively and this amount is approximately three to four times higher 
than the average audit and non-audit fee paid by the services sector with an audit fee 
value of £1.17 million and non-audit fee value of £935 thousands. The substantial 
difference in audit fee levels is possibly due to the difference in audit complexity level 
of these sectors. The average non-audit to audit fee ratio is highest for the consumer 
sector (1.135:1) and lowest for the minerals sector (0.821:1) compared to their 
counterparts. The analysis also shows that 31 per cent of firms in the consumer sector, 
23 per cent of firms in the minerals sector, 38 per cent of firms in the general industrial 
sector, 27 per cent of firms in the services sector and 31 per cent of firms in the 
utilities sector have paid more towards non-audit compared to audit fees. 
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In terms of audit committee size the mean value is over three members for all the 
industries, however adherence to the recommended best practice (e.g. having at least 
three members) is highest in the general industrial sector and lowest in the consumer 
goods sector with average audit committees’ compliance level standing at 96 per cent 
and 86 per cent respectively. The average number of audit committee meetings in the 
general industrial, services and utilities sectors is over four meetings and over 90 per 
cent of audit committees in all the five industries have shown compliance to audit 
committee meetings requirement. The statistics show that on average over 93 per cent 
of audit committee members in these industries are independent with a highest value 
of 96.84 per cent in the mineral industry. 92.4 per cent of audit committees in the 
general industrial sector are fully independent and in compliance with the best 
practice guidelines as compared to 81.3 per cent of audit committees in the services 
industries. On average over 75 per cent of audit committee members in every industry 
are considered as financial experts as per SEC definition however when splitting the 
definition of financial expertise into accounting and non-accounting expertise the 
statistics highlight that the majority of these experts are non-accounting experts. 
General industrial, services and utilities sector companies have at least one financial 
expert on their audit committees followed by minerals and consumer goods industries 
where on average 98 per cent of the audit committees follow the best practice 
guidelines.  The proportion of audit committee members with other audit committee 
experience for mineral industry is 28.70 per cent followed by the services and utilities 
industries with values of 24.93 per cent and 23.39 per cent respectively.. Audit 
committee members in the general industrial sector tend to serve longer on their 
respective company boards with 20.99 per cent of audit committee members in the 
general industrial sector serving longer than nine years as compared to their 
counterparts i.e. consumer goods, minerals, services and utilities sectors where 
approximately 4 to 6 per cent of the members have longer than 9 year tenure on their 
respective board of directors.  The mean value of average directorships held by the 
audit committee is highest in the minerals and utilities industries - .79 and .75 
respectively as compared to the lowest mean value of .50 for the general industrial 
industry. 54.94 per cent of audit committee members in the utilities sector hold at 
least one other directorship whereas only 32.78 per cent of audit committee members 
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in the general industrial sector holds at least one additional directorship. The 
percentage of equity held by the audit committee is quite low in all the industries with 
a highest value of 1.951 per cent and lowest value of .077 per cent for general 
industrial and consumer goods sectors respectively. 82.3 per cent of audit committees 
in the general industrial sector are in full compliance (i.e. ACE1) with the governance 
code followed by the utilities sector (82.1 per cent), minerals sector (78 per cent), 
consumer goods (72.9 per cent) and services sector (70.2 per cent). When the 
composite variables are extended to include both the presence of an accounting 
expert and the absence of members with excess of nine years’ tenure, the proportion 
of companies in compliance reduces to 55.3 per cent in the services sector, 55.1 per 
cent in the minerals sector, 53.7 per cent in the consumer goods, 46.4 per cent in the 
utilities sector and 40.5 per cent in the general industrial sector.   
 
Other than audit committee variables, board independence is highest in the general 
industrial sector with 73.4 per cent of boards are composed of majority independent 
directors as compared to the 53.7 per cent of boards in the minerals sector. Average 
board meetings in the utilities sector seem to be higher as compared to the rest of the 
sectors. The mean value of board meetings in the utilities sector is 9.75 and median 
value is 10. On average 98.8 per cent of external audit in the services sector were 
carried out by big4 accounting firms as compared to the utilities sector where the 
mean value stands at 85.7 per cent. The mean value of audits performed by the 
London based auditors is 87.3 per cent for general industrial sector as compared to the 
lowest mean value of 50.3 per cent for the minerals sector. Audit delay is also highest 
for the general industrial sector with a mean value of 75.4 days whereas the lowest 
audit delay stands at 60.6 days for utilities sector. In terms of total assets, utilities 
sector has the highest mean for total assets followed by the general industrial sector, 
consumer goods sector, minerals sector and finally services sector.  As expected, 25.07 
per cent of total assets in the consumer goods sector are represented by debtors 
where as in the utilities sector only 1.87 per cent of total assets are represented by 
debtors.  Similarly 20 per cent of the mineral sector’ total assets are represented by 
stock however only 9 per cent of the total assets in the utilities sector are represented 
by stock. ROA is highest for the utilities sector at 33.04 per cent followed by the 
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services sector ROA of 29.73 per cent; general industrial sector has the highest gearing 
level; mineral sector has the highest proportion (16 per cent) of firms experiencing loss; 
79 per cent of firms in the minerals sector have at least one US subsidiary where as 
only 23 per cent firms in the consumer goods sector has a US subsidiary; and at least 
40 per cent of equity in the general industrial and services sector is owned by the block 
holders.   
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics - Industry wise 
 
Variables
 
Consumer Goods Minerals General Industrial Services Utilities 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Audit Fee (000) 1615395 312500 1546910 611500 4150106 1879200 1169099 690000 2293953 650000 
Log Audit Fee 5.710 5.495 5.862 5.786 6.196 6.274 5.832 5.839 5.956 5.812 
Non Audit Fee (000) 1152218 297000 1029293 320500 3018870 1252800 935154 400000 1518723 712000 
Non audit Fee Ratio 1.135 0.310 0.821 0.230 1.041 0.380 0.874 0.270 0.978 0.310 
Non Audit Fee Dum 0.31 0 0.23 0 0.38 0 0.27 0 0.31 0 
AC Size 3.445 3.000 3.324 3.000 3.595 3.000 3.354 3.000 3.589 3.000 
AC Size Dummy 0.862 1.000 0.916 1.000 0.962 1.000 0.906 1.000 0.929 1.000 
AC Meetings 3.757 4.000 3.679 3.000 4.215 4.000 4.076 4.000 4.179 4.000 
AC Meetings Dummy 0.940 1.000 0.936 1.000 0.899 1.000 0.950 1.000 0.964 1.000 
AC % Ind 95.971 100.000 96.841 100.000 95.570 100.000 93.735 100.000 93.452 100.000 
AC Ind Dummy 0.885 1.000 0.902 1.000 0.924 1.000 0.813 1.000 0.839 1.000 
AC % Fin Exp 76.512 75.000 78.936 80.000 75.506 75.000 79.066 75.000 82.738 100.000 
AC Fin Exp Dummy 0.977 1.000 0.980 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AC % Acc Exp 34.968 33.333 34.476 33.333 30.802 33.333 36.465 33.333 32.202 33.333 
AC % Non Acc Exp 41.544 50.000 44.459 33.333 44.705 33.333 42.601 36.667 50.536 45.000 
AC % Gov Exp 19.130 16.667 28.699 33.333 19.895 20.000 24.930 25.000 23.393 20.000 
AC % Tenure 9 6.156 0.000 6.177 0.000 20.992 0.000 6.223 0.000 4.048 0.000 
AC % Tenure 6 19.602 0.000 25.231 25.000 32.574 33.333 23.392 25.000 17.976 0.000 
ACE1 0.729 1.000 0.780 1.000 0.823 1.000 0.702 1.000 0.821 1.000 
ACE2 0.537 1.000 0.551 1.000 0.405 0.000 0.553 1.000 0.464 0.000 
ACE3 3.665 4.000 3.733 4.000 3.785 4.000 3.667 4.000 3.732 4.000 
ACE4 5.307 6.000 5.358 6.000 5.114 5.000 5.386 6.000 5.268 5.000 
AC Ave Directorships 0.693 0.667 0.786 0.667 0.504 0.400 0.740 0.667 0.749 0.750 
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Variables Consumer Goods Minerals General Industrial Services Utilities 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
AC % Addirs1plus 44.417 42.857 49.037 50.000 32.785 33.333 46.530 50.000 54.940 66.667 
AC % Addirs2plus 17.761 7.143 20.800 25.000 13.650 0.000 18.564 0.000 15.923 0.000 
AC % Addirs3plus 5.696 0.000 7.477 0.000 3.207 0.000 7.447 0.000 4.911 0.000 
AC % Share own 0.077 0.016 0.453 0.023 1.951 0.006 0.116 0.014 0.143 0.001 
Board Ind Dummy 0.583 1.000 0.537 1.000 0.734 1.000 0.547 1.000 0.661 1.000 
Board Meetings 8.651 9.000 8.615 8.000 7.759 8.000 9.190 8.500 9.750 10.000 
Big 4 0.913 1.000 0.980 1.000 0.899 1.000 0.988 1.000 0.857 1.000 
London 0.569 1.000 0.503 1.000 0.873 1.000 0.664 1.000 0.643 1.000 
Audit Delay 65.216 61.000 65.115 64.000 75.430 74.000 60.725 59.000 60.607 58.500 
Log Delay 1.800 1.785 1.801 1.806 1.861 1.869 1.773 1.771 1.774 1.767 
Total Assets (000) 4605647 951114 2377033 573311 8935602 2323870 1813189 957050 18292986 3901850 
Log Total Assets 9.118 8.978 8.849 8.758 9.375 9.366 8.974 8.981 9.615 9.591 
% Debtors 25.073 15.916 13.170 12.701 3.826 2.776 4.188 0.728 1.868 0.534 
% Stock 11.186 9.317 20.033 18.971 7.351 6.493 18.857 15.958 9.127 7.687 
ROA 25.338 25.712 23.243 26.077 20.743 22.249 29.734 33.170 33.039 38.926 
% Gearing 9.179 9.498 8.257 7.206 12.242 9.481 9.199 7.195 7.423 5.232 
Loss 0.14 0.000 0.16 0.000 0.13 0.000 0.11 0.000 0.14 0.000 
Log Subs 1.042 1.021 1.312 1.342 1.323 1.447 1.244 1.301 1.157 1.203 
US Subs Dummy 0.234 0.000 0.791 1.000 0.392 0.000 0.582 1.000 0.429 0.000 
% Block own 36.014 37.455 38.391 38.315 40.960 44.050 40.798 38.830 28.295 27.525 
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4.2 Univariate Analysis 
Table 4.4 contains univariate statistics from independent t-test and Mann-Whitney 
test highlighting the significant differences in the mean and mean rank values of 
various audit committee variables for firms that are large in size compared to firms 
that are small in size. Since larger companies are considered to be the high profile 
companies in the stock market and have considerably high coverage from the media 
and market analysts, these companies are expected to be associated with better 
governance mechanisms and expected to be seeking a higher standard of audit 
committee composition.  This univariate analysis is conducted by splitting the sample 
into larger and smaller sub-samples using the median value of the firm size (total 
assets).  
 
The statistics from the table show that on average larger firms pay significantly higher 
audit fees and non-audit services fees as compared to smaller firms. This finding 
highlights the fact that larger companies are more complex to audit and hence require 
more audit effort and consequently result in higher audit fees. Larger firms are also 
better resourced and can afford to pay for more audit coverage as compared to their 
counterparts. The mean value of non-audit fee ratio is significantly lower in large firms 
as compared to small firms. The analysis also suggests that on average audit 
committee size, number of meetings and percentage independence is significantly 
higher in those firms that are larger in size as compared to those that are smaller in 
size. Similarly the mean and mean rank values of companies that have full compliance 
with the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) in relation to audit committee size, 
meetings and independence is significantly higher for larger companies than those that 
are small in size. As expected, the proportion of audit committee members with tenure 
of over nine years is significantly lower in larger firms compared to smaller firms. The 
results also show that the number of audit committees with at least one financial 
expert on the committee are significantly higher for firms that are larger in size as 
compared to those that are small in size. The mean and mean rank values of the 
proportion of audit committee members with financial expertise is also higher for 
larger firms however the difference is not statistically significant.  
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Table 4.4: Univariate Analysis  
 
 
Mean T Value (Sig) Mean Rank Z Value (Sig) 
 
Large 
firms 
Small 
firms  
Large 
firms 
Small 
firms  
Audit Fee 2884341 475878 12.878*** 673.22 318.42 19.514*** 
Log Audit Fee 6.182 5.518 24.155*** 673.22 318.42 19.514*** 
Non Audit Fee 2020188 487164 9.460*** 610.02 334.92 15.472*** 
Non audit Fee Ratio 0.848 1.014 -2.262** 465.34 486.95 -1.564 
Non audit Fee Dummy 0.255 0.301 -1.565 465.64 483.63 -1.012 
AC Size 3.688 3.107 11.288*** 580.44 411.39 10.235*** 
AC Size Dummy 0.970 0.840 7.117*** 528.02 463.92 6.945*** 
AC Meetings 4.220 3.588 8.386*** 575.85 415.99 9.236*** 
AC Meetings Dummy 0.982 0.899 5.593*** 516.51 475.45 5.509*** 
AC % Ind 98.180 92.384 7.318*** 536.06 455.86 7.450*** 
AC Ind Dummy 0.946 0.786 7.578*** 535.53 456.39 7.371*** 
AC % Tenure 9 5.357 9.145 -3.597*** 479.88 512.16 -2.564** 
AC % Tenure 6 22.161 24.909 -1.639 490.43 501.58 -.649 
AC Fin Exp Dummy 0.998 0.978 2.917*** 501.00 490.99 2.906*** 
AC % Fin Exp 79.470 77.306 1.426 502.82 489.16 .794 
AC % Acc Exp 32.636 37.067 -3.198*** 465.66 526.40 -3.420*** 
AC % Non Acc Exp 46.833 40.239 4.080*** 528.77 463.16 3.669*** 
AC % Gov Exp 24.273 24.310 -.023 494.19 497.82 -.208 
ACE1 0.895 0.600 11.362*** 569.05 422.80 10.692*** 
ACE2 0.613 0.451 5.187*** 536.19 455.73 5.120*** 
ACE3 3.895 3.503 11.763*** 571.41 420.44 10.968*** 
ACE4 5.544 5.119 8.029*** 550.81 441.07 6.682*** 
AC Ave Directorships 0.774 0.677 2.736*** 522.19 469.76 2.903*** 
AC % Addirs1plus 49.642 42.737 3.802*** 527.14 464.80 3.469*** 
AC % Addirs2plus 19.786 17.239 1.818* 507.63 484.35 1.379 
AC % Addirs3plus 6.623 6.556 .074 497.71 494.29 .271 
AC % Share own 0.035 0.678 -3.059*** 355.25 637.04 -15.497*** 
Board Ind Dummy 0.700 0.446 8.324*** 558.65 433.22 8.051*** 
Board Meetings 8.862 8.771 0.501 499.73 492.26 .414 
Big4 0.990 0.919 5.420*** 513.51 478.46 5.344*** 
London 0.734 0.487 8.233*** 557.13 434.74 7.969*** 
Log Delay 1.770 1.818 -7.201*** 428.87 563.27 -7.393*** 
% Stock 11.484 11.126 .356 485.69 506.33 -1.136 
% Debtors 13.466 18.647 -6.633*** 435.08 557.05 -6.707*** 
% Gearing 31.060 21.527 11.021*** 588.40 403.42 10.172*** 
ROA 7.071 11.044 -5.896*** 433.40 558.73 -6.892*** 
Loss 0.097 0.097 -.010 495.95 496.05 -.010 
Log Subs 1.308 1.134 7.194*** 555.13 436.75 6.513*** 
US Subs Dummy 0.569 0.519 1.560 508.22 483.76 1.559 
% Block own 33.270 43.406 -9.336*** 411.40 580.77 -9.314*** 
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Upon further examination the study reveals that the firms that are larger in size have 
higher percentage of non-accounting financial experts and firms are smaller in size 
have higher percentage of audit committee members with accounting expertise.   The 
average additional directorships held by audit committees as well as the proportion of 
audit committee members with at least one additional directorship is significantly 
higher for companies that are large in size compared to those that are small in size. 
The summary statistics also show that the mean value of the audit committee share 
ownership is significantly lower for larger firms as compared smaller firms. 
 
The study also shows that the audit committee effectiveness as defined by the audit 
committee composite variables i.e. compliance with all four aspects of recommended 
best practice for audit committees (ACE1 and ACE3) or when the composite variables 
are extended to include both the presence of an accounting qualified expert and the 
absence of members with excess of nine years’ tenure (ACE2 and ACE4), the 
proportion of audit committees in compliance is significantly higher for larger firms as 
compared to smaller firms. The above findings highlight that larger companies are 
associated with higher standard of audit committee composition.  
 
For board of director variables, the average number of boards comprised of 
independent non-executive directors is significantly higher for larger firms as 
compared to smaller firms. Of the other audit fee determinants, the mean value of 
audits undertaken by one of the big 4 auditing firms and the mean value of audits 
undertaken by London-based auditors is significantly higher for firms that are large in 
size as compared to those that are small.  The mean and mean rank value for the audit 
delay is significantly lower in larger firms compared to the smaller firms. The other 
financial variables whose mean and mean rank values are significantly higher for larger 
firms include gearing levels and the number of subsidiaries. However average assets 
represented by debtors, return on assets and equity owned by the block holders is 
significantly low for companies that are larger in size as compared to small size firms.    
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4.3 Correlation Matrix  
Table 4.5 contains a correlation matrix showing two-way Pearson correlations between 
all variables included in this study.  Correlations are interesting in this type of study as 
they highlight the associations between audit and non- audit fee ratio and the 
explanatory variables but also identify the significant correlations among the 
independent variables.  The double and single asterisks in table 4.5 signify statistically 
significant correlations at one per cent and five per cent respectively.  The correlations 
in column 1 and 2 show how each of the explanatory variables are associated with the 
log of audit fees and non-audit fee ratio.  As expected, company size, the number of 
subsidiaries, the presence of a US subsidiary, a London-based auditor, big 4 audits and 
the value of non-audit services provided by the auditor are all positively correlated 
with audit fees.   The negative correlation between audit fee and the proportion of 
assets in the form of stocks may reflect the reality that stocks are now relatively easier 
to audit due to advances in audit technology. However, the negative and significant 
correlation between audit fees and the length of audit delay is somewhat counter-
intuitive as longer periods of delay indicate additional auditor investigation and hence 
higher fees (Chan et al., 1993; Ezzamel et al., 1996).  The study also shows a significant 
and negative correlation between the equity owned by the block holders and audit 
fees which is consistent with the prior studies such as Zaman et al., (2011) and 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009).  Consistent with a few prior studies, the correlations 
in column 1 also show that board independence is positively associated with audit fees 
however it is unclear as to why the frequency of board meetings is negatively 
correlated with audit fees. This finding may be influenced by the supply-based 
perspective where auditor associate the higher board diligence with more effective 
monitoring and hence exert less audit effort and reduced audit fee (Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2009). 
 
129 
 
Table 4.5: Audit and non-audit fee ratio correlation matrix 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1Log Audit Fee 1                  
2Non-audit Fee Ratio -.151** 1                 
3AC Size .418** -.040 1                
4AC Size Dummy .203** -.045 .527** 1               
5AC Meetings .358** -.041 .212** .160** 1              
6AC Meetings Dummy .187** -.052 .116** .137** .405** 1             
7AC % Ind .231** -.026 .025 -.012 .112** .120** 1            
8AC Ind Dummy .243** -.024 .010 -.047 .092** .114** .937** 1           
9AC % Tenure 9 -.099** -.076* -.015 -.035 -.067* -.107** -.246** -.206** 1          
10AC % Tenure 6 -.037 -.082* .029 -.051 -.063* -.074* -.135** -.129** .553** 1         
11C % Fin Exp .139** -.097** -.002 .032 .082** .042 -.010 .010 -.053 -.035 1        
12AC Fin Exp Dummy .140** -.018 .159** .279** .067* .011 -.041 -.044 -.063* -.111** .363** 1       
13AC % Acc Exp -.092** -.001 -.243** -.185** -.013 .004 -.030 -.037 -.061 -.057 .376** .176** 1      
14AC % Non Acc Exp .209** -.079* .206** .187** .087** .036 .016 .041 .003 .016 .611** .188** -.504** 1     
15AC % Gov Exp -.015 .057 -.076* .005 .005 .073* .095** .076* -.173** -.117** .152** .009 .196** -.026 1    
16ACE1 .343** -.048 .342** .557** .275** .433** .635** .678** -.193** -.144** .065* .191** -.107** .151** .065* 1   
17ACE2 .138** .007 .156** .345** .146** .268** .393** .420** -.464** -.294** .104** .118** .217** -.088** .175** .619** 1  
18ACE3 .360** -.063 .362** .608** .324** .566** .607** .624** -.201** -.158** .111** .320** -.083** .175** .082* .925** .573** 1 
19ACE4 .237** .004 .197** .390** .229** .450** .473** .476** -.596** -.394** .190** .333** .265** -.050 .205** .684** .828** .749** 
20AC Ave Dirs .077* .065* -.002 .017 .029 .109** .103** .070* -.223** -.127** .246** .042 .236** .028 .615** .063* .194** .106** 
21AC % Addirs1plus .138** -.007 .023 .023 .023 .106** .150** .117** -.221** -.113** .267** .039 .172** .102** .519** .099** .184** .135** 
22AC % Addirs2plus .042 .097** -.002 .022 .056 .098** .054 .026 -.180** -.125** .192** .044 .251** -.035 .577** .043 .184** .078* 
23AC % Addirs3plus -.018 .114** -.023 .005 -.010 .059 .018 .002 -.113** -.081* .111** .008 .175** -.046 .365** .002 .093** .030 
24AC % Share own -.099** .000 .004 .027 -.080* -.080* -.345** -.234** .275** .139** .016 .010 -.054 .060 -.040 .160** -.102** -.160** 
25Board Ind Dummy .355** -.038 .266** .257** .146** .050 .320** .331** -.068* -.071* .081* .110** -.074* .138** -.020 .382** .188** .378** 
26Board Meetings -.107** .049 -.057 -.030 .189** .044 -.004 -.018 -.117** -.104** .013 .009 .063* -.041 .100** -.008 .090** -.007 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
27Big4 .189** .017 .163** .178** .054 .068* .201** .198** -.143** -.018 .053 -.024 .000 .049 .099** .230** .194** .238** 
28London .379** -.053 .196** .102** .208** .114** .050 .074* -.008 -.028 .049 .044 -.027 .068* .018 .151** .126** .155** 
29Log Delay -.164** .106** -.148** -.181** -.061 -.111** -.112** -.090** .082** .003 .016 -.045 .034 -.014 -.024 -.207** -.094** -.206** 
30Log Total Assets .765** -.047 .441** .239** .312** .182** .258** .270** -.123** -.064* .077* .129** -.105** .162** -.031 .384** .160** .391** 
31% Stock -.165** .109** -.014 -.023 -.083** .017 .046 .041 -.045 .002 -.027 -.036 .053 -.071* .049 .023 .009 .013 
32% Debtors .005 -.154** -.061 -.028 -.028 -.041 -.028 -.040 -.054 .019 -.013 .004 .005 -.016 .032 -.077* -.006 -.056 
33% Gearing .242** -.009 .141** .060 .046 .103** .097** .103** -.141** -.074* .070* .096** -.056 .113** .024 .130** .153** .156** 
34ROA -.081* -.074* -.015 -.015 -.044 -.046 .018 .004 .060 .031 -.007 -.019 -.028 .018 -.093** -.023 -.095** -.029 
35Loss -.025 .082* -.024 .013 .040 -.004 -.003 -.001 -.036 -.013 -.025 -.026 .051 -.057 .088** .017 .041 -.001 
36Log Subs .498** -.096** .196** .088** .173** .073* .074* .090** -.052 .009 .070* .043 -.042 .101** .013 .113** .028 .140** 
37US Subs Dummy .386** -.115** .110** .049 .128** .069* .027 .020 -.065* .019 .100** -.009 .001 .093** .112** .047 .034 .065* 
38% Block own -.263** .088** -.226** -.116** -.071* -.031 -.030 -.018 .016 -.007 -.039 -.161** .032 -.064* .063* -.102** -.024 -.116** 
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 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
19ACE4 1                    
20AC Ave Dirs .256** 1                   
21AC % Addirs1plus .248** .818** 1                  
22AC % Addirs2plus .225** .855** .516** 1                 
23AC % Addirs3plus .127** .723** .324** .614** 1                
24AC % Share own -.213** -.077* -.105** -.024 -.043 1               
25Board Ind Dummy .246** .007 .050 -.012 -.029 -.104** 1              
26Board Meetings .089** .069* .082* .036 .054 -.045 -.004 1             
27Big4 .231** .180** .197** .143** .083** -.084** .067* .006 1            
28London .121** .020 .034 .033 -.016 -.014 .277** -.057 -.045 1           
29Log Delay -.129** -.076* -.069* -.057 -.054 .181** -.147** -.033 -.167** -.146** 1          
30Log Total Assets .266** .114** .156** .075* .023 -.095** .320** -.036 .182** .278** -.258** 1         
31% Stock .019 .070* .054 .073* .036 -.011 .010 .031 -.019 -.077* .104** -.051 1        
32% Debtors -.026 -.012 .030 -.031 -.052 -.042 -.107** .054 .096** -.101** .033 -.286** -.062* 1       
33% Gearing .182** .062* .078* .042 .006 -.059 .092** .065* .215** .027 -.141** .377** -.141** -.065* 1      
34ROA -.077* -.076* -.035 -.100** -.063* -.017 -.065* -.106** -.065* -.022 .021 -.215** -.096** .159** -.255** 1     
35Loss .012 .032 .006 .063* .029 .022 .021 .086** .055 -.039 -.028 .000 .087** -.113** -.022 -.207** 1    
36Log Subs .088** .018 .058 .000 -.025 -.034 .081* -.043 .118** .147** .022 .295** -.165** .137** .109** -.058 -.060 1   
37US Subs Dummy .076* .106** .136** .063* .061 -.095** .103** -.012 .131** .149** -.087** .105** -.121** .225** -.023 -.036 -.022 .475** 1  
38% Block own -.063* -.035 -.072* -.017 .020 -.094** -.038 -.027 .074* -.013 .101** -.356** .017 .008 -.022 -.027 .084** -.043 -.037 1 
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In respect of the audit committee characteristics, a number of variables show 
significant and positive correlations with audit fees.  For example, audit committee size, 
the annual frequency of meetings, and the level of independent membership  are 
positively correlated with audit fees suggesting, at the univariate level at least, that 
larger, more diligent, and more independent audit committees are associated with 
more expensive audits. There is also a positive association between both the 
proportion of financial experts and audit fees suggesting that greater expertise on the 
committee may result in more intensive and more expensive audits.  Audit committee 
non-accounting expertise is significant and positively correlated with audit fees 
however there is significant and negative correlation among accounting expertise and 
audit fees. This is consistent with Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) who argue that 
accounting experts provide greater monitoring and hence result in lower audit fees 
charged by the auditor.  Percentage equity held by the audit committee members and 
the proportion of members with nine or over nine year tenure are also negatively 
correlated with audit fees as both these characteristics i.e. share ownership and the 
longer tenure can have a negative impact on the independence of audit committee 
members and hence a negative impact on audit quality.  Finally, all four of the proxies 
for audit committee effectiveness are significant and positively correlated with audit 
fees but the significance of both ACE1 and ACE3, representing compliance with the 
four core components of present audit committee regulation, is especially pronounced.   
The correlations in column 2 show that proportion of equity held by the block holders 
and audit delay are positively correlated with non-audit fee ratios.  The numbers of 
subsidiaries, the presence of a US subsidiary and return on assets are all negatively 
correlated with non-audit fee ratio. With regards to audit committee characteristics, as 
expected, audit committee additional directorships are positively associated with non-
audit fee ratio. Prior research suggests that additional directorships result in a conflict 
of interest and directors focus more on their own interests than on stakeholder 
interests (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). The proportion of audit committee members 
with financial expertise are negatively correlated with non-audit fee ratio. This implies 
that stronger audit committees might be more reluctant to authorize a disproportional 
provision of non-audit services in an effort to increase perceived auditor independence.  
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The proportion of members with over six year tenure as well as over nine year tenure 
is negatively correlated with non-audit fee ratio. Prior research shows that 
accumulated experience of monitoring management by serving longer on the 
corporate boards enhances directors’ effectiveness (Kosnik, 1990; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991). None of the audit committee effectiveness variables i.e. ACE1 to 
ACE4 are correlated with non-audit fee ratio.   
A positive correlation between independent boards and audit committee effectiveness 
variables shows that independent directors promote effectiveness of audit committees 
to complement further their own monitoring responsibilities. Correlation amongst the 
other individual variables show that large size companies (e.g. high total assets) are 
more likely to have audit committees that are bigger in size, more independent and 
have higher meeting frequency. The negative correlation amongst the company size 
and audit committee tenure related variables suggest that bigger firms can afford to 
freshen up their boards more regularly as compared to smaller firms. Consistent with 
prior evidence larger companies appears to have independent boards, audited by big 4 
accounting firms and experience less audit delay.  A positive correlation between 
company size and number of subsidiaries and overseas subsidiaries is expected as 
larger companies are more likely to have more subsidiaries and some of their 
operations overseas. Large companies are also associated less block holder ownership 
suggesting that equity is more likely to be owned in small holdings. Bivariate 
correlations are also important as higher correlation between variables suggest a 
higher likelihood of multicollinearity and hamper the findings derived from 
multivariate regression analysis. Hair et al., (1995) and Gujrati (2003) suggest that a 
correlation value of below 0.80 is deemed to be safe for the variables to be included 
together in the multivariate regression analysis. Consistent with prior studies a high 
correlation exists between the log audit fee and company size represented by log total 
assets. The correlation value is .727 whereas O’Sullivan (2000) and Zaman et al., (2011) 
recorded this as .783 and .688 respectively. There are variables in the correlation 
matrix that have high correlations between each other; .937 for percentage audit 
committee independence and binary variable representing fully independent audit 
committees; .882 proportion of members with nine or over nine year tenure and 
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binary variable representing an audit committee with or without such member; and 
between audit committee average directorships and proportion of members with at 
least one or more (.818), two or more(.855) and three or more directorships (.723). 
However all of these highly correlated variables have been included separately in each 
of the regression models and none of the variables in each of the models have a 
correlation value of above 0.80. 
 
4.4 Multivariate Regression Analysis  
Skewness and kurtosis values presented earlier in the chapter indicate that some of 
the variables were transformed using natural logarithm in order to satisfy the 
normality assumption for these variables. This study also conducted the analysis of 
residuals and Q-Q plot analysis to test for homoscedasticity and linearity. In all audit 
pricing studies researchers need to be conscious of the possibility of multicolinearity, 
not least due to the presence of significant correlations amongst some of the 
independent variables as shown in table 4.5.  Although the correlation values of the 
variables included in each of the regression model were at an acceptable level, for all 
regressions this study calculates the variance inflation factors (VIF) and in all cases 
these were significantly less than 10 (generally seen as the level of concern).  Indeed, 
with the exception of Log of total assets which recorded a VIF of 2 on a few occasions, 
all other variables have values significantly less than 2. Gujrati (2003, p339) states that 
a VIF value of less than 10 is acceptable. 
 
4.4.1 Audit Committee Characteristics and Audit Fees 
Table 4.6 contains the results of four main multivariate regression models.  In each 
regression model the dependent variable is the log of the audit fee. For each 
regression this study utilises time series analysis using year dummies to control for the 
fact that the study uses the same sample of firms in each of the four years (2007-10). 
In all regressions industry dummies are included to control for sector level variations. 
In all regressions the control variables are used to represent company size, complexity 
level, performance, gearing and the presence of a big 4 audit firm. Each regression 
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model also includes the share ownership of audit committee members and a measure 
of audit committee busyness.  In model 1 of table 4.6 this study uses the dummy 
variables for each of the four audit committee characteristics currently recommended 
as best practice for UK listed companies (Combined Code, 2006 and 2008; UK 
Corporate Governance Code, 2010) while in model 2 these dummy variables are 
substituted with corresponding variables containing the absolute values for each of 
these four variables. In models 3 and 4 this study employs variables capturing audit 
committee effectiveness: in model 3 a dummy variable representing those firms whose 
audit committees satisfy all four of the recommended characteristics (ACE1) and in 
model 4 dummy variable is extended to include both the presence of an accounting 
expert and the absence of members with excess of nine years’ tenure (ACE2).   
 
The regression results in column 1 show broad consistency with expectations and with 
most prior studies of the determinants of audit pricing in the UK (O’Sullivan, 2000; 
Zaman et al., 2011).  Firms in the mineral extraction and general industrial sectors have 
a positive association with audit fees and the consumer goods, services and utilities 
sectors have significant negative association with audit fees. These findings suggest 
that regulatory oversight partially substitutes the external audit as a monitoring 
mechanism and results in lower audit fees. None of the yearly variables is significantly 
associated with audit fees.  The log of total assets22 has a very significant and positive 
impact on audit fees while both the number of subsidiaries and the presence of at 
least one US-based subsidiary also exert a significant and positive impact on audit fees.  
As expected, the proportion of assets in the form of debtors (receivables) has a 
positive impact but, unlike earlier findings, the proportion of assets in the form of 
stock (inventories) has a negative impact on audit fees.  Even though the latter result is 
inconsistent with prior findings, it may also highlight the relative ease with which 
modern auditing technologies can undertake the auditing of stock and, therefore, this 
finding may be a more accurate reflection of contemporary auditing practice.  As 
expected, the length of delay between a company’s financial year-end and the date 
the audit report is signed off by the auditor also exerts a positive impact on audit fees.  
This finding is typically interpreted as a sign that the audit is more complicated and 
                                                          
22 The log of turnover is also positively associated with audit fees and significant at one per cent level. 
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therefore requires more time and resources to be completed adequately. The results 
in column 1 also show that return on assets has a significant positive impact on audit 
fees. The level of gearing has no significant association with audit fees however firms 
experiencing loss have a significant positive impact on audit fees. These findings 
suggest that better performing companies can afford to pay for extensive audit and 
hence result in higher audit fee. Similarly, higher levels of gearing or loss is viewed as 
presenting a higher risk to auditors, specifically the risk of client failure and, as a 
consequence, is expected to be associated with a higher audit fee.  The statistics also 
show that audits undertaken by London-based auditors result in higher fees, a finding 
consistent with almost all previous UK-based research (O’Sullivan, 2000; Ezzamel et al., 
1996).  The study finds that being audited by a big 4 audit firm has no impact on audit 
fees.  This is not surprising since recent work by McMeeking et al. (2006) has 
highlighted the gradual disappearance of the big 4 audit premium in the UK market 
since the late 1990s.  Percentage of equity held by the block holders has also shown no 
impact on the audit fees. Finally, consistent with most prior research, the amount of 
non-audit services purchased from the auditor has a positive impact on audit fees.  
Taken together therefore, the results presented in column 1 confirm that audit fees in 
large listed firms remain largely determined by client size, complexity, risk, London-
based auditors and the level of non-audit services also purchased from the auditor.  
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Table 4.6: OLS regressions explaining the determinants of audit fees for FTSE 350 companies 
between 2007 and 2010 (***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
Constant -.347 -1.373 -.029 -.118 -.152 -.625 -.159 -.655 
Consumer Goods -.103 -3.867*** -.104 -3.935*** -.097 -3.613*** -.098 -3.674*** 
Mineral Extraction .035 .957 .030 .830 .034 .921 .033 .878 
Services -.089 -4.093*** -.095 -4.407*** -.080 -3.686*** -.081 -3.743*** 
Utilities -.229 -5.709*** -.239 -5.989*** -.226 -5.598*** -.228 -5.624*** 
2008 -.007 -.291 -.006 -.292 -.006 -.248 -.005 -.235 
2009 .014 .633 .011 .476 .016 .700 .016 .712 
2010 -.033 -1.466 -.035 -1.545 -.033 -1.467 -.033 -1.435 
Log Total Assets .531 26.572*** .513 25.082*** .531 26.351*** .531 26.692*** 
Log Subs .192 7.658*** .183 7.342*** .190 7.552*** .190 7.554*** 
US Subs Dummy .138 6.847*** .135 6.764*** .144 7.081*** .143 7.071*** 
% Debtors .007 9.057*** .006 8.926*** .006 8.890*** .006 8.900*** 
% Stock -.002 -3.826*** -.002 -3.633*** -.002 -3.789*** -.002 -3.791*** 
Log Delay .189 2.311** .170 2.093** .204 2.479** .203 2.477** 
ROA .003 3.090*** .002 2.806** .002 2.976*** .002 2.981*** 
% Gearing .000 -.048 .000 .515 .000 .209 .000 .247 
Loss .069 2.459** .063 2.271** .067 2.388** .067 2.395** 
London .132 7.380*** .128 7.193*** .137 7.614*** .138 7.624*** 
Big 4 -.039 -.892 -.064 -1.499 -.068 -1.579 -.065 -1.510 
% Block own .000 -.415 .000 -.591 .000 -.545 .000 -.554 
Log Non Audit Fee .061 8.861*** .061 8.953*** .062 9.017*** .062 9.020*** 
Board Ind Dummy .006 6.687*** .005 5.230*** .005 5.874*** .005 6.262*** 
Board Meetings -.013 -4.479*** -.015 -5.104*** -.012 -4.235*** -.012 -4.196*** 
AC % Share own -.002 -.680 -.003 -1.060 -.002 -.758 -.002 -.794 
AC Ave Directorships -.019 -1.169 -.017 -.926 -.013 -.774 -.012 -.738 
AC Size Dummy -.079 -2.545**       
 AC Meetings Dummy .115 3.347***       
AC Ind Dummy -.040 -1.480       
AC Fin Exp Dummy .178 2.323**       
AC Size   .006 .551     
AC Meetings   .032 4.520***     
AC % Ind    -.001 -.760     
AC % Fin Exp   .001 3.115***     
ACE1     .004 .184   
ACE2       -.007 -.438 
         
F Test 135.270*** 138.250*** 147.580*** 148.509*** 
Adjusted R
2
 .830 .833 .828 .827 
N 991 991 991 991 
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Definitions of variables 
Dependent variable:  the natural log of audit fee 
Independent variables: Log Total Assets = the natural logarithm of total assets; Log Subs = the natural 
logarithm of total consolidated subsidiaries; US Subs dummy = dummy variable indicating US subsidiaries; 
Debtors = percentage of total assets represented by debtors; % Stock = percentage of total assets 
represented by stock; Log Delay = the natural logarithm of audit delay; ROA = return on assets; % 
Gearing = percentage of total long-term finance represented by long term debt; Loss = dummy variable 
representing the firm incurring loss in last two years; London = dummy variable representing firms 
audited by a London based auditor; Big4 = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit was 
carried out by a Big4 audit firm; % Block Own = percentage of equity owned by the block holders; % Log 
Non Audit Fee = the natural logarithm of non audit fee; Board Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating 
instances where boards comprised of majority independent directors; Board meetings = the number of 
meetings held by the board during the year; AC % Share own = percentage of equity held by audit 
committee members; AC Ave Directorships = average directorships held by the audit committee 
members; AC Size dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committee contains 
three or more members; AC Meetings dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit 
committee held at least three meetings; AC Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the 
audit committee had solely independent non-executive directors; AC Fin Exp dummy = dummy variable 
indicating instances where the audit committees had financial expertise; AC Size = number of audit 
committee members; AC Meetings = Number of audit committee meetings held during the year; AC % 
Ind = Percentage of audit committee members who are independent non-executive directors; AC % Fin 
Exp = Percentage of audit committee members who are financial experts; ACE1 = dummy variable 
representing instances where audit committees comprise at least three members, contained at least one 
financial expert, all members being independent and met at least three times during the financial year; 
ACE2 = dummy variable representing instances where audit committees comprise at least three 
members, contained at least one financial expert, all members being independent and met at least three 
times during the financial year, contains one accounting expert and has no member with more than 9 
years tenure. 
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The board independence dummy variable representing boards comprised of majority 
independent directors has a positive impact on audit fees23, a finding consistent with 
prior research which argues that greater independence on the board is likely to result 
in more intensive and expensive external audit.  This is an important contribution of 
this study as most of the prior UK based evidence has utilised non-executive directors 
as a proxy for independence. Surprisingly board meetings have a significant negative 
impact on audit fees. This finding is counter-intuitive as researchers have typically 
argued that higher meetings frequency results in higher audit fees however this finding 
may be influenced by the supply-based perspective where auditor associate the higher 
board diligence with more effective monitoring and hence exert less audit effort and 
reduced audit fee (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). Other than the board governance, 
audit committee average directorships and the level of equity ownership of audit 
committee members has no significant impact on the audit fees. The negative 
coefficient for the audit committee level of share ownership is surprising as audit 
committee members with an equity stake in their companies are considered more 
effective in their oversight of the financial reporting process.  
 
The remainder of this table focuses on the impact of the four current cornerstones of 
good audit committee governance in the UK – size, meeting frequency, independence 
and the presence of a financial expert.  The dummy variable signifying those firms 
possessing at least three audit committee members is significant however in the 
direction opposite to prediction.  The dummy variable representing those companies 
whose audit committee meets at least three times annually has a significant and 
positive impact on audit fees highlighting the support of active audit committees for 
higher audit quality. Similar significant and positive impact is reported for dummy 
variable representing audit committees with at least one financial expert on the 
committee.  Consistent with prior research, this finding shows that financial experts 
provide additional support to external auditors in the discussion of auditing issues and 
audit scope with management (Abbott et al., 2003a). In model 2 dummy variables are 
substituted with corresponding continuous variables containing the absolute values for 
each of these four variables. Audit committee size in terms of actual number of audit 
                                                          
23
 The proportion independent non-executive directors also have a significant positive impact on audit fees.  
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committee members, although positively correlated with audit fee, is statistically 
insignificant. The number of audit committee meetings has significant and positive 
impact on audit fees suggesting that higher audit committee activity is associated with 
higher fees. This is a very interesting result since the number of meetings is frequently 
used as a measure of audit committee diligence so the relationship identified here is 
consistent with greater audit committee diligence being associated with more 
intensive and expensive audits. Similar significant and positive impact is reported for 
the proportion of financial experts on the audit committee.  These findings are 
interesting in that they identify a consistent impact of good governance practice on 
audit fees and should serve as reassuring to regulators who may interpret this finding 
as supportive of their recommendations, at least if interpreted as more expensive 
audits equals more intensive audits.   
 
In model 3 and 4 of table 4.6 the researcher brings in the composite dummies 
representing those firms adhering to all four recommendations of best practice (ACE1) 
and those that comply with best practice as in ACE1 but, in addition, have no member 
with longer than nine years’ tenure and also has at least one accounting expert (ACE2). 
The findings from model 3 show that audit committees with all four desired 
characteristics (ACE1) have no significant impact on audit fees. The variable 
representing ACE2, although positively correlated, also has no significant impact on 
audit fees24.  
 
In summary therefore, the empirical findings reported in table 4.6 find that the key 
ingredients of what regulators perceive as more effective audit committees i.e. 
meetings and expertise are associated with more expensive audits.  These findings are 
largely consistent with previous research in the US by Abbott et al. (2003) who 
documents a positive relationship between audit committee expertise and audit fees.  
In the only previous UK-based study, Zaman et al. (2011) also document that meeting 
frequency exerts a positive impact on audit fees.  It should be noted, however, that, 
                                                          
24
 Two alternative effectiveness variables (ACE3 and ACE4) are introduced representing the aggregate count of each 
of these elements of compliance from ACE1 and ACE2.  ACE3 that represents the aggregate count of the ACE1 
elements and the ACE4 that represents the aggregate count of ACE2 variable has no significant influence on audit 
fees. 
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unlike the current study, Zaman et al (2011) found no significant impact of the 
presence of a financial expert on audit fees.   This may suggest that expertise may have 
become a more significant determining factor in more recent times, especially in the 
wake of the recommendations of Smith (2003) which the data used in Zaman et al.’s 
(2011) study largely predates25. The F-statistics of each model in table 4.6 are 
significant at one per cent level, suggesting that the models are statistically valid. The 
adjusted R2 for all models ranges between 82.8 per cent and 83.3 per cent.  This shows 
that each model on this table has a high explanatory power.  The total number of 
observations are 991. 
                                                          
25
 Zaman et al. (2011) study a sample of FTSE-350 companies over the period 2001-2004.  Compliance with the 
revised Combined Code (2003), which included the recommendations of the Smith Report (2003), became effective 
for reporting periods beginning on or after 1
st
 November 2003.    
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4.4.2 Tests of Robustness 
As a first robustness measure this study re-runs the main regression models reported 
in Table 4.6, controlling for the clustered adjusted standard errors, and examines 
whether the clustering within firms may have biased the estimated standard errors 
which may have affected, to some extent, the significant levels found for the 
estimated coefficients.  These tests show that the findings reported in the main 
regression analysis specifically in relation to audit committee meetings and audit 
committee financial expertise hold strong and are not sensitive to this approach.   In 
addition to this, a number of other robustness measures were also considered which 
are discussed below. 
 
Table 4.7 provides a detailed analysis of audit committee financial expertise, audit 
committee busyness and audit committee tenure variables and extends our 
understanding of the impact of these variables on audit fees. In model 1, the 
proportion of audit committee members with accounting expertise has been included 
instead of broadly defined financial expertise and model 2 includes the proportion of 
members with non-accounting expertise. In models 3 and 4, this study utilises 
variables representing the extent of holding other directorships by audit committee 
members: the proportion of members holding one or more additional directorships in 
model 3 and the proportion of members holding two or more additional directorships 
in model 4.   Regression models 5 and 6 represent an alternative measure of audit 
committee independence. In model 5 this study utilizes the proportion of audit 
committee members with nine or over nine year tenure and model 6 represents the 
proportion of members with six or over six year of tenure. 
 
In model 1 the proportion of accounting financial experts26 on the audit committee has 
no significant impact on audit fees. However in model 2 the percentage of non-
accounting audit committee members has a positive and significant (at one per cent 
level) impact on audit fees suggesting that more members with finance and 
supervisory related expertise enhance the degree of assurance undertaken by auditors 
                                                          
26 The dummy variable representing audit committees with at least one accounting expert and the proportion of 
audit committee members with accounting qualification has no impact on audit fees.   
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and result in extensive and expensive audit. This finding is important as it suggests that, 
in the UK at least, it is the presence of broader financial experts that appear to 
influence audit fees.  This finding is consistent with the argument presented in 
Krishnan and Krishnan (2009) that these audit committee members with broader 
expertise do not have the experience to help them understand multifaceted 
accounting issues. Therefore to reduce litigation risk these members prefer to 
authorise an extensive and expensive audit. The proportion of audit committee 
members with governance expertise i.e. experience of serving on other audit 
committees positively associated with audit fees but the relationship is statically 
insignificant (un-tabulated).   
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Table 4.7: OLS regressions explaining the determinants of audit fees for FTSE 350 companies between 2007 and 2010 (***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
 AC Expertise Variations AC Busyness Variations AC Tenure Variations 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
Constant -.178 -.728 -.149 -.617 -.334 -1.319 -.339 -1.345 -.357 -1.404 -.351 -1.379 
Log Total Assets .530 26.384*** .527 26.432*** .529 26.448*** .530 26.577*** .528 26.553*** .528 26.533*** 
Log Subs .192 7.663*** .192 7.678*** .193 7.698*** .192 7.669*** .191 7.614*** .190 7.594*** 
US Subs Dummy .136 6.737*** .133 6.590*** .138 6.800*** .138 6.817*** .141 7.041*** .142 7.056*** 
% Debtors .007 9.064*** .007 9.132*** .007 9.126*** .007 9.057*** .007 9.014*** .007 8.989*** 
% Stock -.002 -3.771*** -.002 -3.653*** -.002 -3.889*** -.002 -3.842*** -.002 -3.874*** -.002 -3.905*** 
Log Delay .192 2.332** .179 2.186** .189 2.308** .188 2.296** .194 2.366** .194 2.364** 
ROA .003 3.053*** .002 2.894*** .003 3.051*** .002 3.039*** .002 3.008*** .002 2.999*** 
% Gearing .000 .132 .000 -.115 .000 -.017 .000 -.041 .000 -.047 .000 -.078 
Loss .068 2.438** .072 2.579** .069 2.473** .070 2.497** .069 2.477** .069 2.463** 
London .133 7.378*** .132 7.367*** .132 7.377*** .133 7.408*** .133 7.438*** .133 7.439*** 
Big 4 -.050 -1.150 -.048 -1.100 -.046 -1.044 -.040 -.928 -.047 -1.099 -.049 -1.140 
% Block own .000 -.694 .000 -.744 .000 -.387 .000 -.415 .000 -.445 .000 -.429 
Log Non Audit Fee .063 9.129*** .062 9.062*** .061 8.848*** .061 8.859*** .062 8.906*** .062 8.885*** 
Board Ind Dummy .006 6.600*** .006 6.570*** .006 6.721*** .006 6.665*** .006 6.593*** .006 6.580*** 
Board Meetings -.013 -4.462*** -.012 -4.411*** -.013 -4.504*** -.013 -4.516*** -.012 -4.373*** -.012 -4.380*** 
AC % Share own -.002 -.749 -.003 -1.004 -.002 -.645 -.002 -.645 -.002 -.620 -.001 -.519 
AC Ave Directorships -.017 -.999 -.018 -1.109     -.018 -1.067 -.019 -1.127 
AC Size Dummy -.060 -1.781 -.074 -1.460 -.076 -1.450 -.078 -1.523 -.069 -1.271 -.068 -1.247 
 AC Meetings Dummy .112 3.262*** .113 3.310*** .113 3.289*** .115 3.351*** .112 3.274*** .112 3.263*** 
AC Ind dummy -.041 -1.502 -.043 -1.582 -.040 -1.477 -.041 -1.502     
AC Fin Exp Dummy     .173 2.260** .177 2.321** .181 2.369** .183 2.378** 
AC % Acc Exp .000 -.089           
AC % Non Acc Exp   .001 3.202***         
AC % Addir1plus     .000 -.051       
AC % Addir2plus       .000 -1.157     
AC % Tenure 9         .000 .774   
AC % Tenure 6           .000 .562 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included included included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included included included 
F Test 134.968*** 136.052*** 135.083*** 135.756*** 135.483*** 135.351*** 
Adjusted R
2
 .828 .830 .828 .830 .829 .829 
N 991 991 991 991 991 991 
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Definitions of variables 
Dependent variable:  the natural log of audit fee 
Independent variables: Log Total Assets = the natural logarithm of total assets; Log Subs = the natural logarithm of total consolidated subsidiaries; US Subs dummy = dummy 
variable indicating US subsidiaries; Debtors = percentage of total assets represented by debtors; % Stock = percentage of total assets represented by stock; Log Delay = the 
natural logarithm of audit delay; ROA = return on assets; % Gearing = percentage of total long-term finance represented by long term debt; Loss = dummy variable 
representing the firm incurring loss in last two years; London = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; Big4 = dummy variable indicating 
instances where the audit was carried out by a Big4 audit firm; % Block Own = percentage of equity owned by the block holders; % Log Non Audit Fee = the natural logarithm 
of non audit fee; Board Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where boards comprised of majority independent directors; Board meetings = the number of 
meetings held by the board during the year; AC % Share own = percentage of equity held by audit committee members; AC Ave Directorships = average directorships held by 
the audit committee members; AC Size dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committee contains three or more members; AC Meetings dummy = 
dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committee held at least three meetings; AC Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit 
committee had solely independent non-executive directors; AC Fin Exp dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committees had financial expertise; 
AC % Acc Exp =  Percentage of audit committee members who are accounting experts; AC % Non Acc Exp =  percentage of audit committee members who are non-
accounting experts; AC % Addir1plus =  percentage of audit committee members with at least one additional directorship; AC % Addir2plus =  percentage of audit committee 
members with at least two additional directorships; AC % Tenure 9 = percentage of audit committee members who have served on company board for more than 9 years; 
AC % Tenure 6 = percentage of audit committee members who have served on company board for more than 6 years. 
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In models 3 and 4 this study substitutes the audit committee average directorship 
holding variable with variables representing the extent of holding of other 
directorships by audit committee members: the proportion holding one or more 
additional directorships in model 3 and two or more additional directorships in model 
4. In table 4.7, holding at least one or more and two or more other board seats is not 
significant. The holding of at least three or more directorships has a significant 
negative impact on audit fees however the statistical significance is not very strong 
and stands at 10 per cent level (un-tabulated). This finding suggests that holding too 
many directorships decrease the effectiveness of audit committee members in terms 
of ensuring an effective audit. In regressions model 5 and 6 this study investigates the 
importance of tenure of audit committee members on audit fees by including variables 
representing the proportion of members with excess of nine years’ tenure and the 
proportion of members with over six years’ tenure.  The results show that none of 
these variables are significant in determining audit fees.   
 
The regression results presented in table 4.7 provide some interesting additions in 
understanding the impact of a variety of audit committee financial expertise and 
holding of multiple directorships on audit fees in a contemporary setting.  First, these 
findings highlight the importance of various dimensions of financial expertise in the 
determination of UK audit fees and illustrate the positive and significant relationship 
between the proportion of non-accounting financial experts and audit fees.  Second, 
findings in relation to holding of additional directorships by the audit committee 
members show that these multiple directorships result in busy and overstretched 
directors who are unable to pay adequate attention to external audit issues and hence 
result in a low quality and less expensive audit.   
 
The rest of the regression results for each model are broadly consistent with the main 
regression models on table 4.6. The log of total assets, the number of subsidiaries and 
the presence of at least one US-based subsidiary are consistently showing a significant 
and positive impact on audit fees at one per cent level. The proportion of assets in the 
form of debtors (receivables) has a positive impact however the proportion of assets in 
the form of stock (inventories) has a negative impact on audit fees.   The significance 
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level of both these variables is one per cent respectively.  As expected, the length of 
delay between a company’s financial year-end and the date the audit report is signed 
off by the auditor also exerts a positive impact on audit fees.  The statistics also show 
that audits undertaken by London-based auditors result in higher fees and the amount 
of non-audit services purchased from the auditor also has a positive impact on audit 
fees. The positive association of return on assets and audit fees suggests that better 
performing companies can afford to pay for extensive audit and hence result in higher 
audit fee. Firms experiencing loss are also associated with higher audit fee. This may 
be due to the reason that poorly performing firms are more likely to ask for higher 
external consulting services to improve their profitability (DeFond et al., 2002; 
Whisenant et al., 2003). Each regression model shows that the boards comprised of 
majority independent directors has a significant positive impact on audit fees and 
number of board meetings have significant negative impact on audit fees. Consistent 
with the prior evidence, the finding in relation to board independence suggests that 
greater independence on the board is likely to result in more intensive and expensive 
external audit (O’Sullivan, 2000).  Even though the latter result is inconsistent with 
prior findings it may be influenced by the supply-based perspective where auditor 
associate the higher board diligence with more effective monitoring and hence exert 
less audit effort and reduced audit fee (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009).  Other than 
the board governance, as expected, audit committees that satisfy the regulatory 
requirement of meeting at least three times as well as those with at least one financial 
expert exert a positive and significant impact on audit fees. These findings suggest that 
stronger audit committees are more effective in enhancing audit quality. The 
significance level of both these variables is one per cent and five per cent respectively. 
The F-statistics for all models are significant at one per cent level, suggesting that the 
models are statistically valid. The adjusted R2 for all models ranges between 82.8 per 
cent and 83 per cent.  This shows that each model on this table has a high explanatory 
power.  The total number of observations in each model are 991. 
 
Other than the above analysis of the audit committee expertise, busyness and tenure 
variations, the study also measures the impact of those audit committees on audit fees 
that are bigger in size and meet more frequently. Dummy variables are created using 
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median values of the audit committee size and meetings (un-tabulated). The new audit 
committee size and meetings variables representing audit committees with a size and 
number of meetings higher than the sample median values show that audit 
committees comprised of at least four members has no impact on audit fees however 
audit committees that meet at least five times every year are highly positive significant 
with audit fees27. The study also splits the sample into two parts based on the median 
of total assets as proxy of size and runs separate regressions for larger and smaller 
firms. Appendix A represents larger and smaller firms respectively. It is argued 
previously that larger firms behave differently to smaller firms in term of their demand 
for audit quality. The regression findings in relation to larger firms show that the log of 
total assets has a very significant and positive impact on audit fees while both the 
number of subsidiaries and the presence of at least one US-based subsidiary also exert 
a significant and positive impact on audit fees.  As expected, the proportion of assets 
represented by debtors has a positive impact and the proportion of assets in the form 
of stock has a negative impact on audit fees.  As explained earlier, it is probably the 
relative ease with which modern auditing technologies can undertake the auditing of 
stock and, therefore, this finding may be a more accurate reflection of contemporary 
auditing practice.  The results also show that return on assets and firms experiencing 
loss have a significant positive impact on audit fees. It is argued that better performing 
companies can afford to pay for extensive audit and hence result in higher audit fee. 
Similarly, loss is viewed as presenting a higher risk to auditors, specifically the risk of 
client failure and, as a consequence, is expected to be associated with a higher audit 
fee.  The statistics also show that audits undertaken by London-based auditors result in 
higher fees, a finding consistent with almost all previous UK-based research.  
Percentage of equity held by the block holders has a significant negative impact on the 
audit fees. This finding suggests that an increased external monitoring provides 
comfort to the external auditor and hence results in a less extensive and consequently 
less expensive audit. Finally, consistent with most prior research, the amount of non-
audit services purchased from the auditor has a positive impact on audit fees.  Similar 
to main regressions the independence of the board exerts a positive and significant 
                                                          
27
 Audit committees with at least four meetings per year as recommended by the BRC in the United States are also 
highly significant and positively associated with audit fees.   
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impact on audit fees however the number of board meetings held during the year 
exert a negative and significant impact on audit fees. In relation to audit committee 
characteristics; audit committee size, audit committee meetings and the proportion of 
financial experts on the audit committee has a positive and significant impact on audit 
fees. These findings suggest that stronger audit committees are more effective in 
enhancing audit quality. 
 
The regression findings for smaller firms show that the log of total assets and both the 
number of subsidiaries and the presence of at least one US-based subsidiary also exert 
a significant and positive impact on audit fees.  As expected, the proportion of assets 
represented by debtors also has a positive and significant impact on audit fees.  The 
length of delay between a company’s financial year-end and the date the audit report 
is signed off by the auditor also exerts a positive impact on audit fees.  This finding is 
surprising in a sense that audit delay was expected to be significantly associated with 
audit fees for larger firms however contrary to expectations this study finds that it is 
significantly associated with audit fees for smaller firms. The results also show that 
better performing firms as represented by the return on assets have a positive and 
significant positive impact on audit fees.  The statistics also show that audits 
undertaken by London-based auditors and the amount of non-audit services 
purchased from the auditor has a positive impact on audit fees.  Similar to larger firms, 
the independence of the board has a positive and significant impact on audit fees 
however the numbers of board meetings exert a negative and significant impact on 
audit fees. In relation to audit committee characteristics; audit committee diligence 
represented by audit committee meetings and audit committee expertise represented 
by the proportion of financial experts on the audit committee have a positive and 
significant impact on audit fees. However, contrary to expectations the size of the 
audit committee for smaller firms has a negative and significant impact on audit fees.  
 
The F-statistics for each model are significant at one per cent level, suggesting that the 
models are statistically valid. The adjusted R2 for both models ranges between 63.6 per 
cent and 73.3 per cent showing that each model on this table has a high explanatory 
power.  The total numbers of observations in each model are 496 and 495 respectively.  
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4.4.3 Audit Committee Characteristics and Non-Audit Fee Ratio 
In line with prior research (Abbott et al., 2003b; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Zaman et 
al., 2011), this study utilises non audit fee ratio as its proxy for auditor independence. 
Similar to audit committee and audit fee regressions in table 4.6, table 4.8 also 
contains the results of four multivariate regression models.  In each regression model 
the dependent variable is the ratio of non-audit audit fee ratio. For each regression 
this study utilises time series analysis using year dummies to control for the fact that 
the study uses the same sample of firms in each of the four years (2007-10).  In all 
regressions industry dummies are included to control for sector level variations. In all 
regressions the control variables are used to represent company size, complexity level, 
performance, gearing and the presence of a big 4 audit firm. Each regression model 
also includes the share ownership of audit committee members and a measure of 
audit committee busyness. In model 1 of table 4.8 this study uses the dummy variables 
for each of the four audit committee characteristics currently recommended as best 
practice for UK listed companies (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010) while in 
model 2 these dummy variables are substituted with corresponding variables 
containing the absolute values for each of these four variables. In models 3 and 4, this 
study employs two variables capturing audit committee effectiveness: in model 3 a 
dummy variable representing those firms whose audit committees satisfy all four of 
the recommended characteristics (ACE1) and in model 4 dummy variable is extended 
to include both the presence of an accounting expert and the absence of members 
with excess of nine years’ tenure (ACE2).   
 
The regression results in column 1 show that the return on assets has a negative and 
significant impact on non-audit fee ratio. This finding is in line with the prior research 
(Firth 1997), suggesting that better performing firms do not need as much external 
consulting services as needed by the poorly performing firms.  The proportion of 
equity held by the block holders has a positive and significant impact on non-audit fee 
ratio. Parkash and Venable (1993) argue that direct monitoring of external block 
holders results in lower auditor provided services however the finding may be 
highlighting the fact that external block holders do not have access to inside 
information and therefore rely on the quality of audited financial information to aid 
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their monitoring (Bushee and Noe, 2000).  None of the other financial variable has any 
significant impact on non-audit fee ratio.  
 
Table 4.8: OLS regressions explaining the determinants of non-audit fee ratio for 
FTSE 350 companies between 2007 and 2010 (***, **, * denote statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
Constant 1.428 1.726* 1.755 2.319** 1.301 1.768* 1.393 1.936* 
Consumer Goods .222 2.052** .221 2.044** .224 2.086** .225 2.095** 
General Industrial -.044 -.459 -.047 -.488 -.042 -.441 -.051 -.533 
Mineral Extraction .281 1.798* .288 1.859* .290 1.867* .292 1.875* 
Utilities .080 .462 .092 .535 .085 .492 .086 .498 
2008 -.236 -2.282** -.233 -2.265** -.240 -2.325** -.242 -2.347** 
2009 -.301 -2.901*** -.290 -2.796*** -.308 -2.971*** -.311 -3.000*** 
2010 -.190 -1.828* -.184 -1.779* -.195 -1.884* -.198 -1.910* 
Log Total assets -.042 -.504 -.053 -.617 -.048 -.585 -.059 -.738 
Log Subs -.094 -.837 -.083 -.745 -.094 -.841 -.094 -.837 
US Subs Dummy -.121 -1.332 -.111 -1.219 -.124 -1.367 -.119 -1.316 
ROA -.009 -2.527** -.009 -2.479** -.009 -2.551** -.009 -2.607*** 
% Gearing -.001 -.408 -.001 -.402 -.001 -.448 -.001 -.447 
Loss .196 1.519 .198 1.538 .198 1.539 .196 1.522 
London -.069 -.836 -.069 -.829 -.074 -.900 -.078 -.940 
Big 4 .174 .798 .124 .577 .168 .779 .142 .666 
% Block own .004 1.839* .004 1.868* .004 1.845* .004 1.857* 
Board Ind Dummy -.036 -.426 -.024 -.280 -.032 -.386 -.046 -.572 
Board Meetings .017 1.307 .017 1.298 .017 1.268 .016 1.241 
AC % Share own -.003 -.283 -.003 -.265 -.003 -.276 -.002 -.203 
AC Ave Directorships .158 2.341** .195 2.833*** .152 2.274** .151 2.238** 
AC Size Dummy -.040 -.283       
 AC Meeting Dummy -.171 -1.088       
AC Ind Dummy -.035 -.278       
AC Fin Exp Dummy -.027 -.068       
AC size   .007 .148     
AC Meetings   -.012 -.370     
AC % Ind   -.002 -.450     
AC % Fin Exp   -.004 -2.567***     
ACE1     -.055 -.561   
ACE2       .012 .152 
         
F Test 2.429*** 2.682*** 2.725*** 2.712*** 
Adjusted R
2
 .035 .041 .037 .037 
N 948 948 948 948 
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Definitions of variables 
Dependent variable:  non-audit to audit fee ratio 
Independent variables: Log Total Assets = the natural logarithm of total assets; Log Subs = the natural 
logarithm of total consolidated subsidiaries; US Subs dummy = dummy variable indicating US subsidiaries; 
Debtors = percentage of total assets represented by debtors; % Stock = percentage of total assets 
represented by stock; Log Delay = the natural logarithm of audit delay; ROA = return on assets; % 
Gearing = percentage of total long-term finance represented by long term debt; Loss = dummy variable 
representing the firm incurring loss in last two years; London = dummy variable representing firms 
audited by a London based auditor; Big4 = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit was 
carried out by a Big4 audit firm; % Block Own = percentage of equity owned by the block holders; % Log 
Non Audit Fee = the natural logarithm of non audit fee; Board Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating 
instances where boards comprised of majority independent directors; Board meetings = the number of 
meetings held by the board during the year; AC % Share own = percentage of equity held by audit 
committee members; AC Ave Directorships = average directorships held by the audit committee 
members; AC Size dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committee contains 
three or more members; AC Meetings dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit 
committee held at least three meetings; AC Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the 
audit committee had solely independent non-executive directors; AC Fin Exp dummy = dummy variable 
indicating instances where the audit committees had financial expertise; AC Size = number of audit 
committee members; AC Meetings = Number of audit committee meetings held during the year; AC % 
Ind = Percentage of audit committee members who are independent non-executive directors; AC % Fin 
Exp = Percentage of audit committee members who are financial experts; ACE1 = dummy variable 
representing instances where audit committees comprise at least three members, contained at least one 
financial expert, all members being independent and met at least three times during the financial year; 
ACE2 = dummy variable representing instances where audit committees comprise at least three 
members, contained at least one financial expert, all members being independent and met at least three 
times during the financial year, contains one accounting expert and has no member with more than 9 
years tenure. 
 
The independence of the board and the board meetings has also shown no significant 
impact on non-audit fee ratio. From the audit committee variables, average 
directorships held by the audit committee members have a positive and significant 
impact on non-audit fee ratio. This finding suggests audit committee members’ 
additional directorships result in busy and overstretched directors who are unable to 
pay adequate attention to external audit issues. None of the other audit committee 
variable has any significant impact on non-audit fee ratio however the negative 
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correlation among the fundamental audit committee variable (i.e. size, independence, 
meetings and financial expertise) and non-audit fee ratio suggest that such 
characteristics are supportive of enhanced auditor independence.  
 
In model 2 dummy variables are substituted with corresponding continuous variables 
containing the absolute values for each of these four variables. The proportion of 
financial experts on the audit committee has a negative and significant impact on non-
audit fee ratio suggesting a strong support of members with financial expertise on 
issues relating to auditor independence. Zaman et al. (2011), while examining firms in 
the year 2001 to 2004, have also found financial expertise having a negative impact on 
non-audit fees. Prior studies have also found that audit committee members tend to 
support auditors in the adjustment recommendations if they have more experience 
and knowledge of auditing (Dezoort and Salterio, 2001). Chen and Zhou (2007) also 
found that audit committee independence and the audit committee’s financial 
expertise played a role in firms choosing to dismiss Arthur Andersen more quickly, than 
firms whose audit committee did not have these characteristics. Other than financial 
expertise, audit committee average directorships have a positive and significant impact 
on non-audit fee ratio supporting the busyness hypothesis that argues that 
overstretched directors are not very good monitors of the financial reporting quality. 
This finding is also consistent with the argument that holding of additional 
directorships result in a conflict of interest and such directors focus more on their own 
interests than on stakeholder interests (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).   
 
In model 3 and 4 of table 4.8 the impact of the composite dummies representing those 
firms adhering to all four recommendations of best practice (ACE1) and those that 
comply with best practice as in ACE1 but, in addition, have no member with longer 
than nine years’ tenure and also has at least one accounting expert (ACE2) on non-
audit fee ratio is statistically insignificant28. The insignificance of the audit committee 
effectiveness constructs is somewhat surprising as the prior evidence for the impact of 
audit committee effectiveness on auditor independence shows that audit committee 
                                                          
28
 Two alternative effectiveness variables ACE3 and ACE4 representing the aggregate count of each of these 
elements of compliance from ACE1 and ACE2 also have no significant impact on non-audit fee ratio. 
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effectiveness has a negative and significant impact on non-audit fee ratio and hence 
result in higher auditor independence (Abbott et al., 2003b). However Zaman et al., 
(2011) while measuring auditor independence using non-audit fee documented a 
significant positive association between audit committee effectiveness and non-audit 
fees. 
 
The F-statistics of each model are significant at one per cent level, suggesting that the 
models are statistically valid. The adjusted R2 for all models ranges between 3.5 per 
cent and 4.1 per cent.  The low value of adjusted R2 is consistent with the prior studies 
in this area. Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) and Mitra and Hossain (2007) have 
documented low R2 values, 5.2 per cent and 12.1 per cent respectively.   The total 
number of observations in each model are 948. 
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4.4.4 Tests of Robustness 
Similar to the audit fee regression models this study re-runs the main regressions of 
the non audit fee ratio model and examines whether the clustering within firms may 
have biased the estimated standard errors which may have affected, to some extent, 
the significant levels found for the estimated coefficients.  These tests show that the 
findings reported in the main regression analysis specifically in relation to audit 
committee busyness and audit committee financial expertise hold strong and are not 
sensitive to this approach.   A number of other robustness tests were also conducted 
which are discussed below. 
 
Table 4.9 provides a detailed analysis of audit committee financial expertise, audit 
committee busyness audit committee tenure variables. In model 1, the proportion of 
audit committee members with accounting expertise29 and in model 2 the proportion 
of members with non-accounting expertise reveal a statistical insignificant impact of 
these expertise variations on non-audit fee ratio. The variable representing the 
proportion of audit committee members with governance expertise is also not 
significant (un-tabulated). In models 3 and 4 this study substitutes the audit committee 
average directorships with variables representing the extent of holding other 
directorships by audit committee members. The results show that the holding of one 
or more additional directorships has no significant impact on non-audit fee ratio 
however two or more additional directorships in model 4 have a positive and 
significant impact on non-audit fee ratios at one per cent level. The holding of three or 
more additional directorships also has a positive and significant impact on non-audit 
fee ratios at one per cent level (un-tabulated). These findings again highlight the 
negative impact of additional directorships on audit quality and show that as the 
busyness of directors increases the degree of negative impact on auditor 
independence increases as well. Consistent with busyness hypothesis this finding 
suggests that directors holding other directorships may be too busy to do their job 
effectively and hence have a negative impact on the firms’ audit quality. 
 
                                                          
29 The dummy variable representing audit committees with at least one accounting expert also has no impact on 
non-audit fees. 
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Regression models 5 and 6 represent an alternative measure of audit committee 
independence. In model 5 the variable representing the proportion of audit committee 
members with nine or over nine year tenure also has a significant negative impact on 
non-audit fee ratio. In Model 6 the variable representing the proportion of members 
with six or over six year of tenure also have a negative and significant impact on non-
audit fee ratio. The significance level in both these models is five per cent respectively. 
Taken together these findings suggest that audit committee members serving longer 
on the boards do not prefer to purchase high amount of non-audit services from the 
incumbent auditor.  Kosnik (1990) and Beasley (1996) argue that accumulated 
knowledge and experience by serving longer on the board result in more effective 
directors. The new audit committee size and meetings variables representing audit 
committees comprised of at least four members and audit committees that meet at 
least five times every year have shown no significant impact on non-audit fee ratio (un-
tabulated). 
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Table 4.9: OLS regressions explaining the determinants of non-audit fee ratio for FTSE 350 companies between 2007 and 2010 (***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
 AC Expertise Variations AC Busyness Variations AC Tenure Variations 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
Constant 1.559 2.123** 1.407 1.948* 1.305 1.572 1.403 1.702* 1.575 1.909* 1.562 1.891* 
Log Total assets -.049 -.585 -.037 -.444 -.027 -.323 -.038 -.461 -.050 -.609 -.044 -.534 
Log Subs -.093 -.834 -.089 -.800 -.110 -.981 -.092 -.822 -.106 -.951 -.098 -.879 
US Subs Dummy -.123 -1.352 -.115 -1.257 -.114 -1.244 -.116 -1.281 -.112 -1.233 -.112 -1.241 
ROA -.009 -2.585** -.009 -2.434** -.010 -2.588** -.009 -2.395** -.009 -2.578** -.009 -2.558** 
% Gearing -.001 -.493 -.001 -.301 -.001 -.457 -.001 -.402 -.002 -.546 -.001 -.463 
Loss .202 1.571 .188 1.463 .202 1.564 .183 1.418 .182 1.414 .188 1.462 
London -.068 -.822 -.067 -.814 -.065 -.790 -.077 -.933 -.076 -.922 -.075 -.913 
Big 4 .167 .766 .168 .771 .222 1.010 .174 .802 .176 .821 .188 .875 
% Block own .004 1.850* .004 1.867* .004 1.841* .004 1.848* .004 1.854* .004 1.771* 
Board Ind Dummy -.037 -.439 -.028 -.329 -.046 -.534 -.033 -.388 -.049 -.607 -.051 -.622 
Board Meetings .018 1.341 .016 1.261 .018 1.406 .018 1.355 .015 1.139 .015 1.150 
AC % Share own -.004 -.355 -.002 -.163 -.004 -.329 -.004 -.344 .004 .374 .000 .008 
AC Ave Directorships .177 2.561** .158 2.355**     .131 1.920* .144 2.139** 
AC Size Dummy -.071 -.506 -.021 -.148 -.052 -.368 -.041 -.291 -.030 -.216 -.038 -.277 
 AC Meetings Dummy -.163 -1.038 -.173 -1.099 -.150 -.952 -.181 -1.150 -.200 -1.276 -.193 -1.232 
AC Ind Dummy -.041 -.327 -.032 -.261 -.031 -.248 -.028 -.225     
AC Fin Exp Dummy     .003 .008 -.018 -.048 -.006 -.015 -.048 -.125 
AC % Acc Exp -.002 -1.188           
AC % Non Acc Exp   -.002 -1.381         
AC % Addir1plus     .001 .474       
AC % Addir2plus       .005 3.005***     
AC % Tenure 9         -.006 -2.423**   
AC % Tenure 6           -.003 -2.102** 
             
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
F Test 2.491*** 2.514*** 2.198*** 2.585*** 2.686 2.621*** 
Adjusted R
2
 .036 .037 .029 .039 .041 .039 
N 948 948 948 948 948 948 
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Definitions of variables 
Dependent variable:  non-audit to audit fee ratio 
Independent variables: Log Total Assets = the natural logarithm of total assets; Log Subs = the natural logarithm of total consolidated subsidiaries; US Subs dummy = dummy 
variable indicating US subsidiaries; Debtors = percentage of total assets represented by debtors; % Stock = percentage of total assets represented by stock; Log Delay = the 
natural logarithm of audit delay; ROA = return on assets; % Gearing = percentage of total long-term finance represented by long term debt; Loss = dummy variable 
representing the firm incurring loss in last two years; London = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; Big4 = dummy variable indicating 
instances where the audit was carried out by a Big4 audit firm; % Block Own = percentage of equity owned by the block holders; % Log Non Audit Fee = the natural logarithm 
of non audit fee; Board Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where boards comprised of majority independent directors; Board meetings = the number of 
meetings held by the board during the year; AC % Share own = percentage of equity held by audit committee members; AC Ave Directorships = average directorships held by 
the audit committee members; AC Size dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committee contains three or more members; AC Meetings dummy = 
dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committee held at least three meetings; AC Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit 
committee had solely independent non-executive directors; AC Fin Exp dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committees had financial expertise; 
AC % Acc Exp =  Percentage of audit committee members who are accounting experts; AC % Non Acc Exp =  percentage of audit committee members who are non-
accounting experts; AC % Addir1plus =  percentage of audit committee members with at least one additional directorship; AC % Addir2plus =  percentage of audit committee 
members with at least two additional directorships;  AC % Tenure 9 = percentage of audit committee members who have served on company board for more than 9 years; 
AC % Tenure 6 = percentage of audit committee members who have served on company board for more than 6 years. 
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The impact of the remaining variables in each regression is broadly consistent in each 
of the regression on table 4.9. Return on assets has a negative and significant impact 
on non-audit fee ratio. The proportion of equity held by the block holders has a 
positive and significant impact on non-audit fee ratio. This finding may be highlighting 
the fact that external block holders do not have access to inside information and 
therefore rely on the quality of audited financial information to aid their monitoring 
(Bushee and Noe, 2000). None of the other financial variable has any significant impact 
on non-audit fee ratio. The independence of the board and the board meetings has 
also shown no impact on non-audit fee ratio. The average directorships held by the 
audit committee members have a positive and significant impact on non-audit fee 
ratio. This finding suggests audit committee members directorships result in busy and 
overstretched directors who are unable to pay adequate attention to external audit 
issues.  The F-statistics for all models are significant at one per cent level. The adjusted 
R2 for all models ranges between 2.9 per cent and 4.2 per cent.  The low value of 
adjusted R2 is consistent with the prior studies in this area. Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) 
and Mitra and Hossain (2007) have documented low R2 values, 5.2 per cent and 12.1 
per cent respectively. The total number of observations in each model are 948.  
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The study runs separate regressions for larger and smaller firms and Appendix B 
represents larger and smaller firms respectively. Appendix B also contains a Logistic 
regression analysis model where this study uses a binary variable as its dependent 
variable (=1 if non audit fee is higher than audit fee; =0 otherwise) to represent auditor 
independence. The proportion of equity held by the block holders has a positive and 
significant impact on non-audit fee ratio. This finding may be highlighting the fact that 
external block holders rely on the quality of audited financial information to aid their 
monitoring (Bushee and Noe, 2000). As expected, audit committee independence as 
represented by the proportion of independent members on the audit committee has 
negative and significant impact on non-audit fee ratio. This finding is in line with prior 
research and highlights the fact that independence of the audit committee members is 
crucial in maintaining auditor independence. Abbott et al., (2003b), while investigating 
a sample of 538 US firms, has also documented that audit committee independence 
has a negative and significant impact on non-audit fee ratio. The proportion of audit 
committee members with financial expertise also has a negative and significant impact 
on non-audit fee ratio highlighting the support of audit committee members with 
financial expertise for auditor independence. Prior studies have also found that audit 
committee members tend to support auditors in the adjustment recommendations if 
they have more experience and knowledge of auditing (Dezoort and Salterio, 2001).   
The regression findings for smaller firms show that the firm size represented by the log 
of total assets has a positive and significant impact on non-audit fee ratio. Consistent 
with the prior research, larger firms tend to purchase higher amount of non audit 
services owing to their enormous size and complex activities (Palmrose, 1986; Barkess 
and Simnett, 1994).  None of the other financial and governance variables including 
audit committee variables has any significant impact on non-audit fee ratio.  
 
Finally in logistic regression model this study replaces the dependent variable from 
non-audit fee ratio to non-audit fee binary variable. This variable equals ‘1’ if non audit 
fee of the firm paid to the auditor is greater than audit fee and equals ‘0’ otherwise. 
The log of subsidiaries has a negative and significant impact on non-audit fee dummy 
variable. This finding is counter intuitive however consistent with the prior UK based 
evidence (Zaman et al., 2011). The return on assets has a negative and significant 
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impact on non-audit fee variable. This finding shows that better performing firms tend 
to purchase low non-audit fees compared to their counterparts (Abbott et al., 2003b). 
Firms experiencing losses has a positive and significant impact on non-audit fee 
dummy variable. This finding suggest that poorly performing firm is more likely to ask 
for higher external consulting services to improve their profitability (DeFond et al., 
2002; Whisenant et al., 2003). As expected, Big 4 auditor also has a positive and 
significant impact on non-audit fee dummy variable. Abbott et al., (2003b) state that 
big auditing firms offer a wide variety of consulting services and have expanded into 
consulting services at a much faster rate than expected. From the board governance 
variables, number of board meetings has a positive and significant impact on non-audit 
fee dummy variable. Although the significant impact of board meeting is in the 
direction opposite to prediction, this finding is in line with the prior UK evidence. 
Zaman et al., (2011) has also documented a positive and significant impact of board 
meeting on non-audit services fees.  Audit committee average directorships have a 
positive and significant impact on non-audit fee dummy variable. This finding is also 
consistent with the argument that holding of additional directorships result in a 
conflict of interest if directors accept too many directorships and focus more on their 
own interests than on stakeholder interests (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).  The 
proportion of audit committee members with financial expertise also has a negative 
and significant impact on non-audit fee dummy variable.  This finding highlights the 
importance of such expertise in maintaining auditor independence. Chen and Zhou 
(2007) also found that audit committee’s financial expertise also played a role in firms 
choosing to dismiss Arthur Andersen more quickly, than firms whose audit committee 
did not have these characteristics.  In summary the findings from the logistic 
regression indicate that firms paying higher non audit services fees compared to audit 
fee are those with busy audit committee members, more board meetings, 
experiencing losses, audited by Big4 while firms paying less non audit services fees 
compared to audit fee are those with more financial experts on audit committees, 
higher return on assets and higher complexity.  
 
The F-statistics for each model are significant at one per cent level, suggesting that the 
models are statistically valid. The adjusted R2 for all models ranges between 2 per cent 
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and 7.6 per cent. The low value of adjusted R2 is consistent with the prior studies in 
this area. Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) and Mitra and Hossain (2007) have documented 
low R2 values, 5.2 per cent and 12.1 per cent respectively. The number of observations 
in each of these regression models were 481, 467 and 948 respectively.  
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Table 4.10: Summary of Hypotheses – Audit Quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypotheses Findings 
 
H1: The number of audit committee members are positively 
associated with audit quality. 
Not Supported 
H3: The proportion of audit committee members with financial 
expertise are positively associated with audit quality; 
Supported 
H5: The proportion of independent audit committee members are 
positively associated with audit quality; 
Not Supported 
H7: The frequency of audit committee meetings is positively 
associated with audit quality; 
Supported 
H9: The proportion of audit committee members with longer 
tenure is negatively associated with audit quality; 
Not Supported 
H11: The proportion of equity held by audit committee members 
is positively associated with audit quality. 
Not Supported 
H13: The busyness of the audit committee members is negatively 
associated with audit quality; 
Supported 
H15: The presence of an effective audit committee is positively 
associated with audit quality; 
Not Supported 
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4.5 Summary 
This chapter investigates the impact of various audit committee characteristics on 
audit quality which is represented by both audit fee and non-audit fee ratios. It begins 
by presenting the descriptive statistics for the pooled sample, followed by an 
explanation of the descriptive statistics on a year and industry level. This analysis 
reveals a continuous increase and a large scale adherence to various UK Corporate 
Governance Code requirements in relation to audit committee size, independence, 
meetings and expertise level. The chapter then presents the results of the Univariate 
analysis; in particular it outlines the differences in means and mean ranks of those 
companies that are larger in size as compared to those that are smaller in size. The 
univariate statistics show that on average larger firms pay significantly higher audit 
fees and non-audit service fees as compared to smaller firms. These findings suggest 
that larger companies are more complex and difficult to audit and hence require more 
audit effort and consequently result in higher audit fees. Larger firms are also better 
resourced and can afford to pay for more audit coverage as compared to their smaller 
counterparts. The mean value of non-audit fee ratio is significantly lower in large firms 
as compared to small firms. The analysis also highlights that on average audit 
committee size, number of meetings and percentage independence is significantly 
higher in those firms that are larger in size as compared to those that are smaller in 
size. Similarly the mean and mean rank values of companies that have full compliance 
with the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) in relation to audit committee size, 
meetings and independence is significantly higher for larger companies than those that 
are small in size. 
 
Following the Univariate analysis, the chapter then goes on to show the bivariate 
correlations among the different variables used in this study.   In respect of the audit 
committee characteristics, a number of variables show significant and positive 
correlations with audit fees.  For example, audit committee size, the annual frequency 
of meetings, and the level of independent membership  are positively correlated with 
audit fees suggesting, at the univariate level at least, that larger, more diligent, and 
more independent audit committees are associated with more expensive audits. There 
is also a positive association between both the proportion of financial experts and 
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audit fees suggesting that greater expertise on the committee may result in more 
intensive and more expensive audits.  Audit committee non-accounting expertise is 
significant and positively correlated with audit fees, however there is significant and 
negative correlation among accounting expertise and audit fees. This is consistent with 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) who argue that accounting experts provide greater 
monitoring and hence result in lower audit fees charged by the auditor.  Finally, all four 
of the proxies for audit committee effectiveness are significant and positively 
correlated with audit fees but the significance of both ACE1 and ACE3, representing 
compliance with the four core components of present audit committee regulation, is 
especially pronounced.   
Finally, the multivariate regression results are presented in order to explain the impact 
of various audit committee characteristics on audit quality, represented by audit fees 
and non-audit fee ratio.  In summary, the empirical findings reported in the audit fee 
analysis find that the key ingredients of what regulators perceive as more effective 
audit committees i.e. meetings and expertise, are associated with more extensive and 
expensive audits.  These findings are interesting in that they identify consistent impact 
of good governance practice on audit fees and should serve as reassurance to 
regulators who may interpret these findings as supportive of their recommendations, 
at least if interpreted as more expensive audits equals more intensive audit.   In the 
provision of non-audit services fee, audit committees have the responsibility to ensure 
that provision of such services does not impair the independence and objectivity of the 
external auditor (Smith Report, 2003).   The analyses in relation to audit committees 
and auditor independence shows that audit committee members' financial expertise 
has a negative and significant impact on non-audit fee ratio suggesting a strong 
support of members with financial expertise on issues relating to auditor 
independence. The study also documents that audit committee members serving 
longer on the boards do not prefer to purchase high amounts of non-audit services 
from the incumbent auditor.  Kosnik (1990) and Beasley (1996) argue that accumulated 
knowledge and experience by serving longer on the board results in more effective 
directors. Audit committees' average directorships have a positive and significant 
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impact on non-audit fee ratio supporting the busyness hypothesis that argues that 
overstretched directors are not very good monitors of the financial reporting quality.  
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CHAPTER 5: AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS AND EARNINGS 
QUALITY – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter begins by outlining the descriptive statistics and univariate analysis of the 
variables used in the second empirical analysis to investigate the influence of audit 
committee characteristics on earnings quality. The descriptive analysis includes; a 
comprehensive analysis of the pooled sample, a detailed analysis based on four 
corresponding years and finally a detailed examination of the various industries used in 
this study. The chapter then presents the results of the univariate analysis. The 
univariate analysis contains statistics from independent t-test and Mann-Whittney test 
highlighting the significant differences in the mean and mean rank values of various 
audit committee variables for firms that are large in size compared to firms that are 
small in size.  This is followed by a correlation matrix showing a two way Pearson 
correlation between the variables included in this study. Correlations statistics are not 
only important as they highlight the associations between earnings quality measures 
employed in this study and the explanatory variables but also identify the significant 
correlations among the independent variables.  The chapter then presents the results 
of a detailed multivariate regression analysis that investigates the hypotheses set out 
in chapter three. The multivariate analysis includes a robust investigation of the impact 
of various audit committee characteristics on earnings quality based on pooled sample 
dataset as well as a separate regression for larger and smaller firms. The study utilises 
McNichols (2002) and Francis et al., (2005) models to measure earnings quality. Finally, 
this chapter ends by summarizing the results of the second empirical analysis.  
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 contains descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the second 
empirical analysis. These descriptive statistics are based on 691 firm year observations, 
which is a much reduced sample size as compared to first empirical analysis where the 
sample size equals 991 observations. In line with the prior literature in this area 
(Peasnell et al. 2005; Ghosh, 2010), to provide an unbiased measure of accrual quality 
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this study excludes industries with less than 10 observations in any given year. This 
reduced the pooled sample size to 691. The first two variables represent the two 
accruals based models used in this study where McNichols (2002) model signifies the 
intentional and unintentional errors in the accruals estimation and Francis (2005) 
model represents the intentional/discretionary manipulation of accrual as this model 
has the ability to disaggregates the intentional manipulation of accruals from its 
unintentional part. The mean (median) values of McNichols and Francis are .049 (.036) 
and .045 (.033) respectively illustrating a very minute difference between the two 
models. These results suggest that a majority of accruals estimation errors are linked 
to intentional or discretionary part of accruals estimation equation. These values are 
also consistent with the recent US based studies of Ghosh et al. (2010) and Doyle et al. 
(2007) where they documented the mean values as .052 and .070 respectively.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, this study captures the fine detail in terms of 
audit committee characteristics. Audit committees in this sample have, on average, 
3.36 members with a median of 3 members. The range of audit committee size ranges 
from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 8 members. 89 per cent of sample companies 
have audit committees with 3 or more members as recommended as best practice by 
the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010). Audit committees in the sample meet, on 
average, 3.90 times per year with a median of 4 meetings. The number of meetings 
range from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 12. 93.3 per cent of audit committees 
meet three or more times during the year as recommended in the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010). On average, 94.71 per cent of audit committee members are 
independent non-executives while 84.7 per cent of audit committees comprise only 
independent members as recommended by current best practice.  In terms of the 
additional proxy for independence, the mean presence of members with more than 
nine years’ tenure is only 7.91 per cent.  However the mean presence of members with 
more than six year tenure is 23.47 per cent. The UK Corporate Governance Code (1010) 
requires non-executive directors not to serve more than nine years on a company’s 
board as it can become detrimental to their independence and also requires 
companies to a have a rigorous review of non-executives serving longer than six years.  
The descriptive statistics in table 5.1 also show that, on average, 78.82 per cent of 
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audit committee members are financial experts.  The average proportion of audit 
committee members who are accounting experts is 35.72 per cent and 43.10 per cent 
of audit committee members are non-accounting experts.  The study also finds that 
the average proportion of governance experts (i.e. audit committee member with 
other audit committee experience) on audit committees is 24.14 per cent. 
 
In addition to audit committee characteristics recommended by governance regulation 
this study also captures the ownership of audit committee members since there is a 
strong argument, as well as some supporting evidence, that audit committee members 
with an equity stake in their companies may be more effective in their oversight of the 
financial reporting process. As expected, the summary statistics presented in table 5.1 
show that the ownership levels of the average audit committee is quite low at 0.314 
per cent with an even lower median of only .016 per cent. While examining the 
multiple directorships, the findings show that the average additional directorship held 
by audit committees in the sample is .713 with a median of .667 with a range from 0 to 
a maximum of 4 directorships. The study also constructs variables representing the 
proportion of audit committee members with one or more, two or more or three or 
more additional directorships with mean values for these variables of 45 per cent, 18 
per cent and 6.62 per cent respectively.  
 
As discussed in the previous sections, this study uses a composite variable to identify 
audit committees that conform to all of the minimum recommendations in terms of 
size, independence, meeting frequency and expertise (ACE1). 71.3 per cent of audit 
committees in the sample satisfy all four of the recommended characteristics. 
Furthermore, I also use a variable where I aggregate up each company’s degree of 
compliance (ACE3). The average audit committee in the sample scores 3.66 points out 
of a maximum of 4. When the composite variables are extended to include the 
presence of an accounting expert and the absence of members with excess of nine 
years’ tenure (ACE2), the proportion of companies in compliance reduces to 53.2 per 
cent with the mean score of compliance (ACE4) at 5.33 out of a maximum 6. 
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For board of director variables, the study finds that 55.7 per cent of FTSE 350 boards 
are comprised of a majority of independent directors as required by the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010). The independence level of corporate boards in the UK has 
shown some improvement as O’Sullivan (2000) reports this percentage to be at 41.17 
per cent. O’Sullivan (2000) utilises the proportion of non-executives to quantify board 
independence. This study utilizes governance disclosures subsequent to Higgs (2003) 
and now it is possible to identify independent non-executives rather than just non-
executives as used in O’Sullivan (2000).The average frequency of board meetings is 
8.88 meetings per year with a median of 8 meetings and a range of 1 to 26 meetings 
during the year.  
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics  
 Variables 
  
Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Francis 0.045 0.033 0.043 0.000 0.275 1.786 4.078 
McNichols 0.049 0.036 0.046 0.000 0.303 1.704 3.794 
AC Size 3.366 3.000 0.863 2.000 8.000 1.062 2.534 
AC Size Dummy 0.893 1.000 0.309 0.000 1.000 -2.547 4.499 
AC Meetings 3.904 4.000 1.257 1.000 12.000 1.438 4.477 
AC Meetings Dummy 0.933 1.000 0.249 0.000 1.000 -3.485 10.175 
AC % Ind 94.714 100.000 13.244 25.000 100.000 -2.588 6.636 
AC Ind Dummy 0.847 1.000 0.361 0.000 1.000 -1.928 1.721 
AC % Tenure 9 7.915 0.000 17.476 0.000 100.000 2.516 6.857 
AC % Tenure 6 23.479 25.000 26.594 0.000 100.000 0.929 0.155 
AC % Fin Exp 78.828 75.000 23.500 0.000 100.000 -0.860 0.008 
AC Fin Exp Dummy 0.991 1.000 0.093 0.000 1.000 -10.614 110.986 
AC % Acc Exp 35.724 33.333 21.753 0.000 100.000 0.408 0.393 
AC % Non Acc Exp 43.104 42.857 25.548 0.000 100.000 0.035 -0.323 
AC % Gov Exp 24.140 25.000 25.038 0.000 100.000 0.810 0.085 
AC Ave Directorships 0.713 0.667 0.575 0.000 4.000 1.114 2.120 
AC % Addirs1plus 45.059 50.000 29.347 0.000 100.000 0.134 -0.720 
AC % Addirs2plus 18.415 0.000 23.018 0.000 150.000 1.362 2.396 
AC % Addirs3plus 6.624 0.000 14.780 0.000 100.000 2.353 5.686 
AC % Share own 0.314 0.016 2.873 0.000 39.168 12.630 161.298 
ACE1 0.713 1.000 0.452 0.000 1.000 -0.946 -1.108 
ACE2 0.518 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 -0.073 -2.001 
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Variables Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
 
ACE3 3.664 4.000 0.572 1.000 4.000 -1.597 2.017 
ACE4 5.302 6.000 0.876 2.000 6.000 -1.238 1.077 
Board Ind Dummy 0.557 1.000 0.497 0.000 1.000 -0.231 -1.952 
Board Meetings 8.887 8.000 3.060 1.000 26.000 1.480 4.536 
Big4 0.951 1.000 0.216 0.000 1.000 -4.177 15.496 
Audit Delay 64.546 62.000 16.780 25.000 149.000 1.205 3.010 
Log Delay 1.796 1.792 0.108 1.398 2.173 0.046 1.163 
Total Asset (£000s) 3115682 874756 6729681 32794 55967340 4.456226 22.2 
Log Total Assets 9.004 8.942 0.629 7.516 10.748 0.379 -0.351 
% Gearing 22.412 20.060 17.328 0.000 92.246 0.595 -0.063 
ROA 11.545 9.526 13.613 -47.500 130.311 2.731 18.248 
CFO 13.896 11.875 11.010 -12.234 127.327 3.212 22.886 
Loss  0.122 0.000 0.327 0.000 1.000 2.321 3.398 
% Block own 39.679 39.250 18.141 0.000 92.400 0.205 -0.234 
 
173 
 
95.1 per cent of companies in the sample use one of the big 4 audit firms. This is not a 
surprise but illustrates the extremely high level of concentration prevalent in the UK 
audit market and goes some way to explaining current concerns surrounding the lack 
of choice in this market segment currently being discussed at EU level (European 
Commission, 2011). The average company size based on total assets is £3115 million 
and audit delay is averaging at 64.54 days. The average level of gearing for sample 
companies is 22.41 per cent; the average level of return on assets is 11.54 per cent; 
and the average level of CFO is 13.89 per cent. 12.2 per cent of companies declared 
loss in last two years and 39.67 per cent of the equity is held by the block holders.  
 
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics – Year wise 
Table 5.2 contains descriptive statistics on yearly basis. The yearly analysis of accruals 
shows that as per McNichols model the mean (median) value of absolute accruals has 
decreased from 5.5 (4.2) per cent of total assets in 2007 to 4.3 (2.9) per cent of total 
assets in 2010. Similarly the mean and median values of discretionary accruals as per 
Francis model have decreased from 5.5 (3.9) per cent of total assets in 2007 to 3.9 (2.6) 
per cent of total assets in 2010.  The study also reveals a continuous increase and a 
large scale adherence to various UK Corporate Governance Code requirements in 
relation to audit committee size, independence, meetings and expertise level. From 
2007 to 2010, audit committees average size has increased from 3.33 members to 3.44 
members with audit committees fulfilling the size requirement of a minimum of three 
members have increased from 85.4 per cent to 94.8 per cent. The average number of 
audit committee meetings has increased from 3.80 meetings per year to 3.94 meetings 
per year and audit committees meeting at least three or more times have increased 
from 91.8 per cent to 93.6 per cent. The proportion of independent audit committees 
members have increased from 93.39 per cent to 94.83 per cent and audit committees 
comprised of all independent directors have increased from 80.7 per cent to 85 per 
cent.  Audit committee members with nine or over nine year tenure have slightly 
reduced from 8.72 per cent to 6.94 per cent and proportion of members with six or 
over six year tenure remained largely the same in the four year period from 2007 to 
2010. The proportion of members with financial expertise has increased from 76 per 
cent to 79 per cent and a similar 3 per cent increase has also been recorded for the 
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audit committee members with accounting expertise. Percentage of audit committee 
members with governance expertise have increased from 21.07 per cent to 25.25 per 
cent during the sample period. The mean value of average additional directorships 
held by the audit committee members have increased from .696 to .708 and the 
proportion of members with additional directorships has also shown a small increases 
in the sample time period.  Audit committees complying with all four aspects of 
recommended best practice (i.e. ACE1) have increased from 66.1 per cent to 75.7 per 
cent with the mean score of compliance going up from 3.56 to 3.72 out of 4 (i.e. ACE3).  
Similarly when the composite variable includes both the presence of an accounting 
qualified person and the absence of members with excess of nine years’ tenure (i.e. 
ACE2), the proportion of companies in compliance increased from 46.8 per cent to 
56.1 per cent and mean score of compliance (i.e. ACE4) has gone up from 5.19 to 5.38 
out of a maximum 6. 
 
Other than audit committee characteristics, board independence has increased from 
49 per cent to 63 per cent and the average number of board meetings held during the 
year remains steady at 8 to 9 meetings per year.  Of the other earnings quality 
determinants audits conducted by big 4 auditors have increased from 94.1 per cent to 
96 per cent; average audit delay has decreased from 65.56 to 63.94 days; the mean 
value of total assets has increased considerably from £2534 million to £3549 million; 
average gearing has dropped marginally from 28.43 per cent to 26.49 per cent; ROA 
and CFO have decreased from 15.04 per cent to 10.77 per cent and 14.69 per cent to 
13.40 per cent respectively; the number of companies declaring loss in the last two 
years have increased from 8.2 per cent to 17.3 per cent;  and the percentage of equity 
held by the block holders have remain steady at 40 per cent in the four year period 
from 2007 to 2010.    
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics - year wise 
 
Variables 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Francisdaq 0.055 0.039 0.046 0.036 0.040 0.031 0.039 0.026 
McNichols 0.055 0.042 0.052 0.039 0.046 0.038 0.043 0.029 
AC Size 3.333 3.000 3.312 3.000 3.379 3.000 3.439 3.000 
AC Size Dummy 0.854 1.000 0.867 1.000 0.902 1.000 0.948 1.000 
AC meetings 3.795 4.000 3.919 4.000 3.966 4.000 3.936 4.000 
AC meetings Dummy 0.918 1.000 0.936 1.000 0.943 1.000 0.936 1.000 
AC % Ind 93.392 100.00 95.707 100.00 94.914 100.00 94.827 100.00 
AC Ind Dummy 0.807 1.000 0.879 1.000 0.851 1.000 0.850 1.000 
AC % Tenure 9 8.723 0.000 8.179 0.000 7.822 0.000 6.946 0.000 
AC % Tenure 6 24.094 0.000 22.697 0.000 22.967 25.000 24.169 25.000 
AC % Fin Exp 76.428 75.000 79.002 75.000 80.374 91.667 79.470 80.000 
AC Fin Exp Dummy 0.988 1.000 0.994 1.000 0.994 1.000 0.988 1.000 
AC % Acc Exp 33.635 33.333 35.845 33.333 36.917 33.333 36.466 33.333 
AC % Non Acc Exp 42.792 40.000 43.157 50.000 43.456 50.000 43.004 33.333 
AC % Gov Exp 21.067 20.000 24.784 25.000 25.417 25.000 25.250 25.000 
AC Ave Directorships 0.696 0.667 0.704 0.667 0.743 0.667 0.708 0.667 
AC % Addirs1plus 44.727 40.000 45.827 50.000 45.190 50.000 44.487 33.333 
AC % Addirs2plus 17.778 0.000 17.585 0.000 19.856 20.000 18.426 0.000 
AC % Addirs3plus 5.721 0.000 6.360 0.000 7.299 0.000 7.100 0.000 
AC % Share own 0.303 0.016 0.318 0.015 0.300 0.015 0.335 0.016 
ACE1 0.661 1.000 0.711 1.000 0.724 1.000 0.757 1.000 
ACE2 0.468 0.000 0.520 1.000 0.523 1.000 0.561 1.000 
ACE3 3.567 4.000 3.676 4.000 3.690 4.000 3.723 4.000 
ACE4 5.193 5.000 5.306 6.000 5.328 6.000 5.382 6.000 
Board Ind Dummy 0.491 0.000 0.520 1.000 0.586 1.000 0.630 1.000 
Board Meetings 8.591 8.000 9.225 9.000 8.983 9.000 8.746 8.000 
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Variables 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Big4 0.947 1.000 0.948 1.000 0.948 1.000 0.960 1.000 
Audit Delay 65.561 63.000 64.555 62.000 64.132 62.000 63.948 61.000 
Log Delay 1.803 1.799 1.797 1.792 1.794 1.792 1.792 1.785 
Tot Assets (000) 2534219 691400 3061293 926900 3309560 883005 3549813 964183 
Log Total Assets 8.933 8.840 9.013 8.967 9.024 8.946 9.046 8.984 
% Gearing 28.434 26.247 29.397 26.673 29.327 27.780 26.486 24.164 
ROA 15.038 11.727 12.346 10.732 8.086 7.063 10.769 8.613 
CFO 14.693 11.913 14.624 12.256 12.885 11.341 13.396 12.293 
Loss  0.082 0.000 0.116 0.000 0.115 0.000 0.173 0.000 
% Block own 40.425 38.700 39.559 40.450 37.878 37.300 40.874 40.935 
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5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics – Industry wise 
Table 5.3 contains descriptive statistics of all eleven industries utilised in the second 
empirical analysis. The results show that industrial engineering, food and beverages 
and electrical and electronic sectors have relatively lower mean values of absolute 
accruals and absolute discretionary accruals as compared to their counterparts 
especially the oil and gas sector and travel and leisure sector.  In terms of audit 
committee size the mean value is over three for all the industries however adherence 
to recommended best practice (e.g. having at least three members) is highest in the 
mining sector and lowest in the food and beverages sector with average audit 
committees’ compliance level standing at 97.7 per cent and 75.8 per cent respectively. 
The average number of audit committee meetings is over 3 meetings for all the 
industries however adherence to recommended best practice (e.g. having at least 
three meetings per year) is highest in the household goods sector and lowest in the oil 
and gas sector with average audit committees’ compliance level standing at 100 per 
cent and 83.3 per cent respectively.  The mining sector has the highest proportion of 
independent audit committee members (99.42 per cent) and the media sector has the 
lowest proportion of independent members (88.38 per cent). 97.7 per cent of audit 
committees in the mineral sector are fully independent and in compliance with the 
best practice guidelines as compared to 70 per cent of audit committees from the 
media sector.  
 
Audit committee members in the oil and gas sector tend to have longer service tenure 
with 28.98 per cent of audit committee members in the sector serving longer than nine 
years as compared to services sector where approximately 2.64 per cent of the audit 
committee members have longer than 9 year tenure on their respective board of 
directors.  On average over 90 per cent of audit committee members in the media 
sector are considered as financial experts compared to 73 per cent of members in the 
general retailers sector. However a vast proportion (e.g. 70 per cent) of these 
members in the media sector is non-accounting experts and only 20 per cent of these 
members are accounting experts. Household goods sector on the other hand has the 
highest proportion of accounting experts with a mean value standing at 44.45 per cent. 
The electrical and electronic equipment sector has the highest proportion of audit 
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committee members with experience of serving on another audit committee (38.33 
per cent) as compared to other industries. Similarly 53.70 per cent of audit committee 
members in the electrical and electronic equipment sector have at least one additional 
directorship as compared to 28.84 per cent of audit committee members in the oil and 
gas sector. Equity stake is substantially high in the oil and gas sector.  Over 90 per cent 
of audit committees in the minerals and household goods sectors are in full 
compliance (i.e. ACE1) with the governance code in comparison to 54.9 per cent of 
audit committees in the software and computer services sector. When the composite 
variables are extended to include both the presence of an accounting expert and the 
absence of members with excess of nine years’ tenure, the proportion of companies in 
compliance reduces to 75 per cent in the household goods sector and 35 per cent in 
the media sector.   
 
Other than audit committee variables, board independence is highest in the minerals 
sector with 93 per cent of boards are composed of majority independent directors as 
compared to the 40 per cent of boards in the industrial engineering. Average board 
meetings in the electrical & electronics sector and software & computer services 
sector are 10 meetings per year as compared to 7 meetings per year in the media and 
oil & gas sectors. As expected, the majority of sectors have been audited by the big 4 
auditors. Audit delay is highest in the oil and gas sector with a mean value of 85.28 
days whereas the lowest audit delay stands at 56.95 days for media sector. The 
mineral sector has the highest average firm size with a mean value of total assets 
standing at £13282 millions and the lowest firm size is averaging at £361 millions in the 
electrical and electronics sector. Travel and leisure sector is highly geared with a 
gearing value of 46.25 per cent as compared to the software and computer services 
sector where the gearing level is 12.21 per cent. In terms of ROA and CFO, minerals 
and media sectors are the high performing sectors with mean values of 19.89 per cent 
and 21.98 per cent respectively. Household goods sector seems to be the worst 
performing sector with the mean values of ROA and CFO standing at 4.57 per cent and 
7.04 per cent respectively. 32.5 per cent of companies from the household sector have 
declared loss in one or both of the last two year income statements. The proportion of 
block holder share ownership remains around 40 per cent level in all sectors.  
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics - Industry wise  
Variables
 
Electric and Electronic 
Equipment 
Food and Beverages 
Producers 
General Retailer Household Goods 
Industrial 
Engineering 
Media 
 
 
 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Francis dac 0.022 0.016 0.022 0.019 0.050 0.038 0.041 0.034 0.016 0.010 0.040 0.031 
McNichols 0.032 0.022 0.025 0.020 0.052 0.036 0.044 0.037 0.021 0.013 0.047 0.036 
AC Size 3.175 3.000 3.435 3.000 3.380 3.000 3.250 3.000 3.325 3.000 3.275 3.000 
AC Size Dummy 0.825 1.000 0.758 1.000 0.870 1.000 0.950 1.000 0.950 1.000 0.975 1.000 
AC meetings 3.775 3.000 3.919 4.000 3.700 4.000 3.625 3.000 3.200 3.000 4.100 4.000 
AC meetings Dummy 0.900 1.000 0.968 1.000 0.890 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.900 1.000 0.975 1.000 
AC % Ind 95.208 100.000 94.032 100.000 95.583 100.000 98.333 100.000 96.083 100.000 88.375 100.000 
AC Ind Dummy 0.875 1.000 0.839 1.000 0.870 1.000 0.950 1.000 0.850 1.000 0.700 1.000 
AC % Tenure 9 4.625 0.000 9.343 0.000 5.283 0.000 4.250 0.000 8.625 0.000 12.500 0.000 
AC % Tenure 6 24.208 0.000 22.001 0.000 18.033 0.000 22.167 25.000 27.250 29.167 23.333 25.000 
AC % Fin Exp 87.792 100.000 80.766 100.000 73.717 75.000 77.542 100.000 86.708 100.000 90.875 100.000 
AC Fin Exp Dummy 1.000 1.000 0.984 1.000 0.960 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AC % Acc Exp 42.292 33.333 32.212 33.333 32.350 33.333 44.458 33.333 36.417 33.333 20.500 25.000 
AC % Non Acc Exp 45.500 50.000 48.554 50.000 41.367 50.000 33.083 33.333 50.292 50.000 70.375 66.667 
AC % Gov Exp 38.333 33.333 14.437 0.000 16.667 0.000 31.250 33.333 34.958 33.333 24.583 29.167 
AC Ave Directorships 0.985 0.875 0.543 0.536 0.692 0.667 0.902 0.667 0.697 0.667 0.615 0.667 
AC % Addirs1plus 53.708 50.000 40.580 41.429 44.467 50.000 49.958 45.000 46.375 50.000 48.958 58.333 
AC % Addirs2plus 30.000 33.333 11.736 0.000 17.333 0.000 27.083 25.000 16.542 22.500 10.000 0.000 
AC % Addirs3plus 13.958 0.000 1.452 0.000 6.000 0.000 11.667 0.000 6.750 0.000 2.500 0.000 
AC % Share own 0.100 0.061 0.198 0.021 0.033 0.010 0.025 0.017 0.076 0.023 0.108 0.009 
ACE1 0.625 1.000 0.613 1.000 0.690 1.000 0.900 1.000 0.800 1.000 0.675 1.000 
ACE2 0.550 1.000 0.419 0.000 0.480 0.000 0.750 1.000 0.475 0.000 0.350 0.000 
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Variables
 
Electric and Electronic 
Equipment 
Food and Beverages 
Producers 
General Retailer Household Goods 
Industrial 
Engineering 
Media 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
ACE3 3.600 4.000 3.548 4.000 3.590 4.000 3.900 4.000 3.700 4.000 3.650 4.000 
ACE4 5.225 6.000 5.113 5.000 5.180 5.000 5.725 6.000 5.250 5.000 5.000 5.000 
Board Ind Dummy 0.475 0.000 0.565 1.000 0.550 1.000 0.675 1.000 0.400 0.000 0.450 0.000 
Board Meetings 10.125 10.000 8.935 8.500 8.650 9.000 9.025 8.500 8.000 8.000 7.125 7.000 
Big4 0.925 1.000 0.887 1.000 0.880 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Audit Delay 61.800 63.500 66.952 59.500 63.520 57.000 72.200 69.500 70.625 68.000 56.950 59.000 
Log Delay 1.775 1.803 1.808 1.775 1.788 1.756 1.854 1.842 1.840 1.833 1.741 1.771 
Total Asset (000) 361543 233648 4991376 651050 3737001 705050 2870517 1441485 777781 481115 2754935 2892350 
Log Total Assets 8.415 8.368 9.030 8.813 9.046 8.848 9.225 9.159 8.755 8.682 9.062 9.461 
% Gearing 21.890 21.985 33.685 31.487 23.361 21.168 16.884 17.447 23.321 23.290 32.291 28.443 
ROA 9.771 10.150 10.857 11.630 12.214 10.425 4.570 5.320 14.105 11.665 16.519 6.581 
CFO 12.060 13.031 12.812 12.372 14.797 12.524 7.046 6.232 14.281 13.164 21.982 11.552 
Loss 0.200 0.000 0.113 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.325 0.000 0.075 0.000 0.200 0.000 
% Block own 43.396 47.249 31.576 33.925 38.677 38.825 40.117 42.225 36.968 35.470 45.430 45.230 
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics - Industry wise  
 
 Mining Oil and Gas Producers 
Software and Computer 
Services 
Support Services Travel and Leisure 
 
 
 
Variables 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Francis dac 0.041 0.026 0.048 0.030 0.058 0.051 0.051 0.040 0.064 0.056 
McNichols 0.050 0.041 0.074 0.051 0.062 0.058 0.051 0.044 0.064 0.047 
AC Size 3.465 3.000 3.750 3.000 3.020 3.000 3.460 3.000 3.350 3.000 
AC Size Dummy 0.977 1.000 0.944 1.000 0.824 1.000 0.921 1.000 0.890 1.000 
AC meetings 4.744 4.000 3.583 3.000 4.098 4.000 4.014 4.000 3.970 4.000 
AC meetings Dummy 0.953 1.000 0.833 1.000 0.863 1.000 0.986 1.000 0.930 1.000 
AC % Ind 99.419 100.000 90.972 100.000 91.993 100.000 94.442 100.000 95.700 100.000 
AC Ind Dummy 0.977 1.000 0.861 1.000 0.765 1.000 0.813 1.000 0.860 1.000 
AC % Tenure 9 14.302 0.000 28.981 25.000 8.824 0.000 2.638 0.000 6.867 0.000 
AC % Tenure 6 26.667 20.000 39.630 40.000 20.065 0.000 21.811 25.000 25.500 25.000 
AC % Fin Exp 76.008 75.000 74.907 66.667 73.889 75.000 79.010 75.000 76.583 75.000 
AC Fin Exp Dummy 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.990 1.000 
AC % Acc Exp 31.357 33.333 30.139 33.333 37.712 33.333 41.256 33.333 36.150 33.333 
AC % Non Acc Exp 44.651 40.000 44.769 33.333 36.176 33.333 37.754 33.333 40.433 40.000 
AC % Gov Exp 18.992 0.000 20.278 20.000 28.039 33.333 26.314 25.000 23.200 22.500 
AC Ave Directorships 0.485 0.333 0.507 0.500 0.694 0.667 0.815 0.750 0.742 0.500 
AC % Addirs1plus 35.310 33.333 28.843 29.167 44.706 33.333 51.797 50.000 41.767 33.333 
AC % Addirs2plus 11.822 0.000 14.815 8.333 17.745 20.000 20.567 25.000 21.133 0.000 
AC % Addirs3plus 1.357 0.000 5.417 0.000 6.275 0.000 7.364 0.000 8.950 0.000 
AC % Share own 0.024 0.003 4.254 0.020 0.092 0.034 0.170 0.014 0.068 0.013 
ACE1 0.907 1.000 0.722 1.000 0.549 1.000 0.727 1.000 0.720 1.000 
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 Mining Oil and Gas Producers 
Software and Computer 
Services 
Support Services Travel and Leisure 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
ACE2 0.419 0.000 0.389 0.000 0.353 0.000 0.676 1.000 0.550 1.000 
ACE3 3.907 4.000 3.639 4.000 3.451 4.000 3.719 4.000 3.670 4.000 
ACE4 5.302 5.000 4.889 5.000 5.157 5.000 5.590 6.000 5.370 6.000 
Board Ind Dummy 0.930 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.529 1.000 0.554 1.000 0.530 1.000 
Board Meetings 8.116 8.000 7.333 7.000 10.039 10.000 9.173 9.000 9.510 8.000 
Big4 0.814 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.971 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Audit Delay 67.186 68.000 85.278 83.000 64.843 65.000 62.101 61.000 57.370 57.000 
Log Delay 1.810 1.833 1.923 1.919 1.792 1.813 1.786 1.785 1.752 1.756 
Total Asset (000) 13282140 5926306 3743904 662638 930029 239882 1097945 631300 2932214 2356100 
Log Total Assets 9.674 9.773 9.017 8.821 8.649 8.380 8.844 8.800 9.280 9.372 
% Gearing 21.002 21.280 27.701 26.181 12.207 7.093 30.830 31.731 46.245 45.574 
ROA 19.892 17.434 11.530 6.752 13.901 11.714 12.070 10.071 6.271 5.283 
CFO 16.602 13.577 16.275 13.150 16.438 13.176 13.961 12.140 10.346 9.171 
Loss 0.047 0.000 0.222 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.160 0.000 
% Block own 41.065 44.060 40.835 43.900 40.852 40.710 39.431 38.700 41.565 37.520 
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5.2 Univariate Analysis 
Table 5.4 presents the univariate analysis results from the independent t-test and 
Mann-Whitney tests highlighting the significant differences in the mean and mean 
rank values of various audit committee characteristics for firms that are large in size 
compared to firms that are small in size. As the sample size of the second empirical 
(earnings quality) is considerably smaller than the first empirical (audit quality), the 
univariate analysis is repeated  to examine the significant differences in the mean and 
mean rank values of various audit committee characteristics for firms that are large in 
size compared to their counterparts.  This univariate analysis is conducted by splitting 
the sample into larger and smaller sub-samples using the median value of the firm size 
(total assets). The earnings quality is calculated using McNichols (2002) and Francis et 
al., (2005) models respectively.  
 
The statistics show that there is no significant difference in the earnings quality of 
firms that are larger in size to those that are smaller in size. However, the univariate 
analyses highlight a substantial difference in the mean and mean rank values of audit 
committee variables for both the larger and smaller firms. The analysis suggests that 
on average audit committee size, number of meetings and percentage independence is 
significantly higher in those firms that are larger in size as compared to those that are 
smaller in size. Similarly the mean and mean rank values of companies that have full 
compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) in relation to audit 
committee size, meetings and independence is significantly higher for larger 
companies than those that are small in size. As expected, the proportion of audit 
committee members with over nine year tenure and over six year tenure is 
significantly lower in larger firms compared to smaller firms. The results also show that 
the number of audit committees with at least one financial expert present are 
significantly higher for firms that are larger in size as compared to those that are small 
in size. The mean and mean rank values of the proportion of audit committee 
members with financial expertise is also higher for larger firms however the difference 
is not statistically significant. Upon further examination the study reveals that the firms 
that are larger in size have higher percentage of non-accounting financial experts and 
firms are smaller in size have higher percentage of audit committee members with 
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accounting expertise.   The average additional directorships held by audit committees 
as well as the proportion of audit committee members with at least one, two and 
three additional directorship is higher for companies that are large in size compared to 
those that are small in size however the difference in means and mean ranks is 
statistically not significant. The summary statistics also show that the mean value of 
the audit committee share ownership is significantly lower for larger firms as 
compared smaller firms. 
 
The study also shows that the audit committee effectiveness as defined by the audit 
committee composite variables i.e. compliance with all four aspects of recommended 
best practice for audit committees (ACE1 and ACE3) or when the composite variables 
are extended to include both the presence of an accounting qualified expert and the 
absence of members with excess of nine years’ tenure (ACE2 and ACE4), the 
proportion of audit committees in compliance is significantly higher for larger firms as 
compared to smaller firms. The above findings highlight that larger companies are 
associated with higher standard of audit committee composition.  
 
For board of director variables, the average number of boards comprised of 
independent non-executive directors is significantly higher for larger firms as 
compared to smaller firms. Of the other determinants, the mean and mean rank values 
of audits undertaken by one of the big 4 auditing firms is significantly higher for firms 
that are large in size as compared to those that are small however the mean and mean 
rank values for the audit delay is significantly lower in larger firms compared to the 
smaller firms. The mean and mean rank values of average gearing level are significantly 
higher for larger firms however average return on assets, cash flow from operations 
and equity owned by the block holders is significantly low for companies that are 
larger in size as compared to small size firms. 
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Table 5.4: Univariate Analysis 
 
Variables Mean T Value (Sig) Mean Rank 
Z Value 
(Sig) 
 
Large firms Small firms 
 
Large firms Small firms 
 
McNichols 0.049 0.049 -0.107 345.10 341.89 -.212 
Francis 0.045 0.045 0.035 346.45 339.54 .457 
AC Size 3.630 3.101 8.447*** 399.42 292.42 7.747*** 
AC Size Dummy 0.962 0.823 6.065*** 383.76 308.13 5.984*** 
AC Meetings 4.234 3.574 7.151*** 399.51 292.33 7.399*** 
AC Meetings 
Dummy 
0.977 0.890 4.653*** 361.01 330.94 4.585*** 
AC % Ind 97.497 91.923 5.655*** 372.38 319.54 5.553*** 
AC Ind Dummy 0.922 0.771 5.622*** 372.04 319.89 5.501*** 
AC % Tenure 9 5.783 10.053 -3.233*** 331.38 360.66 -2.718*** 
AC % Tenure 6 21.201 25.763 -2.261** 333.98 358.06 -1.680* 
AC % Fin Exp  79.479 78.174 0.730 349.59 342.40 .501 
AC Fin Exp Dummy 1.000 0.983 2.471** 349.00 342.99 2.462** 
AC % Acc Exp 33.767 37.686 -2.376** 326.78 365.28 -2.596*** 
AC % Non Acc Exp 45.713 40.488 2.700*** 366.18 325.76 2.706*** 
AC % Gov Exp 23.230 25.053 -0.957 337.05 354.98 -1.234 
ACE1 0.867 0.559 9.496*** 399.07 292.78 8.936*** 
ACE2 0.624 0.412 5.717*** 382.69 309.21 5.590*** 
ACE3 3.861 3.467 9.646*** 400.86 290.98 9.167*** 
ACE4 5.549 5.055 7.719*** 392.99 298.88 6.818*** 
AC Ave 
Directorships 
0.749 0.677 1.641 355.56 336.41 1.270 
AC % Addirs1plus 46.702 43.411 1.476 354.02 337.96 1.070 
AC % Addirs2plus 19.802 17.024 1.588 350.84 341.15 .691 
AC % Addirs3plus 7.077 6.169 0.807 350.61 341.38 .884 
AC % Share own 0.028 0.601 -2.633*** 244.34 447.96 -13.407*** 
Board Ind Dummy 0.662 0.452 5.668*** 382.17 309.73 5.544*** 
Board Meetings 8.884 8.890 -0.023 342.09 349.92 -.520 
big4 0.983 0.919 3.915*** 357.01 334.96 3.875*** 
Log Delay 1.778 1.815 -4.578*** 309.38 382.73 -4.831*** 
% Gearing 34.145 22.663 8.172*** 408.77 283.04 8.278*** 
ROA 8.513 14.585 -6.011*** 290.40 401.77 -7.333*** 
CFO 11.606 16.193 -5.595*** 301.63 390.50 -5.851*** 
Loss 0.092 0.070 1.103 349.95 342.03 1.103 
% Block own 35.653 43.717 -5.988*** 300.84 391.29 -5.955*** 
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5.3 Correlation Matrix 
Table 5.5 contains correlations between the two dependent variables as well as 
between the explanatory variables. Columns one of table 5.5 shows that audit 
committees having three or more meetings and variables representing audit 
committee effectiveness (ACE1 and ACE3) are significantly negatively correlated with 
the McNichols measure of earnings management.  Column two of the table 10 shows 
that audit committees having three or more meetings and the dummy for audit 
committee independence and the audit committee effectiveness variables (ACE1 and 
ACE3) are significantly negatively correlated with the Francis measure of earnings 
management. Audit committee average directorships and the proportion of audit 
committee members with at least one additional directorship are significantly 
positively correlated with the Francis measure of earnings management. As is often 
the case in empirical studies of this kind, firm size variable i.e. the log of total assets 
significantly correlated with the presence of a big 4 auditor, gearing, ROA, CFO and 
quite a number of the audit committee variables. Of course, since this study has more 
than one measure of each of the audit committee characteristics therefore the 
correlation matrix show significant correlations between these linked variables. Also, 
the four audit committee effectiveness variables are highly correlated with the various 
audit committee variables as the measures of effectiveness incorporate various 
dummy variables I use in relation to audit committee characteristics.  There are 
variables in the correlation matrix that have high correlations between each other 
however all of these highly correlated variables have been included separately in each 
of the regression models and none of the variables in each of the models have a 
correlation value of above 0.70. 
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Table 5.5: Earnings management correlation matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1McNichols 1                
2Francis .831** 1               
3AC Size .038 .007 1              
4AC Size Dummy .035 .012 .548** 1             
5AC Meetings -.026 -.038 .194** .149** 1            
6AC Meetings Dum -.133** -.091* .093* .114** .419** 1           
7AC % Ind -.061 -.071 -.026 -.068 .097* .121** 1          
8AC Ind Dummy -.068 -.099** -.061 -.095* .067 .112** .938** 1         
9AC % Tenure 9 .054 .011 .018 .023 -.060 -.160** -.287** -.219** 1        
10AC % Tenure 6  .017 .002 .050 -.020 -.043 -.117** -.156** -.127** .563** 1       
11AC % Fin Exp -.039 -.027 -.061 .007 .088* .038 .013 .037 -.055 -.020 1      
12 AC Fin Exp Dum .028 .047 .148** .270** .080* .038 -.037 -.040 -.002 -.093* .314** 1     
13AC % Acc Exp -.014 .023 -.246** -.206** -.010 .000 .029 .018 -.070 -.041 .365** .154** 1    
14AC % Non Acc Exp -.023 -.044 .154** .181** .089* .036 -.013 .019 .009 .017 .609** .158** -.516** 1   
15AC % Gov Exp -.002 -.018 -.104** -.049 .001 .054 .076* .054 -.233** -.122** .243** .090* .264** -.001 1  
16ACE1 -.076* -.104** .306** .546** .250** .421** .630** .672** -.174** -.129** .053 .148** -.101** .134** .018 1 
17ACE2 -.045 -.059 .168** .359** .109** .277** .414** .441** -.470** -.285** .085* .097* .157** -.055 .159** .657** 
18ACE3 -.077* -.088* .322** .574** .318** .574** .601** .621** -.195** -.157** .095* .300** -.075* .151** .045 .926** 
19ACE4 -.066 -.041 .177** .349** .218** .490** .502** .496** -.604** -.395** .160** .282** .242** -.059 .228** .698** 
20AC Ave Dirs .065 .093* -.007 -.010 .065 .110** .084* .043 -.274** -.138** .273** .103** .255** .034 .641** .043 
21AC % Addirs1plus .032 .078* .028 .021 .042 .078* .144** .106** -.267** -.149** .315** .117** .197** .123** .537** .091* 
22AC % Addirs2plus .063 .070 -.024 -.028 .088* .109** .028 -.008 -.230** -.112** .202** .075* .271** -.045 .620** .004 
23AC % Addirs3plus .056 .055 -.023 -.019 .022 .084* .008 -.018 -.140** -.059 .111** .042 .165** -.038 .385** -.002 
24AC % Share own .025 -.033 .035 .028 -.087* -.137** -.419** -.218** .340** .204** .049 .008 -.093* .125** -.085* -.150** 
25Board Ind Dum .035 -.007 .243** .238** .139** .054 .352** .348** -.067 -.072 .061 .074 -.040 .090* -.049 .389** 
26Board Meetings .040 .025 -.019 .027 .176** .021 .030 .011 -.166** -.148** .040 .032 .049 -.005 .123** .032 
27Big4 .010 -.012 .159** .181** .025 .073 .073 .070 -.108** .002 .118** -.021 .102** .022 .115** .167** 
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28 Log Delay -.009 -.053 -.107** -.187** -.073 -.131** -.074 -.053 .105** .019 .002 -.092* .019 -.015 .014 -.194** 
29 Log Total Asset -.032 -.049 .385** .232** .318** .201** .261** .258** -.096* -.066 .062 .102** -.090* .134** -.048 .380** 
30 % Gearing -.003 .045 .128** .055 -.006 .106** .097* .107** -.063 -.051 .042 .050 -.037 .070 .048 .131** 
31 ROA .051 .046 -.050 -.020 -.025 -.067 .023 .015 .085* .061 -.031 -.060 -.043 .008 -.110** -.026 
32 CFO .052 .019 -.077* -.023 -.023 -.056 -.041 -.033 .068 .054 -.009 -.112** -.037 .024 -.106** -.045 
33Loss  -.070 -.078* -.009 .029 .064 -.007 -.063 -.038 -.038 -.071 .023 .035 .096* -.061 .091* .001 
34 % Block own .045 .057 -.179** -.089* -.023 .018 -.011 -.006 -.003 -.008 .029 -.152** .059 -.024 .066 -.063 
 
Variables 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
17ACE2 1                  
18ACE3 .609** 1                 
19ACE4 .826** .760** 1                
20AC Ave Dirs .225** .086* .284** 1               
21AC % Addirs1plus .228** .131** .286** .821** 1              
22AC % Addirs2plus .200** .039 .240** .864** .528** 1             
23AC % Addirs3plus .112** .022 .139** .734** .343** .628** 1            
24AC % Share own -.101** -.181** -.253** -.109** -.137** -.065 -.041 1           
25Board Ind Dum .236** .383** .278** .001 .061 -.053 -.014 -.105** 1          
26Board Meetings .124** .035 .125** .112** .086* .083* .122** -.042 .030 1         
27Big4 .182** .171** .193** .175** .188** .148** .079* .014 .040 .057 1        
28 Log Delay -.120** -.206** -.151** -.045 -.031 -.031 -.031 .204** -.086* -.062 -.171** 1       
29 Log Total Asset .197** .392** .283** .073 .099** .051 .009 -.106** .304** -.041 .165** -.161** 1      
30 % Gearing .156** .152** .151** .032 -.009 .072 .030 -.041 .054 .022 .193** -.197** .304** 1     
31 ROA -.122** -.040 -.101** -.066 -.012 -.094* -.079* -.022 -.075* -.095* -.042 .050 -.262** -.286** 1    
32 CFO -.112** -.076* -.113** -.062 -.042 -.064 -.047 .000 -.114** -.079* .012 -.008 -.263** -.210** .782** 1   
33 Loss  .057 -.006 .043 .031 -.009 .062 .046 -.029 .020 .098* .085* .012 .068 .134** -.335** -.214** 1  
34 % Block own -.038 -.068 -.051 -.037 -.051 -.023 -.001 -.100** -.020 -.032 .077* .028 -.268** .036 -.005 .031 .140** 1 
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5.4 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
The results of the multivariate analysis are presented in tables 5.6 to 5.13. In tables 5.6 
to 5.9 this study uses the McNichols (2002) model of earnings quality as the dependent 
variable while in tables 5.10 to 5.13 this study utilises the Francis et al., (2005) model 
of earnings quality30. The study then runs identical multivariate regressions in each 
table for both models. For each regression this study utilises panel data analysis using 
dummies for each of the four year. In all regressions industry dummies are included to 
control for sector level variations. In all regressions the control variables are used to 
represent company size, performance, gearing, the presence of a big 4 audit firm and 
audit delay. Each regression model also includes the share ownership of audit 
committee members and a measure of audit committee busyness. 
 
5.4.1 Earnings Quality – McNichols Model (2002) 
This model is based on the assumption that earnings quality can deteriorate by both 
the intentional and unintentional errors of management in the accruals estimation. It 
is argued that the presence of an effective monitoring body (i.e. audit committee) will 
not only prevent management from making intentional errors but also motivate them 
to exercise greater care in reducing unintentional errors, hence resulting in improved 
earnings quality (Dhaliwal et al., 2010). This study utilises four main regression models 
and various tests of robustness to investigate whether audit committee characteristics 
have any influence on a firm’s earnings quality.  
 
In regression model 1 of tables 5.6 this study uses the dummy variables for each of the 
four audit committee characteristics currently recommended as best practice for UK 
listed companies (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010) while in model 2 these 
dummy variables are substituted with corresponding absolute variables. In model 3 a 
dummy variable representing those firms whose audit committees satisfy all four of 
the recommended characteristics (ACE1) and in model 4 dummy variable is extended 
to include both the presence of an accounting expert and the absence of members 
with excess of nine years’ tenure (ACE2).   
 
                                                          
30
 Earnings quality is an inverse measure of earnings management. 
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Table 5.6 (McNichols Model): OLS regressions explaining the determinants of earnings 
quality for FTSE 350 companies between 2007 and 2010 (***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
(Constant) .133 2.447** .156 3.052*** .139 2.783*** .144 2.867*** 
Electric & electronic equip -.039 -4.304*** -.040 -4.434*** -.039 -4.390*** -.040 -4.476*** 
Food & beverage producers -.038 -5.124*** -.041 -5.567*** -.041 -5.499*** -.041 -5.493*** 
General retailer -.014 -2.098** -.016 -2.317** -.014 -2.093** -.014 -2.148** 
Household goods -.018 -1.996** -.021 -2.273** -.019 -2.027** -.020 -2.171** 
Industrial engineering -.046 -5.078*** -.046 -5.154*** -.044 -4.859*** -.046 -5.147*** 
Media -.017 -1.986** -.018 -1.988** -.017 -1.942* -.017 -2.008** 
Mining -.014 -1.495 -.012 -1.331 -.013 -1.447 -.014 -1.533 
Oil and gas producer .013 1.377 .012 1.246 .015 1.584 .013 1.354 
Software & comp services -.009 -1.057 -.008 -.963 -.009 -1.061 -.009 -1.091 
Support services -.017 -2.678*** -.019 -3.027*** -.017 -2.779*** -.017 -2.773*** 
2008 -.002 -.403 -.002 -.378 -.002 -.505 -.003 -.533 
2009 -.009 -1.833* -.009 -1.814* -.009 -1.872* -.009 -1.931* 
2010 -.012 -2.424** -.012 -2.388** -.012 -2.375** -.012 -2.411** 
big4 -.002 -.210 -.003 -.326 -.001 -.065 -.001 -.089 
Log delay -.009 -.507 -.005 -.300 -.014 -.802 -.010 -.558 
Log total asset -.005 -1.300 -.007 -1.749* -.005 -1.413 -.007 -1.881* 
% gearing .000 -.173 .000 -.336 .000 -.266 .000 -.263 
ROA .000 .134 .000 .143 .000 .245 .000 .090 
CFO .000 .141 .000 .048 .000 .072 .000 .071 
Loss  -.011 -1.962* -.010 -1.724* -.010 -1.750* -.009 -1.665* 
% Block own .000 .524 .000 .331 .000 .114 .000 .059 
Board Ind Dummy .007 1.793* .007 1.768* .008 2.216** .007 1.875* 
Board Meetings .001 1.039 .001 1.289 .001 1.117 .001 1.115 
AC % Share own -.001 -.938 -.001 -1.117 .000 -.546 .000 -.403 
AC Ave Directorships .008 2.099** .009 2.249** .007 1.817* .007 2.049** 
AC Size Dummy .004 .643       
AC Meet Dummy -.021 -3.025***       
AC Ind Dummy -.009 -1.702*       
Fin Exp Dummy .010 .527       
AC Size   .003 1.445     
AC Meetings   -.002 -1.117     
AC % Ind   .000 -1.625*     
AC % Fin Exp   .000 .019     
ACE1     -.010 -2.186**   
ACE2       -.005 -1.423 
         
F Test 3.741*** 3.496*** 3.770*** 3.653*** 
Adjusted R
2
 .107 .105 .098 .095 
N 691 691 691 691 
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Definitions of variables 
Dependent variable:  earnings quality measured using McNichols (2002) model
31
 
Independent variables: Big4 = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit was carried out by a 
Big4 audit firm; Log Delay = the natural logarithm of audit delay; Log Total Assets = the natural 
logarithm of total assets; % Gearing = percentage of total long-term finance represented by long term 
debt; ROA = return on assets; CFO = cash flow from operations; Loss = dummy variable representing the 
firm incurring loss in last two years; % Block Own = percentage of equity owned by the block holders; 
Board Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where boards comprised of majority 
independent directors; Board meetings = the number of meetings held by the board during the year; AC % 
Share own = percentage of equity held by audit committee members; AC Ave Directorships = average 
directorships held by the audit committee members; AC Size dummy = dummy variable indicating 
instances where the audit committee contains three or more members; AC Meetings dummy = dummy 
variable indicating instances where the audit committee held at least three meetings; AC Ind dummy = 
dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committee had solely independent non-executive 
directors; AC Fin Exp dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committees had 
financial expertise; AC Size = number of audit committee members; AC Meetings = Number of audit 
committee meetings held during the year; AC % Ind = Percentage of audit committee members who are 
independent non-executive directors; AC % Fin Exp = Percentage of audit committee members who are 
financial experts; ACE1 = dummy variable representing instances where audit committees comprise at 
least three members, contained at least one financial expert, all members being independent and met at 
least three times during the financial year; ACE2 = dummy variable representing instances where audit 
committees comprise at least three members, contained at least one financial expert, all members being 
independent and met at least three times during the financial year, contains one accounting expert and 
has no member with more than 9 years tenure. 
                                                          
31
 The proxy for accruals quality is measured by estimating the following regression by industry and year;  
ΔWCt = b0 + b1CFOt-1 + b2CFOt + b3CFOt+1 + b4ΔRevt + b5PPEt + εt (1) 
Where Δ in working capital in year t (ΔWCt) = (ΔCurrent Assets – ΔCurrent Liabilities) – ΔCash; CFOt-1 represents 
‘Cash flows from operations in year t – 1’; CFOt represents ‘Cash flows from operations in year t’ and CFOt+1 
represents ‘Cash flows from operations year in year t + 1’; ΔRevt represents ‘Sales in year t – Sales in year t – 1’ and 
PPEt represents ‘Gross property, plant and equipment in year t’. All variables shown above are scaled by average 
assets.   Operationally, this model measures accrual quality for each firm by using the absolute value of the residual 
as the measure of accrual quality (Srindhi and Gul, 2007; Baxter and Cotter, 2009). The high value of absolute 
residual for each sample company signifies the low quality of earnings. 
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The regression results in column 1 show that the firms experiencing losses appear to 
have a negative and significant association with earnings management. This finding is 
consistent with the prior work in this area (Davidson et al., 2005). Unexpectedly, board 
independence has shown a significant positive association with earnings management.   
 
Model 1 highlights three audit committee variables having a statistically significant 
impact on the McNichols measure of earnings quality. First, the dummy variable 
representing audit committee independence has a negative impact on earnings 
management. This suggests that fully independent audit committees are better able to 
constrain earnings management practices. The finding is consistent with the prior 
research (Vafeas, 2005; Yang and Krishnan, 2005) and suggests that independent 
directors are more concerned about their reputation in the market and hence more 
objective in their monitoring role (Fama and Jenson, 1983).  Second, the dummy 
variable representing the holding of a minimum of three meetings per year has a 
negative and significant impact on earnings management. This is consistent with 
expectations since audit committees meeting more frequently are expected to be 
more effective and diligent monitors of the financial reporting process. Third, the 
average number of additional directorships held by audit committee members has a 
positive impact on earnings management. This finding is consistent with the busyness 
hypothesis whereby audit committee members holding other directorships may be 
over committed with other directorships to adequately monitor the financial reporting 
process.  In model 2 when the dummy variables are substituted with the absolute 
measures of the recommended key audit committee characteristics, the proportion of 
audit committee members that are independent has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on earnings management. This finding further strengthens the 
argument that independent members are more objective in their monitoring of the 
financial reporting process (Fama and Jenson, 1983). In line with the busyness 
hypothesis, the impact of the busyness of audit committee members on earnings 
quality remains negative and significant. These variables are significant at the ten and 
five per cent level of significance respectively and these findings are consistent with 
expectations.  
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In models 3 and 4 of table 5.6 the researcher brings in the composite dummies 
representing those firms adhering to all four recommendations of best practice (ACE1) 
and those that comply with best practice as in ACE1 but, in addition, have no member 
with longer than nine years’ tenure and also has at least one accounting expert (ACE2). 
In model 3 ACE1 has a negative impact at five per cent level of significance. This finding 
is consistent with expectations in that it suggests when companies satisfy all four of 
the current recommendations of best practice the extent of earnings management is 
reduced hence the quality of financial statements is better. ACE2 has no statistically 
significant impact on earnings management32. These findings are interesting in that 
they identify a consistent impact of good governance practice on earnings quality and 
should serve as reassuring to regulators who may interpret this finding as supportive 
of their recommendations.  
 
In summary therefore, the empirical findings reported in table 5.6 find that the key 
ingredients of what regulators perceive as more effective audit committees are 
associated with higher earnings quality.  The findings in relation to audit committee 
independence and activity are largely consistent with prior research as Lo et al., (2010); 
Vafeas (2005); Xie et al., (2003); Yang and Krishnan (2005) found a positive association 
between audit committee independence and earnings quality. Similarly Vafeas (2005), 
Koh et al. (2007) and Kent et al. (2010) reported a positive impact of audit committee 
meetings on earnings quality. This study however failed to find any significant 
association between financial expertise and earnings quality as it was documented in 
the prior literature (Lo et al. 2010; Sun et al. 2012). Ghosh et al., (2010) argues that 
members with financial expertise have a thorough knowledge of technical and 
accounting standards and therefore are better able to constrain earnings management.  
However this study has failed to find any significant impact of financial expertise on 
the quality of earnings. The negative impact of holding external directorships on 
earnings quality confirms the busyness hypothesis, as these additional directorships 
                                                          
32
 Two alternative effectiveness variables (ACE3 and ACE4) representing the aggregate count of each of these 
elements of compliance from ACE1 and ACE2 have a significant negative impact on earnings management 
suggesting that audit committees that comply with the recommended best practice are far more effective in 
enhancing earnings quality as compared to their counterparts. 
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could result in a conflict of interest if directors accept too many directorships and 
focus more on their own interest than on shareholder interests. 
The F-statistics of each model in table 5.6 are significant at one per cent level, 
suggesting that the models are statistically valid. The adjusted R2 for all models in table 
5.7 ranges between 9.5 per cent and 10.7 per cent. These values although low are 
consistent with the prior research conducted in this area.  Ghosh et al. 2010), Baxter 
and Cotter (2009) and Kent et al., (2010) reported the R2 value as 8.28 per cent, 9.8 per 
cent and 2.8 per cent respectively. The total number of observations in each model 
equals 691. 
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5.4.2 Tests of Robustness 
Firstly as a robustness measure, this study re-runs the main regression models 
reported in Table 5.6 and examines whether the clustering within firms may have 
biased the estimated standard errors which may have affected the significant levels 
found for the estimated coefficients.  These tests show that the findings reported in 
the main regression analysis hold strong and are not sensitive to this approach.   
Additionally a number of other robustness tests have been used to check the strength 
of the main findings and these are as follows. 
 
Table 5.7 provides a thorough analysis of audit committee expertise, audit committee 
busyness and audit committee tenure variables and extends our understanding of the 
impact of these variables on earnings management. In model 1, the proportion of 
audit committee members with accounting expertise have been included instead of 
broadly defined financial expertise and model 2 includes the proportion of members 
with non-accounting expertise. This study also utilises a continuous variable 
representing the proportion of audit committee members with experience of serving 
on other audit committees. In models 3 and 4 this study utilises variables representing 
the extent of holding other directorships by audit committee members: the proportion 
holding one or more additional directorships in model 3 and two or more additional 
directorships in model 4. In regressions model 5 and 6 this study investigates the 
importance of tenure of audit committee members on earnings management by 
including variables representing the proportion of members with excess of nine years’ 
tenure and the proportion of members with over six years’ tenure.   
 
In models 1 and 2, the proportion of accounting financial experts33 on the audit 
committee and the proportion of non-accounting experts has no significant impact on 
earnings management. The percentage of audit committee members with governance 
expertise also has no significant impact on earnings management (un-tabulated).  In 
models 3 and 4, this study substitutes the average number of additional directorships 
held by audit committee members by variables representing the proportion of audit 
                                                          
33
 The dummy variable representing audit committees with at least one accounting expert also has no impact on 
earnings quality and the proportion of audit committee members with accounting qualification also has no impact 
on earnings quality. 
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committee members holding one or more other board seats and two or more other 
board seats respectively. In table 5.7, where this study uses the McNichols model of 
earnings management, holding one or more outside board seats and holding at least 
two or more seats has a positive impact on earnings management at 10 per cent level 
of significance.  These results suggest that busy audit committee members are less 
effective in constraining earnings management practices. Although a positive 
correlation exists among greater tenure and earnings management the results show 
that none of these variables have any significant impact on earnings management. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that it is the level of audit committee 
independence that really influences the quality of financial statements rather than 
other proxies for independence. 
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Table 5.7 (McNichols Model): OLS regressions explaining the determinants of earnings quality for FTSE 350 companies between 2007 and 
2010 (***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
 AC Expertise Variations AC Busyness Variations AC Tenure Variations 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
(Constant) .147 2.912*** .145 2.883*** .134 2.457** .129 2.374** .130 2.364** .134 2.428** 
Big4 -.002 -.222 -.002 -.265 -.001 -.150 -.001 -.123 -.002 -.239 -.003 -.299 
Log Delay -.010 -.558 -.010 -.552 -.010 -.575 -.009 -.481 -.008 -.423 -.008 -.442 
Log Total Assets -.005 -1.315 -.005 -1.304 -.005 -1.279 -.005 -1.214 -.006 -1.545 -.006 -1.606 
% Gearing .000 -.169 .000 -.155 .000 -.133 .000 -.321 .000 -.328 .000 -.318 
ROA .000 .167 .000 .166 .000 .106 .000 .204 .000 -.062 .000 -.038 
CFO .000 .096 .000 .088 .000 .220 .000 .093 .000 .210 .000 .181 
Loss Dummy -.011 -1.888* -.011 -1.921* -.011 -1.933* -.011 -1.990** -.011 -1.852* -.011 -1.855* 
% Block own .000 .465 .000 .457 .000 .452 .000 .512 .000 .491 .000 .493 
Board Ind Dummy .007 1.806* .007 1.789* .007 1.760* .007 1.881* .005 1.332 .005 1.309 
Board Meetings .001 1.025 .001 1.029 .001 1.080 .001 1.116 .001 1.095 .001 1.026 
AC % Share own -.001 -.961 -.001 -.946 -.001 -.938 -.001 -.976 -.001 -.833 .000 -.669 
AC Ave Directorships .008 2.188** .008 2.138**     .008 2.214** .008 2.140** 
AC size Dummy .004 .672 .005 .755 .003 .496 .004 .618 .006 1.032 .007 1.087 
AC Meetings Dummy -.021 -3.037*** -.021 -3.031*** -.020 -2.897*** -.022 -3.044*** -.022 -3.073*** -.022 -3.122*** 
AC Ind Dummy -.009 -1.728* -.009 -1.717* -.010 -1.820* -.009 -1.622*     
AC Fin Exp Dummy     .011 .560 .012 .599 .011 .560 .011 .572 
AC % Acc Exp .000 -.443           
AC % Non Acc Exp   .000 .144         
AC % Adddirs1plus     .000 1.373*       
AC % Adddirs2plus       .000 1.854*     
AC % Tenure 9         .000 .812   
AC % Tenure 6           .000 .154 
             
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
F Test 3.738*** 3.731*** 3.644*** 3.704*** 3.654*** 3.630*** 
Adjusted R
2
 .107 .107 .104 .106 .104 .103 
N 691 691 691 691 691 691 
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Definitions of variables 
Dependent variable:  earnings quality measured using McNichols (2002) model
34
 
Independent variables: Big4 = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit was carried out by a Big4 audit firm; Log Delay = the natural logarithm of audit delay; 
Log Total Assets = the natural logarithm of total assets; % Gearing = percentage of total long-term finance represented by long term debt; ROA = return on assets; CFO = 
cash flow from operations; Loss = dummy variable representing the firm incurring loss in last two years; % Block Own = percentage of equity owned by the block holders; 
Board Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where boards comprised of majority independent directors; Board meetings = the number of meetings held by the 
board during the year; AC % Share own = percentage of equity held by audit committee members; AC Ave Directorships = average directorships held by the audit committee 
members; AC Size dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committee contains three or more members; AC Meetings dummy = dummy variable 
indicating instances where the audit committee held at least three meetings; AC Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committee had solely 
independent non-executive directors; AC Fin Exp dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committees had financial expertise; AC % Acc Exp =  
Percentage of audit committee members who are accounting experts; AC % Non Acc Exp =  percentage of audit committee members who are non-accounting experts; AC % 
Addir1plus =  percentage of audit committee members with at least one additional directorship; AC % Addir2plus =  percentage of audit committee members with at least 
two additional directorships;  AC % Tenure 9 = percentage of audit committee members who have served on company board for more than 9 years; AC % Tenure 6 =  
percentage of audit committee members who have served on company board for more than 6 years. 
                                                          
34
 The proxy for accruals quality is measured by estimating the following regression by industry and year;  
ΔWCt = b0 + b1CFOt-1 + b2CFOt + b3CFOt+1 + b4ΔRevt + b5PPEt + εt (1) 
[Where Δ in working capital in year t (ΔWCt) = (ΔCurrent Assets – ΔCurrent Liabilities) – ΔCash; CFOt-1 represents ‘Cash flows from operations in year t – 1’; CFOt represents ‘Cash flows from 
operations in year t’ and CFOt+1 represents ‘Cash flows from operations year in year t + 1’; ΔRevt represents ‘Sales in year t – Sales in year t – 1’ and PPEt represents ‘Gross property, plant and 
equipment in year t’. All variables shown above are scaled by average assets.] 
Operationally, this model measures accrual quality for each firm by using the absolute value of the residual as the measure of accrual quality (Srindhi and Gul, 2007; Baxter and Cotter, 2009). 
The high value of absolute residual for each sample company signifies the low quality of earnings. 
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It should also be noted that in regression models 1 to 6, the dummy variable 
representing audit committees holding at least three meetings per year has a negative 
and statistically significant impact on earnings management. This finding is consistent 
with the argument that more active audit committees monitor the quality of a 
company’s financial statements more diligently. It is also worth noting that the dummy 
variable representing those audit committees that are comprised only of independent 
non-executives also has a continuous significant negative impact on earnings 
management, suggesting that completely independent audit committees are more 
effective in restraining earnings management and hence improving earnings quality. 
These findings are largely consistent with prior research as Lo et al., (2010); Vafeas 
(2005) and Yang and Krishnan (2005) found a positive association between audit 
committee independence and earnings quality. Similarly Vafeas (2005), Koh et al. 
(2007) and Kent et al. (2010) reported a positive impact of audit committee meetings 
on earnings quality. The regression results presented here also provide some 
interesting additions to our understanding of the impact of a variety of audit 
committee financial expertise and holding of multiple directorships on earnings quality 
in a contemporary setting.  First, these findings highlight the apparent absence of a link 
between accounting experts and earnings management. This result does not support 
the prior evidence of the positive impact of accounting financial expertise on earnings 
quality (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008). Second, findings in relation to holding of 
additional directorships by the audit committee members show that these members 
are unable to pay adequate attention to the quality of financial statements and hence 
result in a high earnings management and low earnings quality. This finding shows that 
these additional directorships could result in a conflict of interest if directors accept 
too many directorships and focus more on their own interest than on shareholder 
interests (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). 
 
The rest of the regression results for each model in table 5.7 are mainly consistent. 
Consistent with prior research (Davidson et al., 2005), firms experiencing losses are 
significantly negatively associated with earnings management. Unexpectedly board 
independence has shown a positive association with earnings management, however 
the strength of the association is quite weak. The F-statistics of each model are 
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significant at one per cent level, suggesting that the models are statistically valid. The 
adjusted R2 for all models in table 5.7 ranges between 10.4 per cent and 10.8 per cent. 
These values although low are consistent with the prior research conducted in this 
area.  Ghosh et al. 2010), Baxter and Cotter (2009) and Kent et al., (2010) reported the 
R2 value as 8.28 per cent, 9.8 per cent and 2.8 per cent respectively. The number of 
observation in each model equals 691. 
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The study also splits the sample into two parts based on the median of total assets as 
proxy of size and runs separate regressions for larger and smaller firms. Appendix C 
represents larger and smaller firms respectively. It is argued previously that larger 
firms behave differently in term of their demand for financial reporting quality to 
smaller firms.  
 
While analysing large firms, firm size in terms of total assets is negative and 
significantly associated with earnings management. The result shows that bigger firms 
can afford to have better internal control mechanisms and hence an improved quality 
of earnings. Percentage gearing is negatively associated with earnings management 
suggesting that higher leverage results in greater external monitoring and therefore 
have a positive impact on earnings quality. Audit committee meetings have a negative 
and significant impact on earnings management showing that more active and diligent 
audit committees are better able to constrain earnings management practices. 
Previous research has also shown that higher frequency of meetings results in lower 
earnings management (Koh et al., 2007; Kent et al., 2010).  While analysing small firms, 
firms experiencing loss are negatively associated with earnings management.  From 
the audit committee variables, audit committee meetings have a negative and 
significant impact on earnings management signifying the level of diligence and 
scrutiny exercised by the audit committee members and hence resulting in an 
improved earnings quality. The F-statistics for each model suggest that the models are 
statistically valid. The adjusted R2 for all models ranges between 5.7 per cent and 36.3 
per cent. The total numbers of observations in each model are 346 and 345 
respectively. 
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5.4.3 Earnings Quality – Francis et al., (2005) Model 
Francis et al., (2005) separates McNichols (2002) measure of earnings management 
into its discretionary and non-discretionary elements. As the overseer of the financial 
reporting process and having fundamental responsibility in monitoring the integrity of 
the financial statements of the company, an effective audit committee should prevent 
management from making intentional errors. To capture the impact of the audit 
committee characteristics in constraining earnings management35 this study repeats 
the four main regression models and robustness tests used above for the McNichols 
model of earnings quality.  
 
In model 1 of table 5.8 this study uses the dummy variables for each of the four audit 
committee characteristics currently recommended as best practice for UK listed 
companies (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010) while in model 2 these dummy 
variables are substituted with corresponding actual variables. In model 3 a dummy 
variable representing those firms whose audit committees satisfy all four of the 
recommended characteristics (ACE1) and in model 4 dummy variable is extended to 
include both the presence of an accounting expert and the absence of members with 
excess of nine years’ tenure (ACE2).  The regression results in column 1 show the log of 
total assets has a significant and negative impact on earnings management. Prior 
research suggests that bigger firms can afford to have better internal control 
mechanisms and hence an improved quality of earnings. The firms experiencing loss 
also have a negative and significant association with earnings management. This 
finding is in line with the prior research conducted in this area (Davidson et al., 2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35
 Earnings quality is an inverse measure of earnings management. 
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Table 5.8 (Francis et al., 2005): OLS regressions explaining the determinants of earnings 
quality for FTSE 350 companies between 2007 and 2010 (***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
(Constant) .161 3.202*** .202 4.310*** .182 3.948*** .186 4.028*** 
Electric & Electronic Equip -.050 -5.998*** -.051 -6.131*** -.050 -6.077*** -.051 -6.156*** 
Food & Bev Producers -.042 -6.145*** -.045 -6.600*** -.044 -6.452*** -.044 -6.447*** 
General Retailer -.015 -2.480** -.017 -2.793*** -.016 -2.548** -.016 -2.597** 
Household Goods -.020 -2.356** -.021 -2.528** -.020 -2.324** -.021 -2.448** 
Industrial Engineering -.049 -5.975*** -.051 -6.124*** -.048 -5.717*** -.050 -6.032*** 
Media -.024 -3.060*** -.025 -3.050*** -.023 -2.907*** -.024 -2.995*** 
Mining -.019 -2.262** -.017 -2.025** -.019 -2.189** -.020 -2.295** 
Oil and Gas Producer -.008 -.909 -.009 -1.033 -.007 -.719 -.009 -1.003 
Software & Comp Services -.011 -1.381 -.009 -1.195 -.010 -1.340 -.011 -1.382 
Support Services -.018 -3.101*** -.019 -3.322*** -.017 -3.065*** -.017 -3.014*** 
2008 -.007 -1.499 -.007 -1.496 -.007 -1.626 -.007 -1.658* 
2009 -.014 -3.068*** -.014 -3.043*** -.014 -3.109*** -.014 -3.170*** 
2010 -.014 -3.100*** -.014 -3.055*** -.014 -3.075*** -.014 -3.103*** 
Big4 -.006 -.804 -.009 -1.068 -.006 -.755 -.006 -.750 
Log Delay -.014 -.833 -.013 -.781 -.021 -1.275 -.017 -1.030 
Log Total Assets -.008 -2.115** -.010 -2.514** -.008 -2.123** -.009 -2.619*** 
% Gearing .000 .929 .000 .806 .000 .830 .000 .852 
ROA .000 .786 .000 .831 .000 .890 .000 .718 
CFO .000 -.851 .000 -1.031 .000 -.964 .000 -.959 
Loss Dummy -.010 -1.871* -.008 -1.572 -.009 -1.635 -.008 -1.534 
% Block own .000 .635 .000 .362 .000 .201 .000 .140 
Board Ind Dummy .004 .998 .003 .817 .004 1.272 .003 .929 
Board Meetings .000 .253 .000 .549 .000 .354 .000 .378 
AC % Share own -.001 -1.757* -.001 -2.002** -.001 -1.327 -.001 -1.171 
AC Ave Directorships .010 3.106*** .013 3.393*** .010 2.919*** .011 3.206*** 
AC Size Dummy .003 .429       
AC Meetings Dummy -.014 -2.147**       
AC Ind Dummy -.011 -2.287**       
AC Fin Exp Dummy .022 1.215       
AC Size   .003 1.331     
AC Meetings   -.002 -1.209     
AC % Ind   .000 -1.958**     
AC % Fin Exp   .000 .828     
ACE1     -.010 -2.405***   
ACE2       -.007 -1.927** 
         
F Test 4.915*** 4.842*** 5.132*** 5.038*** 
Adjusted R
2
 .147 .144 .140 .137 
N 691 691 691 691 
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Definitions of variables 
Dependent variable:  earnings quality measured using Francis et al. (2005) model
36
 
Independent variables: Big4 = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit was carried out by a 
Big4 audit firm; Log Delay = the natural logarithm of audit delay; Log Total Assets = the natural 
logarithm of total assets; % Gearing = percentage of total long-term finance represented by long term 
debt; ROA = return on assets; CFO = cash flow from operations; Loss = dummy variable representing the 
firm incurring loss in last two years; % Block Own = percentage of equity owned by the block holders; 
Board Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where boards comprised of majority 
independent directors; Board meetings = the number of meetings held by the board during the year; AC % 
Share own = percentage of equity held by audit committee members; AC Ave Directorships = average 
directorships held by the audit committee members; AC Size dummy = dummy variable indicating 
instances where the audit committee contains three or more members; AC Meetings dummy = dummy 
variable indicating instances where the audit committee held at least three meetings; AC Ind dummy = 
dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committee had solely independent non-executive 
directors; AC Fin Exp dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committees had 
financial expertise; AC Size = number of audit committee members; AC Meetings = Number of audit 
committee meetings held during the year; AC % Ind = Percentage of audit committee members who are 
independent non-executive directors; AC % Fin Exp = Percentage of audit committee members who are 
financial experts; ACE1 = dummy variable representing instances where audit committees comprise at 
least three members, contained at least one financial expert, all members being independent and met at 
least three times during the financial year; ACE2 = dummy variable representing instances where audit 
committees comprise at least three members, contained at least one financial expert, all members being 
independent and met at least three times during the financial year, contains one accounting expert and 
has no member with more than 9 years tenure. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36
 Francis et al., (2005) separates McNichols (2002) measure of earnings management into its discretionary and 
non-discretionary elements. Francis et al., (2005) compute the components of accruals (i.e. both discretionary and 
non-discretionary) by estimating a regression of firms’ innate factors affecting accruals quality. To determine the 
discretionary components of accruals quality, the regression equation will be as follows;  
AQ = α + b1SIZE + b2 LOSS + b3OPCYC + b4ϭCFO + b5ϭREV + et (2)  
The residual from (2) is the estimate of the discretionary component of firm’s accrual quality. 
[where AQ is the accruals quality (absolute value of accruals quality from equation 1); SIZE is the natural log of total 
assets, ; LOSS is the number of years in which a loss was recorded for last three years; OPCYC is the natural log of 
average age of inventory plus the average age of receivables (in days), ϭCFO is the standard deviation of cash flow 
from operation over last five years (scaled by total assets) and ϭREV is the standard deviation of operating revenue 
over the last five years (scaled by total assets.] 
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None of the board variables have shown any impact on earnings management 
practices.    As expected, in model 1 of table 5.8, where the dependent variable is the 
Francis measure of earnings quality the impact of audit committee independence in 
constraining earnings management is higher than the McNichols model and 
statistically significant at five per cent level. This finding suggests that independent 
directors are more concerned about their reputation in the market and hence more 
objective in their monitoring role (Fama and Jenson, 1983). This finding also highlights 
that independent members are much more effective in constraining the intentional 
manipulation of accruals. Audit committee meetings show a negative and significant 
impact on earnings management and the level of significance is recorded at five per 
cent level.  The increased frequency of audit committee meetings signifies the higher 
level of diligence and scrutiny exercised by audit committee members and hence 
resulting in improved earnings quality. The equity ownership of audit committee 
members also has a negative and significant impact on earnings management and 
hence a positive impact on earnings quality. This finding shows that audit committee 
members with a higher level of equity ownership are more likely to perform their role 
in accordance with shareholders’ interests (Jensen, 1993). Beasley (1996) also found a 
negative association between the equity ownership of outside directors and the 
chances of financial statement fraud. Other than these characteristics, the significant 
negative impact of the additional directorships held by audit committees on earnings 
quality suggests that overstretched directors are not very good monitors of the 
financial reporting process and hence result in low earnings quality.  
 
In model 2, when the dummy variables are substituted with the absolute measures of 
the recommended key audit committee characteristics, the negative impact of the 
busyness of audit committee members on earnings quality remains significant in each 
regression. Consistent with the busyness hypothesis this finding suggests that directors 
holding other directorships may be too busy to do their job effectively and hence have 
a negative impact on the firms’ earnings quality. Both the proportion of independent 
audit committee members and the percentage share ownership of audit committee 
members have a negative and statistically significant impact on earnings management.  
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The significance level of both these variables is higher in Francis model as compared to 
McNichols model of earnings management. This suggests that, in the case of the 
Francis model, greater audit committee independence and greater share ownership by 
audit committee members serves to better monitor the quality of financial reporting. 
These variables are significant at the five and ten per cent level of significance 
respectively and these findings are consistent with expectations.  
 
In model 3 and 4 the researcher brings in the composite dummies representing those 
firms adhering to all four recommendations of best practice (ACE1) and those that 
comply with best practice as in ACE1 but, in addition, have no member with longer 
than nine years’ tenure and also has at least one accounting expert (ACE2). In model 3, 
ACE1 has a negative impact at five and one per cent level of significance respectively. 
This finding is consistent with expectations in that it suggests when companies satisfy 
all four of the current recommendations of best practice the extent of earnings 
management is reduced hence the quality of financial statements is better. ACE2, 
although not significant in the McNichols model, has a significant negative impact in 
the Francis model37.  These findings are also interesting in that they identify a 
consistent impact of good governance practice on earnings quality and should serve as 
reassuring to regulators who may interpret this finding as supportive of their 
recommendations.  
 
In summary therefore, the empirical findings reported in table 5.8 find that the key 
ingredients of what regulators perceive as more effective audit committees are 
associated with higher earnings quality. The findings in relation to audit committee 
independence and activity are largely consistent with prior research as Lo et al., (2010); 
Vafeas (2005); Xie et al., (2003); Yang and Krishnan (2005) found a positive association 
between audit committee independence and earnings quality. Similarly Vafeas (2005), 
Koh et al. (2007) and Kent et al. (2010) reported a positive impact of audit committee 
meetings on earnings quality.  This study however failed to find any significant 
                                                          
37
 Two alternative effectiveness variables (ACE3 and ACE4) representing the aggregate count of the ACE1 and ACE2 
variables have a significant negative impact on earnings management suggesting that audit committees that comply 
with the recommended best practice are far more effective in enhancing earnings quality as compared to their 
counterparts. 
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association between the financial expertise and earnings quality as it was documented 
in the prior literature (Lo et al. 2010; Sun et al. 2012). The negative influence on 
earnings management by the audit committee members with an equity stake in their 
companies proves that equity stake of audit committee members makes them more 
effective in their oversight of the financial reporting process. The negative impact of 
holding external directorships on earnings quality confirms the busyness hypothesis, as 
these additional directorships could result in a conflict of interest if directors accept 
too many directorships and focus more on their own interest than on shareholder 
interests (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). 
 
The F-statistics of each model in table 5.8 is significant at one per cent level, suggesting 
that the models are statistically valid. The adjusted R2 for all models ranges between 
13.7 per cent and 14.7 per cent. These values although low are consistent with the 
prior research conducted in this area. Ghosh et al. 2010), Baxter and Cotter (2009) and 
Kent et al., (2010) reported the R2 value as 8.28 per cent, 9.8 per cent and 2.8 per cent 
respectively. The number of observations in each model equal 691.  
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5.4.4 Tests of Robustness 
Similar to the McNichols model of earnings quality this study re-runs the main 
regression models reported in table 5.8, controlling for the clustered adjusted 
standard errors, and examines whether the clustering within firms may have biased 
the estimated standard errors which may have affected the significant levels found for 
the estimated coefficients.  These tests show that the findings reported in the main 
regression analysis specifically in relation to audit committee independence, audit 
committee meetings, audit committee busyness and audit committee effectiveness 
variables hold strong and are not sensitive to this approach.   In addition to this, a 
number of other robustness tests have also been conducted and these are discussed 
below. 
 
Table 5.9 provides a thorough analysis of audit committee expertise, audit committee 
busyness and audit committee tenure variables and extends our understanding of the 
impact of these variables on earnings management. In model 1, the proportion of 
audit committee members with accounting expertise have been included instead of 
broadly defined financial expertise and in model 2 this study includes the proportion of 
members with non-accounting expertise. In models 3 and 4 this study utilises different 
variables representing the extent of holding other directorships by audit committee 
members: the proportion holding one or more additional directorships in model 3 and 
two or more additional directorships in model 4.  In regressions model 5 and 6 this 
study investigates the importance of tenure of audit committee members on earnings 
management by including variables representing the proportion of members with 
excess of nine years’ tenure and the proportion of members with over six years’ tenure.  
 
The proportion of accounting financial experts38 on the audit committee and the 
proportion of non-accounting financial experts have no significant impact on earnings 
management. The proportion of audit committee members with experience of serving 
on other audit committees i.e. governance experts also have no significant impact on 
earnings management practices (un-tabulated). In models 3 and 4 this study 
                                                          
38
 The dummy variable representing audit committees with at least one accounting expert also has no impact on 
earnings quality and the proportion of audit committee members with accounting qualification also has no impact 
on earnings quality. 
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substitutes the average number of additional directorships held by audit committee 
members by variables representing the proportion of audit committee members 
holding one or more other board seats and two or more other board seat respectively. 
In the Francis model, holding one or more other board seats is significant at 1 per cent 
level and holding two or more board seats is significant at 5 per cent. These results 
suggest that audit committee members with other board commitments may not be 
able to monitor the management of earnings with the same level of attention as those 
without other directorships. Consistent with the busyness hypothesis this finding 
suggests that directors holding other directorships may be too busy to do their job 
effectively and hence have a negative impact on the firms’ earnings quality. 
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Table 5.9 (Francis et al., 2005): OLS regressions explaining the determinants of earnings quality for FTSE 350 companies between 2007 and 
2010 (***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
 AC Expertise Variations AC Busyness Variations AC Tenure Variations 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
(Constant) .183 3.935*** .186 4.003*** .168 3.329*** .154 3.065*** .159 3.139*** .161 3.156*** 
Big4 -.008 -.972 -.007 -.931 -.007 -.877 -.005 -.602 -.007 -.870 -.007 -.923 
Log Delay -.015 -.914 -.015 -.937 -.016 -.981 -.013 -.804 -.012 -.737 -.012 -.736 
Log Total Assets -.007 -2.091** -.008 -2.131** -.008 -2.185** -.007 -1.959* -.009 -2.477* -.009 -2.525** 
% Gearing .000 .985 .000 .971 .000 1.078 .000 .727 .000 .723 .000 .738 
ROA .000 .855 .000 .860 .000 .690 .000 .878 .000 .537 .000 .555 
CFO .000 -.977 .000 -.979 .000 -.728 .000 -.875 .000 -.772 .000 -.794 
Loss Dummy -.010 -1.840* -.009 -1.784* -.010 -1.828* -.010 -1.889* -.009 -1.727* -.009 -1.720* 
% Block own .000 .498 .000 .476 .000 .586 .000 .566 .000 .589 .000 .595 
Board Ind Dummy .004 1.004 .004 .991 .003 .908 .004 1.106 .001 .283 .001 .273 
Board Meetings .000 .259 .000 .232 .000 .289 .000 .365 .000 .290 .000 .258 
AC % Share own -.001 -1.729* -.001 -1.784* -.001 -1.721* -.001 -1.810* -.001 -1.496 -.001 -1.409 
AC Ave Directorships .010 3.141*** .011 3.189***     .011 3.202*** .011 3.161*** 
AC Size Dummy .005 .771 .004 .666 .002 .271 .002 .315 .006 .966 .006 1.010 
AC Meetings Dummy -.014 -2.155** -.014 -2.160** -.013 -1.960** -.014 -2.117** -.015 -2.241** -.015 -2.266** 
AC Ind Dummy -.012 -2.299** -.012 -2.324** -.013 -2.520** -.011 -2.207**     
AC Fin Exp Dummy     .021 1.171 .024 1.351 .023. 1.256 .023 1.279 
AC % Acc Exp .000 .258           
AC % non acc exp   .000 .352         
AC % Adddirs1plus     .000 3.030***       
AC % Adddirs2plus       .000 2.066**     
AC % Tenure 9         000 .652   
AC % Tenure 6           .000 .311 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
F Test 4.857*** 4.859*** 4.896*** 4.698*** 4.720*** 4.706*** 
Adjusted R
2
 .145 .145 .146 .140 .140 .140 
N 691 691 691 691 691 691 
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Definitions of variables 
Dependent variable:  earnings quality measured using Francis et al. (2005) model
39
 
Independent variables: Big4 = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit was carried out by a Big4 audit firm; Log Delay = the natural logarithm of audit delay; 
Log Total Assets = the natural logarithm of total assets; % Gearing = percentage of total long-term finance represented by long term debt; ROA = return on assets; CFO = 
cash flow from operations; Loss = dummy variable representing the firm incurring loss in last two years; % Block Own = percentage of equity owned by the block holders; 
Board Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where boards comprised of majority independent directors; Board meetings = the number of meetings held by the 
board during the year; AC % Share own = percentage of equity held by audit committee members; AC Ave Directorships = average directorships held by the audit committee 
members; AC Size dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committee contains three or more members; AC Meetings dummy = dummy variable 
indicating instances where the audit committee held at least three meetings; AC Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committee had solely 
independent non-executive directors; AC Fin Exp dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit committees had financial expertise; AC % Acc Exp =  
Percentage of audit committee members who are accounting experts; AC % Non Acc Exp =  percentage of audit committee members who are non-accounting experts; AC % 
Gov Exp =  percentage of audit committee members who served on the audit committee of another FTSE listed company at the same time; AC % Addir1plus =  percentage of 
audit committee members with at least one additional directorship; AC % Addir2plus =  percentage of audit committee members with at least two additional directorships;  
AC % Tenure 9 = percentage of audit committee members who have served on company board for more than 9 years; AC % Tenure 6 =  percentage of audit committee 
members who have served on company board for more than 6 years. 
 
                                                          
39
 Francis et al., (2005) separates McNichols (2002) measure of earnings management into its discretionary and non-discretionary elements. Francis et al., (2005) compute the components of 
accruals (i.e. both discretionary and non-discretionary) by estimating a regression of firms’ innate factors affecting accruals quality. To determine the discretionary components of accruals 
quality, the regression equation will be as follows;  
AQ = α + b1SIZE + b2 LOSS + b3OPCYC + b4ϭCFO + b5ϭREV + et (2)  
The residual from (2) is the estimate of the discretionary component of firm’s accrual quality. 
[where AQ is the accruals quality (absolute value of accruals quality from equation 1); SIZE is the natural log of total assets, ; LOSS is the number of years in which a loss was recorded for last 
three years; OPCYC is the natural log of average age of inventory plus the average age of receivables (in days), ϭCFO is the standard deviation of cash flow from operation over last five years 
(scaled by total assets) and ϭREV is the standard deviation of operating revenue over the last five years (scaled by total assets.] 
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The regression results presented in table 5.9 provide some interesting additions to our 
understanding of the impact of a variety of audit committee expertise and holding of 
multiple directorships on earnings quality in a contemporary setting.  First, these 
findings highlight the apparent absence of a link between accounting experts (either as 
a continuous or dummy variable) and earnings management. This result does not 
support the prior evidence of the positive impact of accounting financial expertise on 
earnings quality (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008). Second, findings in relation to the 
holding of additional directorships by the audit committee members show that these 
members are unable to pay adequate attention to the quality of financial statements 
and hence result in a high earnings management and low earnings quality. This finding 
shows that these additional directorships could result in a conflict of interest if 
directors accept too many directorships and focus more on their own interest than on 
shareholder interests. 
 
It should also be noted that in regression models 1 to 6 the dummy variable 
representing audit committees holding at least three meetings per year has a negative 
and statistically significant impact on earnings management. The frequency of audit 
committee meetings signifies the level of diligence and scrutiny exercised by the audit 
committee members and hence resulting in improved earnings quality. It is also worth 
noting that the dummy variable representing those audit committees that are 
comprised only of independent non-executives also has a significant negative impact 
on earnings management, suggesting that completely independent audit committees 
are more effective in restraining earnings management. The finding is consistent with 
the prior research (Vafeas, 2005; Yang and Krishnan, 2005) and suggests that 
independent directors are more concerned about their reputation in the market and 
hence more objective in their monitoring role (Fama and Jenson, 1983).  The 
regressions also show that the ownership level of audit committee members has a 
negative impact on earnings management, again suggesting that audit committee 
members with an equity stake in the company may be more diligent in their 
monitoring of the financial reporting process.  However the insignificant finding in 
relation to the tenure of audit committee members is somewhat surprising as Vafeas 
(2003) argues that longer board service might compromise audit committee directors’ 
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independence by bringing directors and management closer resulting in directors 
‘befriending’ management. However this study has failed to find any significant impact 
of longer tenure on the quality of earnings. 
 
The rest of the regression results for each model are mainly consistent. From the 
control variables, firm size represented by the log of total assets has a significant and 
negative impact on earnings management. This finding shows that bigger firms can 
afford to have better internal control mechanisms and these improved mechanisms 
hence result a better quality of earnings.  The firms experiencing loss also have a 
negative and significant association with earnings management. None of the board 
variables have shown any impact on the earnings management practices. The F-
statistics of each model are significant at one per cent level, suggesting that the 
models are statistically valid. The adjusted R2 value for all models ranges between 13.6 
per cent and 14.6 per cent. The number of observations in each table are 691. 
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The study also splits the sample into two parts based on the median of total assets as 
proxy of size and runs separate regressions for larger and smaller firms. Appendix D 
represents larger and smaller firms respectively. While analysing large firms, firm size 
in terms of total assets is negative and significantly associated with earnings 
management suggesting that larger firms have more resources to invest to enhance 
their internal control mechanisms and this in turn results in a better financial reporting 
quality. In line with prior research, the proportion of audit committee independent 
directors has a negative and significant impact on earnings management. The 
frequency of audit committee meetings also has a negative and significant impact on 
earnings management and hence a positive impact on earnings quality. The profound 
impact of independent and more diligent audit committees in constraining earnings 
management practices is largely consistent with prior research as Lo et al., (2010); 
Vafeas (2005); Xie et al., (2003); Yang and Krishnan (2005) found a positive association 
between audit committee independence and earnings quality. Similarly Vafeas (2005), 
Koh et al. (2007) and Kent et al. (2010) reported a positive impact of audit committee 
meetings on earnings quality. While analysing small firms, firms experiencing loss are 
negatively associated with earnings management. Audit committee average 
directorships are positively associated with earnings management. Consistent with 
busyness hypothesis this finding suggests that directors holding other directorships 
may be too busy to do their job effectively and hence have a negative impact on the 
firms’ earnings quality. None of the other audit committee characteristic has any 
significant impact on earnings management practices in smaller firms.  
 
F-statistics for each model suggest that the models are statistically valid. The adjusted 
R2 value stands at 15.9 per cent and 20.5 per cent respectively. The skewness and 
kurtosis values presented earlier in the chapter indicate that some of the variables 
were transformed using natural logarithm in order to satisfy the normality assumption 
for these variables. An analysis of residuals and Q-Q plot is also conducted to test for 
homoscedasticity and linearity. Although the correlation values of the variables 
included in each of the regression model were at an acceptable level, for all 
regressions this study calculates the variance inflation factors (VIF) and in all cases 
these were significantly less than 10 (generally seen as the level of concern).   
215 
 
Table 5.10: Summary of Hypotheses – Earnings Quality 
 
Hypotheses Findings 
 
H2: The number of audit committee members are positively 
associated with earnings quality. 
Not Supported 
H4: The proportion of audit committee members with financial 
expertise is positively associated with earnings quality; 
Not Supported 
H6: The proportion of independent audit committee members are 
positively associated with audit quality; 
 Supported 
H8: The frequency of audit committee meetings is positively 
associated with earnings quality; 
Supported 
H10: The proportion of audit committee members with longer 
tenure is negatively associated with earnings quality; 
Not Supported 
H12: The proportion of equity held by audit committee members 
is positively associated with earnings quality. 
 Supported 
H14: The busyness of the audit committee is negatively 
associated with earnings quality; 
Supported 
H16: The presence of an effective audit committee is positively 
associated with earnings quality; 
Supported 
 
 
5.5 Summary  
This chapter investigates the impact of various audit committee characteristics on 
earnings quality represented by McNichols (2002) and Francis et al., (2005) models. 
The chapter begins by presenting the descriptive statistics; firstly for the whole sample 
and then an analysis of these statistics on a yearly basis and industry level.  The mean 
(median) values of McNichols and Francis are .049 (.036) and .045 (.033) respectively 
illustrating a very minute difference between the two models. These results suggest 
that a majority of accruals estimation errors are linked to intentional or discretionary 
part of accruals estimation equation. The analysis also reveals a continuous increase 
and a large scale adherence to various UK Corporate Governance Code requirements 
in relation to audit committee size, independence, meetings and expertise level.  71.3 
per cent of audit committees in the sample satisfy all four of the recommended 
characteristics and the average audit committee in the sample scores 3.66 points out 
of a maximum of 4.  The univariate analyses show that there is no significant difference 
in the earnings quality of firms that are larger in size to those that are smaller in size. 
However, the univariate analyses highlight a substantial difference in the mean and 
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mean rank values of audit committee variables for both the larger and smaller firms. 
The analysis suggests that on average audit committee size, number of meetings and 
percentage independence is significantly higher in those firms that are larger in size as 
compared to those that are smaller in size. Similarly, the mean and mean rank values 
of companies that have full compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) 
in relation to audit committee size, meetings and independence is significantly higher 
for larger companies than those that are small in size. The above findings highlight that 
larger companies are associated with higher standard of audit committee composition. 
Following on from this, the bivariate correlations shows that audit committees having 
three or more meetings and variables representing audit committee effectiveness 
(ACE1 and ACE3) are significantly negatively correlated with the McNichols measure of 
earnings management.  The results show that audit committees having three or more 
meetings and the dummy for audit committee independence and the audit committee 
effectiveness variables (ACE1 and ACE3) are significantly negatively correlated with the 
Francis measure of earnings management. Audit committee average directorships and 
the proportion of audit committee members with at least one additional directorship 
are significantly positively correlated with the Francis measure of earnings 
management.  Finally, the multivariate regression results are presented in order to 
explain the impact of various audit committee characteristics on earnings quality, 
represented by McNichols (2002) and Francis et al., (2005) models of earnings 
management. In summary, the empirical findings reported highlight broadly consistent 
evidence that audit committees meeting three or more times and fully independent 
audit committees exert a significant positive impact on the quality of reported 
earnings. These findings suggest that independent and more diligent audit committees 
are better able to constrain earnings management practices than their counterparts. 
This study also finds that the level of ownership of audit committee members also 
exerts a positive impact on the quality of reported earnings, highlighting the fact that 
audit committee members with an equity stake in their companies are considered 
more effective in their oversight of the financial reporting process. On the other hand, 
this study finds evidence that the busyness of audit committee members has a 
significant negative impact on the quality of reported earnings.  Consistent with 
busyness hypothesis this finding suggests that directors holding other directorships 
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may be too busy to do their job effectively and hence have a negative impact on the 
firms’ earnings quality.  The study has failed to find other key characteristics of audit 
committees having an impact on the quality of reported earnings, for example size and 
the extent of financial expertise. In spite of this, the study finds composite variables 
(i.e. ACE1, ACE2, ACE3 and ACE4) representing those companies that satisfy all aspects 
of current best practice in terms of audit committee composition and operation, has a 
positive impact on the quality of reported earnings. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 
The past two decades have witnessed a renewed focus on the governance of 
companies, motivated largely by a number of high-profile corporate failures, many 
subsequently found to possess either weak or non-existent governance structures.  
The almost universal response has been the introduction of stronger governance 
recommendations in the hope that these changes will serve both to prevent 
unacceptable behaviour and increase the external transparency of what companies do 
and how they do it.   Audit committees have been identified as a powerful source for 
improvement in corporate governance.  In the UK, Cadbury (1992) argued that 
appropriately structured audit committees have the potential to improve both the 
quality of companies’ financial reporting, as well as ensuring the independence of the 
statutory external audit.  Subsequent governance reports have sought to build on this 
by introducing further refinements focusing on audit committee composition, 
independence and expertise (Smith, 2003; UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010).  
This has resulted, not only in audit committees becoming a ‘comply or explain’ 
obligation for all listed companies in the UK, but also being subject to ongoing scrutiny 
into the potential for certain characteristics to impact corporate decision-making and 
behaviour.   
 
This study firstly sets out to investigate the impact of a range of audit committee 
characteristics on audit fees and non-audit fee ratio by a sample of UK listed 
companies, specifically firms from the FTSE-350.  Secondly, this study investigates the 
impact of selected audit committee characteristics on the quality of reported earnings 
for FTSE-350 companies. This study covers the period 2007 to 2010 and therefore 
offers a contemporary analysis of the influence of audit committee characteristics. This 
study draws on both the established literature on the determinants of audit fees as 
well as the emerging literature on the impact of audit committee governance on audit 
fees. The study investigates the impact of audit committee size, independence, 
diligence, expertise, share ownership and busyness on the financial reporting quality.  
Furthermore, this study utilises alternative measures of both independence and 
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expertise as well as new composite measures of audit committee effectiveness and 
investigate whether it influences financial reporting quality.   
 
The first empirical analysis shows that audit fees in the UK continue to be largely 
determined by client size, complexity, risk, the use of London-based auditors and the 
level of non-audit services simultaneously provided by the auditor.  In terms of audit 
committee characteristics, the findings show that many audit committee 
characteristics have an impact on audit fees.  Specifically, this study finds that most 
aspects of current recommended best practice in respect of audit committee 
governance exert a positive impact on audit fees.  The results show that audit fees are 
influenced by the actual number of meetings as well as having a minimum number of 
meetings (as currently recommended).  This study finds no evidence that audit fees are 
influenced by the degree of independence more so than the existence of fully 
independent committees.  Both the presence of financial experts and the proportion of 
financial experts on the audit committee exert a significant positive impact on audit 
fees.  Investigating expertise further, this study finds no support for the notion that 
accounting expertise influence audit fees, however a significant positive influence on 
audit fees is recorded for the non-accounting financial expertise. The composite 
variables representing those companies that satisfy all aspects of current best practice 
in terms of audit committee composition and operation has a positive correlation with 
audit fees however the level of impact is statistically insignificant. This study also 
investigates the influence of equity ownership, governance expertise and holding of 
additional directorships on audit fees. The study finds that equity ownership has no 
significant impact audit fees however the holding of additional directorships has a 
significant negative impact on audit fees, supporting the busyness hypothesis. The 
governance expertise of audit committee members i.e. the experience of serving on 
another audit committee although positively correlated have no significant impact on 
the audit fees.  
 
The analysis of the impact of audit committee characteristics on the purchase of higher 
non-audit services in relation to audit fees shows that these services are largely 
determined by client financial health and the proportion of equity held by the external 
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block holders. The multivariate analysis in relation to audit committees and auditor 
independence further shows that audit committee members' financial expertise has a 
negative and significant impact on non-audit fee ratio suggesting a strong support of 
members with financial expertise on issues relating to auditor independence. The 
study also documents that audit committee members serving longer on the boards do 
not prefer to purchase high amount of non-audit services from the incumbent auditor.  
This study also records a significant positive impact of the holding of additional 
directorships on the provision of non-audit to audit fee ratio signifying a profound 
support for the busyness hypothesis that argues that overstretched directors are not 
very good monitors of the financial reporting quality.  The composite variables 
representing those companies that satisfy all aspects of current best practice in terms 
of audit committee composition and operation have not shown any significant impact 
on the provision of non-audit fees.   
 
The findings of the second empirical analysis suggest that audit committee 
characteristics do influence the quality of reported earnings. Specifically, this study 
finds broadly consistent evidence that audit committees meeting three or more times 
per year and fully independent audit committees exert a significant positive impact on 
the quality of reported earnings. This study also finds some evidence (depending on 
the earnings model used) that the level of ownership of audit committee members 
also exerts a positive impact on the quality of reported earnings, highlighting the fact 
that audit committee members with an equity stake in their companies are considered 
more effective in their oversight of the financial reporting process. On the other hand, 
this study finds evidence that the busyness of audit committee members (busyness 
defined in terms of the holding of board seats in other companies) has a significant 
negative impact on the quality of reported earnings. This finding is consistent with the 
argument that holding of additional directorships result in a conflict of interest if 
directors accept too many directorships and focus more on their own interests than on 
stakeholder interests (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). The study has failed to find other key 
characteristics of audit committees having an impact on the quality of reported 
earnings, for example size and the extent of financial expertise. In spite of this, the 
study finds composite variables (i.e. ACE1, ACE2, ACE3 and ACE4) representing those 
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companies that satisfy all aspects of current best practice in terms of audit committee 
composition and operation, has a positive impact on the quality of reported earnings. 
 
6.1 Further Research Avenues 
From a public policy perspective these findings should provide comfort to governance 
regulators as the positive impact of a range of audit committee characteristics on the 
quality of external audit and earnings quality could be interpreted as representing 
evidence of better financial reporting quality.  Of course what this analysis cannot 
show is exactly why this positive relationship exists.  Further research could usefully 
explore whether more effective audit committees really encourage more extensive 
audits or whether their presence, and the buffer they represent between company 
management and auditors and management, merely facilitates auditors to do their 
audit as thoroughly as they would wish.  Further questions raised by this study include; 
to what extent do audit committees simply transfer their monitoring responsibilities to 
auditors and the extent to which improved governance characteristics facilitate this? In 
a related vein, it seems rather peculiar that there is growing evidence that financial 
expertise actually leads to more audit work, at least as reflected by higher fees.   It 
could be countered that more effective audit committees should result in less need for 
intensive audits and consequently lower fees.  The findings in this study raise the 
question on what greater expertise actually means in the context of audit committees 
and why does it seem to increase rather than decrease audit fees?  All this suggests 
much more qualitative research needs to be undertaken in order to really understand 
what underlies the relationships being reporting.  Like this study, existing research is 
almost exclusively concerned with the study of audit committees in the context of 
agency theory. As corporate governance is now seen to embody a broad range of 
theoretical paradigms, research in this field should also reflect this. 
 
Expanding future research to analyse audit committees in a wider governance role, 
such as acknowledging their broader social responsibility role and their relevance to 
stakeholders other than shareholders, would tie in better with current expectations of 
governance oriented research as well as the broader user expectations of corporate 
financial reporting.  Governance regulators (Higgs Report 2003; Smith Committee 2003) 
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point out that the performance of board sub-committee members depends as much 
on their individual behaviour and relationships as on recommended guidance (Spira 
and Bender 2004). Turley and Zaman (2007, p. 765) also highlight the importance of 
informal networks of audit committee members by stating that ‘the most significant 
effects of the audit committee on governance outcomes occur outside the formal 
structure and processes’.  
 
More qualitative research methods may also help shed light on concerns raised by 
Spira (1999) regarding the ceremonial role of audit committees, which still seem to 
exist in the post-governance reform period. For example, in a recent qualitative study, 
Fearnley et al., (2011), reporting on the discussions between the chief financial officer, 
audit partners and audit committee on financial statement issues, stated that 41.0% 
did not involve the audit committee and 35.0% did not involve either the audit 
committee or the audit committee chair. These findings appear to indicate that neither 
the audit committee nor the audit committee chair is fully engaged in all aspects of 
financial reporting decision-making.  Examples of research questions where a more 
qualitative approach might be particularly useful include:   How do audit committee 
members decide on the continuation or change of the external auditor?; How do audit 
committee members decide on the balance between audit and non-audit work for 
external auditors, and at what point do they believe independence of the audit might 
be impaired? How are audit and non-audit fee negotiations undertaken between the 
audit committee and the auditor? What factors influence audit committee members in 
deciding the extent and scope of the audit? 
 
6.2 Research Limitations 
There are a number of limitations that need to be considered before the findings of 
this study are generalized. Firstly, due to the ease of data availability the focus of this 
research was on FTSE 350 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. Therefore, the 
implications of generalizing the findings of this study to non FTSE 350 may need to be 
considered. Secondly, this study investigates the impact of audit committees on 
financial reporting quality using a number of audit committee characteristics and 
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various constructs of financial reporting quality40. The process of quantifying these 
constructs also needs to be taken into consideration when generalizing the findings of 
this study. For example, higher audit quality in terms of higher audit fee assumes that 
more expensive and hence more extensive audit consequently results in a better 
quality audit (O’Sullivan, 2000; Abbott et al., 2003; Zaman et al., 2011). Another 
weakness of using this measure is that some of the prior literature also shows that 
lower audit fees could also be associated with a perceived higher audit quality. These 
studies assume that the auditor sees those firms with strong governance systems as 
lower risk firms and therefore reduce the audit effort and consequently their audit fee 
(Tsui et al., 2001; Boo and Sharma, 2008). It is also worth noting that some researchers 
have utilised different proxies to measure audit effort, e.g. Caramanis and Lennox 
(2008) have used audit hours in order to test the effect of audit effort.  However there 
seems to be a strong link between audit hours and audit fees as Deis and Giroux (1996) 
suggest that audit fees and audit hour are significantly related to audit quality. 
Therefore it can be said that more audit hours will lead to higher audit fees and 
consequently result in a higher quality audit.  
 
In the same vein auditor independence is a very elusive and intangible concept and as 
a result the constructs of independence are equally as difficult to find.    The use of non 
audit services fee as a proxy for auditor independence is based on the argument that 
the purchase of non audit services from the incumbent auditor creates reliance and 
dependence on the auditor and hence damages auditor independence. It is argued 
that a higher non-audit to audit fee ratio shortens the distance between the 
management and the auditor which can then impair auditor independence and hence 
results in a lower quality audit (Zaman et al., 2011). However on the other side, several 
studies suggest that the joint provision of audit and non audit services are beneficial in 
many ways and promote auditor independence through economies of scope and by 
providing more economic power to the auditor (Simunic, 1984; Wallman, 1996; 
Goldman and Barlev, 1974).  Although Beattie and Fearnly (2002) argue that there is 
very little support for the view that joint provision of audit and non audit services 
impairs independence, they also agree that joint provision adversely affects the 
                                                          
40
 This study does not consider any of these measures as less or more important than the others. 
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perception of independence; hence the ratio of non-audit fees to audit fees can be 
regarded as a measure of perceived independence of the auditor.  It is therefore 
important to bear in mind the assumptions and limitations of the non audit fee ratio as 
a measure of auditor independence when generalising the findings of this study.  
 
Similarly, the accruals based measure of earnings quality is not the only way to capture 
earnings quality. Prior research has discussed a number of measures to capture 
earnings quality. These have been categorised as those derived from: "(1) the time-
series properties of earnings; (2) selected qualitative characteristics in the FASB's 
Conceptual Framework; (3) the relations among income, cash and accruals; and (4) 
implementation decisions" (Schipper and Vincent 2003, p 99).  Prior research has used 
a number of measures to capture earnings quality i.e. accruals based measures, the 
Penman and Zhang score and transfer pricing manipulations. Within accruals based 
measures there are a number of different accruals based models (e.g. Jones (1991) and 
its variants; Dechow and Dichev (2002) and its variants) to capture any manipulation in 
the reported numbers. This study uses the McNichols (2002) approach and its variant 
the Francis et al., (2005) model to measure earnings quality. Therefore, these points 
should be considered when generalizing the findings of this study.     
 
Finally, this study relies heavily on the information available in annual financial reports 
and on various databases, however the nature of desk research can prohibit an 
understanding of the actual working of the audit committees.  While these limitations 
are acknowledged, they do not detract from the strengths of this research and the 
importance of its findings. The limitations merely provide platforms for future research, 
some of which are discussed in the above section. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A:  OLS regressions explaining the determinants of audit fees for FTSE 350 
companies between 2007 and 2010 (***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:  the natural log of audit fee 
Independent variables: Log Total Assets = the natural logarithm of total assets; Log Subs = the natural 
logarithm of total consolidated subsidiaries; US Subs dummy = dummy variable indicating US subsidiaries; 
Debtors = percentage of total assets represented by debtors; % Stock = percentage of total assets 
represented by stock; Log Delay = the natural logarithm of audit delay; ROA = return on assets; % 
Gearing = percentage of total long-term finance represented by long term debt; Loss = dummy variable 
representing the firm incurring loss in last two years; London = dummy variable representing firms 
audited by a London based auditor; Big4 = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit was 
carried out by a Big4 audit firm; % Block Own = percentage of equity owned by the block holders; % Log 
Non Audit Fee = the natural logarithm of non audit fee; Board Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating 
instances where boards comprised of majority independent directors; Board meetings = the number of 
meetings held by the board during the year; AC % Share own = percentage of equity held by audit 
committee members; AC Ave Directorships = average directorships held by the audit committee 
members; AC Size = number of audit committee members; AC Meetings = Number of audit committee 
meetings held during the year; AC % Ind = Percentage of audit committee members who are independent 
non-executive directors; AC % Fin Exp = Percentage of audit committee members who are financial 
experts. 
 
 Large Firms Small Firms 
Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
Constant 1.317 2.823*** -1.339 -3.092*** 
Log Total Assets .461 13.268*** .648 13.750*** 
Log Subs .161 4.340*** .177 5.393*** 
US Subs Dummy .130 4.138*** .120 4.580*** 
% Debtors .009 7.448*** .005 5.673*** 
% Stock -.003 -3.525*** -.001 -.744 
Log Delay -.118 -.871 .361 3.712*** 
ROA .002 1.700* .003 2.954*** 
% Gearing -.002 -1.458 .000 -.095 
Loss .122 3.045*** -.004 -.115 
London .135 4.929*** .108 4.934*** 
Big 4 -.375 -2.939*** .080 1.800 
% Block own -.002 -2.605*** .001 1.918 
Log Non Audit Fee .088 8.005*** .028 3.341*** 
Board Ind Dummy .100 3.675*** .069 2.942*** 
Board Meetings -.013 -2.968*** -.011 -2.933*** 
AC % Share own .000 .010 -.002 -.912 
AC Ave Directorships -.033 -1.525 -.002 -.124 
AC Size .039 2.843*** -.050 -2.970*** 
 AC Meetings .020 1.972** .053 5.730*** 
AC % Ind .000 .029 .000 -.196 
AC % Fin Exp .001 1.801* .001 3.107*** 
     
F Test 50.994*** 35.389*** 
Adjusted R
2
 .733 .636 
N 496 495 
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Appendix B: OLS and logistic regressions explaining the determinants of non-audit fee ratio 
for FTSE 350 companies between 2007 and 2010 (***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:  the non audit to audit fee ratio 
Independent variables: Log Total Assets = the natural logarithm of total assets; Log Subs = the natural 
logarithm of total consolidated subsidiaries; US Subs dummy = dummy variable indicating US subsidiaries; 
Debtors = percentage of total assets represented by debtors; % Stock = percentage of total assets 
represented by stock; Log Delay = the natural logarithm of audit delay; ROA = return on assets; % 
Gearing = percentage of total long-term finance represented by long term debt; Loss = dummy variable 
representing the firm incurring loss in last two years; London = dummy variable representing firms 
audited by a London based auditor; Big4 = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit was 
carried out by a Big4 audit firm; % Block Own = percentage of equity owned by the block holders; % Log 
Non Audit Fee = the natural logarithm of non audit fee; Board Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating 
instances where boards comprised of majority independent directors; Board meetings = the number of 
meetings held by the board during the year; AC % Share own = percentage of equity held by audit 
committee members; AC Ave Directorships = average directorships held by the audit committee 
members; AC Size = number of audit committee members; AC Meetings = Number of audit committee 
meetings held during the year; AC % Ind = Percentage of audit committee members who are independent 
non-executive directors; AC % Fin Exp = Percentage of audit committee members who are financial 
experts. 
 Large firms Small firms Logit model 
Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef Wald 
Constant 3.450 2.320** -4.044 -1.689* 1.139 .533 
Log Total assets .024 .208 .574 2.114** -.257 1.998 
Log Subs -.076 -.561 -.235 -1.215 -.579 6.016** 
US Subs Dummy -.146 -1.264 -.166 -1.090 -.212 1.264 
ROA -.007 -1.445 -.005 -.844 -.023 8.176*** 
% Gearing -.002 -.485 -.005 -1.054 -.001 .019 
Loss .150 1.003 .245 1.144 .441 3.128* 
London -.019 -.184 -.117 -.881 .012 .005 
Big 4 .646 1.089 .201 .699 .956 3.477* 
% Block own .005 1.741* .005 1.219 .005 .918 
Board Ind Dummy -.050 -.494 .000 -.002 .099 .310 
Board Meetings .019 1.232 .032 1.410 .058 4.558** 
AC % Share own .055 .318 -.007 -.474 -.003 .019 
AC Ave Directorship .112 1.411 .153 1.347 .375 7.132*** 
AC Size .023 .090 -.183 -.929 .158 1.570 
 AC Meetings -.314 -.929 -.138 -.689 -.075 1.091 
AC % Ind  -.418 -1.985** -.035 -.193 -.003 .195 
AC % Fin Exp -2.794 -2.998*** .400 .820 -.215 4.472** 
       
Industry Dummies Included  Included  Included  
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
F Test 2.173*** 1.404* 75.315*** 
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2
 .055 .020 .076 
N 481 467 948 
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Appendix C : OLS regressions examining the determinants of earnings quality for FTSE 350 
companies between 2007 – 2010 (***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:  earnings quality measured using McNichols (2002) model 
Independent variables: Big4 = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit was carried out by a 
Big4 audit firm; Log Delay = the natural logarithm of audit delay; Log Total Assets = the natural 
logarithm of total assets; % Gearing = percentage of total long-term finance represented by long term 
debt; ROA = return on assets; CFO = cash flow from operations; Loss = dummy variable representing the 
firm incurring loss in last two years; % Block Own = percentage of equity owned by the block holders; 
Board Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where boards comprised of majority 
independent directors; Board meetings = the number of meetings held by the board during the year; AC % 
Share own = percentage of equity held by audit committee members; AC Ave Directorships = average 
directorships held by the audit committee members; AC Size = number of audit committee members; AC 
Meetings = Number of audit committee meetings held during the year; AC % Ind = Percentage of audit 
committee members who are independent non-executive directors; AC % Fin Exp = Percentage of audit 
committee members who are financial experts. 
 
 Large firms Small firms 
Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
(Constant) .350 3.881*** .063 .545 
Big4 -.006 -.289 -.002 -.186 
Log Delay -.009 -.312 -.008 -.348 
Log Total Assets -.022 -2.975*** .003 .221 
% Gearing .000 -1.953* .000 1.077 
ROA .000 .874 .000 -.460 
CFO .000 1.162 .000 .023 
Loss  -.007 -.866 -.018 -2.014** 
% block own .000 -.182 .000 -.054 
Board Ind Dummy .003 .502 .008 1.338 
Board Meetings .001 .829 .002 1.886* 
AC % share own -.004 -.275 -.001 -.716 
AC Ave Directorships .004 .794 .009 1.559 
AC Size  .003 .205 .006 .783 
 AC Meetings -.048 -2.889*** -.017 -2.145** 
AC % Ind -.010 -1.018 -.007 -1.021 
AC % Fin Exp    -.006 -.306 
     
Industry Dummies Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included 
F Test 2.533*** 2.946*** 
Adjusted R
2
 .115 .146 
N 346 345 
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Appendix D: OLS regressions examining the determinants of earnings quality for FTSE 350 
companies between 2007 – 2010 (***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:  earnings quality measured using Francis et al. (2005) model 
Independent variables: Big4 = dummy variable indicating instances where the audit was carried out by a 
Big4 audit firm; Log Delay = the natural logarithm of audit delay; Log Total Assets = the natural 
logarithm of total assets; % Gearing = percentage of total long-term finance represented by long term 
debt; ROA = return on assets; CFO = cash flow from operations; Loss = dummy variable representing the 
firm incurring loss in last two years; % Block Own = percentage of equity owned by the block holders; 
Board Ind dummy = dummy variable indicating instances where boards comprised of majority 
independent directors; Board meetings = the number of meetings held by the board during the year; AC % 
Share own = percentage of equity held by audit committee members; AC Ave Directorships = average 
directorships held by the audit committee members; AC Size = number of audit committee members; AC 
Meetings = Number of audit committee meetings held during the year; AC % Ind = Percentage of audit 
committee members who are independent non-executive directors; AC % Fin Exp = Percentage of audit 
committee members who are financial experts. 
 
 Large Firms Small Firms 
Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
(Constant) .458 5.493*** .015 .142 
Big4 .002 .114 -.007 -.801 
Log Delay -.030 -1.108 .003 .139 
Log Total Assets -.028 -4.128*** .005 .430 
% Gearing .000 -.707 .000 .926 
ROA .000 1.444 .000 -.040 
CFO .000 .002 .000 -.653 
Loss -.005 -.650 -.019 -2.380** 
% Block own .000 -.692 .000 .480 
Board Ind Dummy .002 .391 .000 -.083 
Board Meetings .000 -.398 .002 1.856* 
AC % Share own -.008 -.690 -.001 -1.349 
AC Ave Directorships .007 1.554 .010 1.942** 
AC Size  -.004 -.357 .008 1.152 
 AC Meetings -.042 -2.619*** -.010 -1.318 
AC % Ind -.021 -2.344** -.006 -.883 
AC % Fin Exp .002 .393 .008 .413 
     
Industry Dummies Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included 
F Test 3.237*** 4.050*** 
Adjusted R
2
 .159 .205 
N 346 345 
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